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Abstract 
 
The apparent increase in market concentration and vertical integration in the Indonesian 
crude palm oil (CPO) industry has led to concerns about the presence of market power.  
For the Indonesian CPO industry, such concerns attract more attention because of the 
importance of this sector to the Indonesian economy.  CPO is used as the main raw 
material for cooking oil (which is an essential commodity in Indonesia) and it contributes 
significantly to export earnings and employment. However, dominant producers argue 
that the increase in economies of scale and scope lead to an increase in the efficiency, 
which eventually will be beneficial for the end consumers and export earnings.  This 
research seeks to examine whether the dominant producers do behave competitively and 
pass the efficiency gains to the end consumers, or they enhance inefficiency through 
market power instead. 
 
In order to identify the most suitable model to measure market power in the Indonesian 
CPO industry, different market power models are explored.  These models can be divided 
into static and dynamic models. In general, all of them accept the price–cost margins as a 
measure of market power.  However, static models fail to reveal the dynamic behaviour 
that determines market power; hence the dynamic models are likely to be more 
appropriate to modelling market power.  Among these dynamic models, the adjustment 
model with a linear quadratic specification is considered to be a more appropriate model 
to measure market power in the Indonesian CPO industry.  
 
In the Indonesian CPO industry, producers can be divided into three groups, namely the 
public estates, private companies and smallholders. However, based on their ability to 
influence market price, smallholders are not considered as one of the dominant groups. 
By using the adjustment cost model, the market power of the dominant groups is 
estimated. The model is estimated using a Bayesian technique annual data spanning 
1968–2003.  The public estates and private companies are assumed to engage in a non-
cooperative game.  They are assumed to use Markovian strategies, which permit firms to 
respond to changes in the state vector.  In this case, the vector comprises the firms and 
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their rivals’ previous action, implying that firms respond to changes in their rivals’ 
previous action.  
 
The key contribution of this thesis is the relaxation of the symmetry assumption in the 
estimation process. Although the existence of an asymmetric condition often complicates 
the estimation process, the different characteristics of the public estates and private 
companies lead to a need for relaxing such an assumption.  In addition, the adjustment 
system—which can be seen as a type of reaction function—is not restricted to have 
downward slopes.  Negative reaction functions are commonly assumed for a quantity 
setting game.  However, the reverse may occur in particular circumstances.  Without such 
restrictions, the analysis could reveal the type of interaction between the public estates 
and private companies.  In addition, it provides insights into empirical examples of 
conditions that might lead to the positive reaction function.  Furthermore, the analysis 
adds to the understanding of the impact of positive reaction functions to avoid the 
complicated estimation of the asymmetric case.   
 
As expected, the public estates act as the leader, while the private companies are the 
follower. Interestingly, results indicate that as well as the private companies, public 
estates do exert some degree of market power.  Moreover, the public estates enjoy even 
higher market power than the private companies, as indicated by market power indices of 
-0.46 and -0.72, respectively. The exertion of market power by both the public estates and 
the private companies cast some doubts about the effectiveness of some current policies 
in the Indonesian CPO industry.   With market power, the underlying assumption of a 
perfectly competitive market condition—that serves as the basis for the government 
interventions—is no longer applicable.  Hence, many government interventions are 
unlikely to have the desired effect.   
 
The Indonesian competition law that has been imposed since 1999 might be effective in 
preventing firms to sign collusive contracts. In fact, even without such an agreement, 
firms in the CPO industry are likely to exert some degree of market power. As an 
alternative, eliminating the ‘sources’ of market power might be a better solution.  If the 
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public estates have the aim of maximising welfare, privatisation might improve their 
efficiency, hence they have ability to suppress the private companies’ market power.  
However, if in fact, the public estates deliberately reduce output to gain higher profit, 
privatisation might increase the degree of market power of both groups of companies 
even further. In such a condition, addressing the long term barriers of entry stemming 
from the requirement of high investment might be a better alternative to address the 
market power problem in the CPO industry. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
In recent decades, the problem of market distortion in the Indonesian crude palm oil 
(CPO) industry has been widely discussed. The issue is a source of public concern 
because CPO has been an important contributor to the Indonesian economy for at least 
three reasons. Firstly, cooking oil, an end product of the CPO industry, is an essential 
commodity in Indonesia. As an essential commodity, the fluctuations in cooking oil 
prices appear to influence not only economic stability in Indonesia, but also political 
stability. Secondly, the industry is a major contributor to Indonesia’s exports. In 2002, 
palm oil exports grew by 93 per cent, which was the highest rate among all sectors 
contributing to export revenue (Indonesian Bureau of Statistics 2003). This has been the 
case both in periods of strong economic growth and during the economic crisis  of 1997–
1998 (Susila 2003). Finally, the CPO industry is a significant employer, which is 
important given Indonesia’s large population. It is estimated that in 2002, 1.2 million 
people worked in the Indonesian palm oil production and processing industries, and that 
around 5.5 million people were being supported by this industry (Barlow et al. 2003, p. 
9).   
 
The CPO industry has been the focus of many acts of government intervention. The main 
purpose of these interventions has been to ensure that the cooking oil price remains 
stable, either by subsidising CPO and cooking oil prices, or by imposing CPO export 
taxes. However, these policies are not always effective.  Although Indonesia is arguably 
known as the most cost efficient CPO producer in the world, the cooking oil price in the 
domestic market is often higher than that of in the international market’s. Theoretically, 
efficient producers can sell their output at a low price. If producers are vertically 
integrated with the downstream industry, lower prices will be transmitted to the final 
output. However, such assumptions hold only when producers behave competitively. If 
the CPO producer exerts some degree of market power, prices will remain above the 
marginal cost of production. As a result, low production costs will not be followed by 
low market prices, nor will low intermediate output prices be transmitted to the final 
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output prices. Arifin (2002) suggests that both government interventions and CPO 
producers’ non-competitive behaviour might explain the distortions in the CPO market. 
While studies such as Larson (1996), Marks et al.(1998) and Hasan (2000) have 
scrutinised the impact of the government interventions, to date no study appears to have 
been addressed the impact of the CPO producers’ behaviour on the market.   
 
In Indonesia, CPO producers can be divided into three groups: public estates, the private 
companies and the smallholders. Before 1986, public estates were the dominant group in 
the Indonesian CPO market. Triggered by the 1986–1996 distribution of concessionary 
credits, in 2003, private companies and smallholders gradually increased their share, 
reaching 50 per cent and 40 per cent of the market, respectively (Indonesian Bureau of 
Statistics 2004). The public estates and private companies tend to be more integrated with 
both the upstream industry (such as the seed gardens) and the downstream industry (such 
as the cooking oil refineries). In contrast, smallholders do not possess such facilities. 
They also suffer from diseconomies of scale and are lack of joint marketing associations. 
Hence, although the total size of smallholders has reached 40 per cent of the market 
share, this group is not considered as one of the dominant groups in the industry.  
 
A number of economists believe that this change in structure might allow the dominant 
producers to control market price, and hence exercise market power (Basri 1998; 
Pasaribu 1998; Rachbini 1998; Arifin 2001; Competition Indonesia 2001; Arifin 2002; 
Widjojo 2004; Syachrudin 2005). In 2001, the Indonesian Commission for the 
Supervision of Business Competition (2001) indicated that one of the largest and most 
vertically integrated firms in the palm oil industry might exercise market power, yet 
failed to provide empirical evidence to support this claim. In fact, high market shares and 
vertical integrations might increase firms’ efficiency rather than market power. For this 
reason, empirical analysis is essential to an examination of market power. A likely 
complication is that market power, although well-defined, is not always easy to be 
measured. These concerns constitute the motivation for this research to model and 
measure market power in the Indonesian palm oil industry.   
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1.1 Basic research questions 
 
Despite the importance of the CPO industry for Indonesia, and concerns over the 
presence of market power, to the author’s best knowledge, to date no study has been 
taken to investigate market power in this industry. This research is designed to fill the 
void by modelling and measuring market power in this industry. Specifically, the 
following research questions are addressed: 
 
• What is the most appropriate model to analyse and measure market power in the 
Indonesian CPO industry? 
• Do the dominant players in the Indonesian CPO industry exercise market power? 
• If these players do exert market power, does market power vary among them?  
• What is the type of interaction between the players? 
• What factors do affect the type of interaction between the players? 
• What are the policy implications of the research findings? 
 
The answers to the questions will provide useful information for promoting competition 
in the Indonesian CPO industry. Loughlin et al. (1999, p. 26) suggest that the 
understanding of competition issues among policy makers in Indonesia is often narrowed 
to market concentration or conglomerates, while in fact, competition is a more complex 
issue.  A descriptive or statistical analysis that is often employed appears inadequately to 
prove whether producers in an industry behaved competitively or exercised some degree 
of market power. In contrast, a model could provide a measurement that reveals the 
behaviour of the producers, even that emerge from a non-cooperative mechanism.  
Although competition laws might not be able to address such tacit collusion, the evidence 
is useful for the policy makers in addressing the market power problems.  Despite the fact 
that the competition issue in Indonesia has been widely examined from a legal 
perspective—especially after the introduction of the competition law—no market power 
model has been introduced as a tool to measure market power.  The proposed analytical 
framework of this thesis is expected to give insights for modelling and measuring market 
power in the CPO industry.  
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1.2 Objectives of the study 
 
Based on the previous research questions, the aims of this study are: 
 
• To understand the relevant features of the Indonesian CPO industry in developing 
a framework for the theoretical and empirical model;     
 
• To explore various market power models and to determine the most suitable 
model for the Indonesian CPO industry;   
 
• To develop an empirical model to estimate the type of interaction and the degree 
of market power held by the dominant players, and to analyse possible factors that 
might explain the results; and 
 
• To use the estimation results to assess the effectiveness of current government 
policies and to propose some alternative policies that might prevent the abuse of 
market power and increase social welfare.  
 
 
1.3 Methods and data 
 
The study employs a dynamic duopoly model to measure the market power of dominant 
players in the Indonesian CPO industry. Specifically, an adjustment cost model with a 
linear quadratic specification is considered mostly appropriate to capture the important 
features of the industry. In particular, the long maturation period and an extended 
economic life in the CPO production pattern induce the substantial adjustment costs 
associated with changing the level of production.  
 
In this dynamic duopoly model, the reaction functions of the players are modelled 
through an adjustment system. In a static model, the slope of a reaction function is 
interpreted as conjectural variations, which show how a firm’s (or group of firms’) 
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conjecture about its rivals’ reactions causes the firm to change its own actions. The 
conjectural variation values are also interpreted as the market power index. In contrast, in 
this dynamic model, the slope of a reaction function is the actual response rather than the 
conjecture of the response. The market power index is not directly inferred from but is 
calculated using the value of the slope. The index nests all possible behaviours, from 
perfectly competitive to perfectly collusive. 
 
In order to capture the specific characteristics of each duopolist, the symmetry 
assumption—that is common in the previous studies—is relaxed. With a symmetry 
assumption, the responses of both firms will be identical. Therefore, it can only show 
whether the firms interact cooperatively or non-cooperatively. Without the assumption of 
symmetry, the slope of a firm’s reaction function will show the firm-specific response. 
Hence, a more complex pattern of interdependence will be revealed (Gollop and Roberts 
1979). The relationship between the firms’ degrees of market power and the type of 
interaction between the firms provides insights into possible sources of the market power.  
 
The linear quadratic specification is useful as it allows the estimation of the market power 
index without using any cost data.  Ideally, firm-level data would provide the best 
information about market power in the industry. However, firm-level data are 
insufficient, and therefore group data are used as an alternative.   
 
 
1.4 Organisation of the study 
 
A plethora of approaches to modelling market power are reported in the literature, 
focusing on different aspects of the problem and using different frameworks. In order to 
identify the most suitable model to the Indonesian CPO industry, the main features of the 
industry are explored in Chapter 2. This chapter explains the reasons behind setting the 
public estates and private companies groups as the dominant players in the industry. The 
different characteristics of these groups are discussed, highlighting the requirement of an 
asymmetric duopoly model. In addition, the existence of an intertemporal link is also 
presented.  
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In Chapter 3, various models of market power are explored. In comparing these models, 
the chapter focuses on the main factor that determines market power in an oligopolistic 
(duopolistic) market, which is the ability of oligopolists (duopolists) to respond to their 
rivals’ actions. These models are divided into models using the structure–conduct–
performance approach and the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach. 
The structure–conduct–performance approach includes various static models, while the 
NEIO approach includes both static and dynamic models. In addition, the NEIO static 
models are grouped into the comparative and conjectural variations models, while the 
NEIO dynamic models are grouped into the repeated-game and the state-space game 
models. The assumptions employed in each model are discussed to determine the 
appropriateness of its application in certain cases.   
 
Chapter 4 explores the theoretical and empirical models in greater details. The theoretical 
model provides the foundation of the state-space game framework. Three different 
strategies—the open-loop, closed-loop and Markovian strategies—widely used in 
previous studies are discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the Lagrangean 
multiplier and dynamic programming as the tools for obtaining the optimal solution. The 
empirical model presents the adjustment cost model with a linear quadratic specification. 
The relevance of this model for the CPO industry and the importance of its specification 
for market power estimation are discussed. The reasons for relaxing the symmetry 
assumption in the Indonesian CPO industry case are highlighted. The model is estimated 
using a Bayesian technique in order to impose the stability, convexity and market power 
properties of the model.  In the last section of Chapter 4, the estimation procedure is 
presented.   
 
The model is estimated by using annual data for the period of 1968–2003. The estimation 
results are presented in Chapter 5. Firstly, the results of the demand equation and the 
adjustment system are presented. The results from the adjustment system provide insights 
into the impact of positive reaction functions in avoiding the complicated estimation of 
the asymmetric case. Secondly, given these estimates, the adjustment cost parameter and 
market power index are calculated. The Monte Carlo numerical integration results are 
examined, including a possible explanation of the rejection of the stability, convexity and 
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market power index properties. This is followed by a discussion of the accuracy of the 
estimation. Finally, the type of interaction and the degree of market power exerted by the 
dominant groups are detailed.  
 
Based on these findings, several policy implications of the analysis are considered in 
Chapter 6. The effectiveness of the subsidy and export tax policies is examined. The role 
of the public estates and the effectiveness of Law No.5/1999 as an instrument to suppress 
market power in this industry are also discussed. Then, some possible alternative policies 
to address the market power problem are provided. Limitations of the study are outlined, 
leading to some avenues for further research. Finally, a number of concluding comments 
are made. 
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Chapter 2  
The Indonesian Crude Palm Oil Industry 
 
The structure of the Indonesian crude palm oil (CPO) industry has undergone a number 
of significant changes since the first large-scale establishment of an oil palm plantation in 
1911. The public estates’ share of production is decreasing, overtaken by a group of  
private companies (Directorate General of Plantation 2004), and vertical integration 
among oil palm plantations, crude palm oil millers and cooking oil refineries is increasing  
(BIRO 1999). Also, the regulatory environment in this industry appears to be moving 
towards free trade, by reducing the palm oil export taxes (Tomich and Mawardi 1995, 
cited in Sugiyanto 2002, pp. 18-19).  
 
On one hand, these changes may increase cost efficiency, as they increase economies of 
scale and scope, which in turn may benefit consumers through lower output prices. Noor 
et al. (2004) show that the cost of production index of fresh fruit bunches (FFB)—that is 
the output from the oil palm trees—steadily decreases from 100 to less than 80 with an 
increase in estate size from less than 100 ha to 3,500 ha.  Similarly, the cost of processing 
index of CPO steadily decreases from 100 to 80 with an increase in CPO mill capacity 
from less than 20 tonnes of FFB/ hour to more than 50 tonnes of FFB/ hour.  They show 
that, in general, non-integrated mills are more costly than their integrated counterparts. In 
addition, vertical integration between the oil palm estates and CPO mills allows the CPO 
mills to operate without interruption, which further increases the mills’ efficiency.  On 
the other hand, the increase in market share and vertical integration of large private 
companies in this industry might also provide them with an ability to control market 
prices and exercise market power (Basri 1998; Pasaribu 1998; Rachbini 1998; Arifin 
2001; Competition Indonesia 2001; Arifin 2002; Widjojo 2004; Syachrudin 2005). 
However, these allegations could not be supported by evidence.  
 
This research seeks out to model and measure market power in the Indonesian palm oil 
industry. The main features of the Indonesian palm oil industry are explored in this 
chapter. In section 2.1, the importance of the Indonesian palm oil industry is discussed. In 
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section 2.2, the main features of the industry are described. These features will be useful 
later on in choosing the most appropriate model for the Indonesian palm oil industry. In 
section 2.3, possible factors that can lead to market power are examined. Finally, some 
concluding comments are presented in section 2.4.  
 
 
2.1 The importance of the Indonesian crude palm oil industry 
 
The importance of the CPO industry in the Indonesian economy arises from at least three 
conditions. First, CPO is used as the main raw material for cooking oil, which is an 
essential commodity in Indonesia. Demand for cooking oil is strong and has gradually 
been increasing as Indonesia’s population growth and purchasing power increased 
(Amiruddin et al. 2005). Population increased from 150 million in 1980 to 217 million in 
2003, and the real gross domestic product volume index (2000=100) almost tripled from 
40 in 1980 to 114 in 2003 (International Financial Statistics 2006). Overall, cooking oil 
consumption per capita has significantly increased from 0.08 litre per capita in 1980 to 
0.19 litre in 2003, resulting in an increase in CPO demand (2000=100) from the cooking 
oil refineries from 14.7 millions Rupiah in 1980 to 29.4 millions Rupiah in 2003 
(Indonesian Bureau of Statistics various issues-a)  as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1    CPO real demand from the cooking oil industry, 1980–2003 
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Source: Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia in Suharyono (1996); CIC  (2004). 
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Second, CPO is one of the main contributors to Indonesia’s export revenue. From 1979 to 
1987, the government limited CPO exports to ensure an adequate supply for the domestic 
cooking oil industry. Since 1988, when CPO production increased sharply, this restriction 
was no longer necessary and exports started to grow again. From 1995 to 2002, on 
average, more than half of the total CPO production was exported (see Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2    Indonesian production and export of CPO, 1995–2002  
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Source: Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (various issues-b). 
 
The volume of CPO exports declined only during the economic crisis of 1997–1998, 
resulting from the imposition of the export ban and high export tax. During the economic 
crisis, the Rupiah–U.S dollar exchange rate significantly decreased, and selling in the 
international market became more profitable than selling domestically. CPO exports 
increased sharply, leading to a significant reduction in domestic supply. Coupled with the 
annual increase in domestic demand during New Year, Ramadhan and Eid Fitr (Muslim 
festive seasons), this led to a significant increase in the domestic price. To address this, 
the Indonesian government banned CPO exports from the end of December 1997 to 
March 1998.  However, as the export ban significantly decreased national income and led 
to smuggling, in July 1998, the government lifted the ban and replaced it with an export 
tax of 60 per cent (Marks et al. 1998, pp. 53-54).  Despite the decline in the volume of 
CPO exports, along with a significant increase in the CPO world price, the revenue from 
CPO exports during the economic crisis 1997–1998 was higher than the revenue before 
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and after the crisis. As the second largest CPO producer in the world, the decrease in 
Indonesia’s volume of exports during the export ban and high export tax significantly 
increased the CPO world price. When domestic prices returned to their pre-crisis level, 
the government gradually reduced the export tax. CPO exports rose and reached a 71 per 
cent share of total production in 2002. With a growth rate of 93 per cent, the CPO 
industry recorded the highest growth in export revenues among all the contributing 
sectors (see Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3    Growth of palm oil exports, 1981–2002 
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Source:  Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (various issues-b). 
 
Third, the industry employs a large number of workers. This is important in Indonesia 
where a high unemployment rate is still a problem, especially since the economic crisis. 
In 2005, there were almost 11 million unemployed workers, resulting an unemployment 
rate of 10.26 per cent (Indonesian Bureau of Statistics 2006). In 1994, more than 250 
thousand workers were recorded as permanent workers on the oil palm estates. Six years 
later, the number had almost doubled to more than 450 thousand (Indonesian Bureau of 
Statistics various issues-c). Permanent workers are estimated to comprise one third of 
total workers in the CPO industry. Including casual workers in estates and all workers in 
processing industries, the total number employed is between 1.2 and 2 million people 
(Barlow et al. 2003, p. 9; Goenadi et al. 2005).   
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In summary, the CPO industry plays an important role in the Indonesian economy. It 
affects consumers, the government and producers.  For consumers, palm oil is important 
because it is used as the main raw material for cooking oil. For the government, it 
contributes to significant export earnings and employment.  For producers, it is found to 
be a profitable business, both for large companies and for smallholders. Accordingly, if 
producers in this industry exercise some market power, the impacts can be wide ranging 
and significant. Thus, it is important to analyse the market power issue in this industry.  
 
 
2.2 Features of the industry 
 
2.2.1 The production pattern and homogeneity of the product 
 
The palm oil industry is an industry which produces a huge range of commodities based 
on the fresh fruit bunches (FFB) (output from the oil palm/ Elais guineensis sp. tree). 
Among the various commodities, cooking oil appears to be most important to Indonesian 
economic sector. From 1993 to 2003, on average, the cooking oil industry accounted for 
75 per cent of palm oil usage. The remainder was used in the oleochemical (13 per cent), 
soap (7 per cent) and margarine/shortening (5 per cent) industries (CIC 1994, 1997, 2003, 
2004). This study focuses on the CPO industry as a part of the cooking oil production 
chain. Figure 2.4 illustrates the production chain of cooking oil (shown by the shaded 
area), as a part of the whole palm oil industry. After being harvested, FFB are processed 
in the mills to extract the CPO.  Then, they are further processed in the refineries to 
produce the refined, bleached and deodorised olein, which in its pure form could be sold 
as cooking oil. 
 
The production of FFB is a long term process. The maturation period between initial 
input and first output is about three years. Then, FFB yield gradually increases from eight 
tonnes/ ha/ year to 30 tonnes/ ha/ year at the age of 13.  This peak production continues 
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for about four years, then decreases slowly and remains steady at 16 tonnes/ ha/ year until 
the end of the oil palm tree’s economic life at the age of 25 (see Figure 2.5).  1 
 
 
Figure 2.4    The palm oil industry  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: van Gelder (2004, p. 3).  
 
The mature age comprises three periods: the periods when the oil palm is considered 
young (3–8 years), prime (9–20 years) and old (>20 years). Each period has different 
levels of productivity and oil content. On average, the mature FFB contain 23 per cent 
                                                 
1 With a production cycle that lasts for several years, capital used in the CPO production process can be 
seen as a quasi-fixed input. For such an input, it is more expensive to make changes quickly, hence they are 
spread over time (Perloff et al. 2005 chapter 7, p.3).This shows that the existence of quasi-fixed inputs in a 
production process induces the existence of non-linear adjustment costs (van Gelder 2004). 
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CPO, but this depends on when the FFB are harvested. To gain the maximum oil 
possible, FFB need to be picked at the right level of ripeness. However, the ripeness level 
changes quickly. Unless the FFB are processed within 24 hours of harvesting, the amount 
of free fatty acid (FFA) will quickly increase. The FFA reacts to oxygen and causes the 
oil to develop a rancid taste, thus damaging the CPO quality (van Gelder 2004, pp. 4-5).   
 
Figure 2.5    The production stages of the oil palm tree  
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Source: Marihat and Plantation Research Centre cited in CIC (2004, p. 22). 
 
 
Generally, CPO has a single standard quality and price in both domestic and international 
markets. The standard specifies FFA content of  less than 5 per cent, moisture and 
impurity levels less than 0.5 per cent, and an iodine value of less than 51 per cent 
(Alibaba.com 2006). Hence, it would be reasonable to treat CPO as homogeneous 
product. 
 
Another factor that determines palm oil productivity is soil condition. Initially most of the 
Indonesian oil palm plantations were located in Sumatra Island, because these areas have 
land highly suitable for oil palm trees. In 1984, 324,883 hectares of oil palm plantations 
had been established in Sumatra. Two decades later, the oil palm plantation area in 
Sumatra had increased more than sevenfold to 2,423,341 hectares (see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1    Geographical distribution of oil palm plantations 
1984 2003 
Island 
ha per cent ha per cent 
Sumatra 324,883 95.41 2,423,341 82.91
Java 2,661 0.78 14,702 0.50
Kalimantan 11,244 3.30 391,840 13.41
Sulawesi 1,160 0.34 93,002 3.18
Others 563 0.17 n.a n.a
Total 340,511 100 2,922,885 100
Source: Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (various issues-e). 
 
Oil palm plantations on Sumatra were found to be more profitable than those in other 
islands because they yielded higher production at a minimum cost. Moreover, the 
infrastructure and services that were needed for the plantation establishment were already 
developed. However, as land became more limited in Sumatra, the plantation 
establishment was extended to other lands, especially those more suited to oil palm 
production, such as Kalimantan and Sulawesi. From 1984 to 2003 the oil palm plantation 
area in Kalimantan and Sulawesi islands had increased more than 30 (from 11,244 
hectares in 1984 to 391,840 hectares in 2003) and 90 times (from 1,160 hectares in 1984 
to 93,002 hectares in 2003), respectively. Given land suitability and low labour costs, in 
1997, Indonesia was recorded as the most cost efficient CPO industry in the world. The 
cost of production was 14.3 per cent lower than the world average and 8.3 per cent lower 
than Malaysia’s, which is the largest palm oil producer in the world (see Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2    Comparison of CPO production costs, 1997 
US$ per tonne 
Colombia 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Indonesia Malaysia Nigeria 
World 
Average 
Establishment 71.2 69.5 64.3 60.7 224.5 72.1 
Cultivation 91.2 136.1 72.5 75.7 113.7 79.3 
Harvesting/transport 78.9 33.8 40.2 45.1 90.7 47.3 
Milling costs 106.1 105.3 82.6 98.3 130.7 96.6 
Kernel milling 6.9 7.7 7.2 7.6 8.2 7.5 
Total 354.3 352.4 266.8 287.4 567.8 302.8 
Source: PT Purimas Sasmita 1998 cited in Casson (2000, p. 15). 
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2.2.2 The strategic groups 
 
In Indonesia, three different groups of CPO producers can be identified: the public 
estates, private companies and smallholders groups. The public estates group comprises 
10 public estates with a single Joint Marketing Office.  Hence, it is assumed that all of 
these estates act strategically as a coordinated group. The private companies are 
dominated by 10 conglomerates (Casson 2000). Unlike the public estate, they do not have 
a single marketing office.  However, together with the public estates, these conglomerates 
are the members of the Indonesian Palm Oil Producers Association.  The existence of 
such an association allows the members to homogenise their perceptions of both the 
market state and other firms’ information (Clarke, 1983).  Therefore, the private 
companies are also assumed to act strategically as a coordinated group.     
 
The public estates and private companies are usually organised on traditional lines from 
president director to local supervisors. Most possess good infrastructure and operate 
estates with size more than the minimum efficient scale. On average, the size of an 
individual  public or private estate is approximately 10,000–25,000 ha, and is usually a 
part of a larger group whose estates ranging from 100,000 to 600,000 ha (Casson 2000). 
Both public estates and private companies appear to be highly vertically integrated, from 
the seed gardens to the cooking oil refineries. They have good access to capital markets, 
new technologies and information. However, public estates tend to be more bureaucratic, 
less adaptable to change and consequently less efficient (Barlow et al. 2003, pp. 10-13; 
van Gelder 2004, pp. 31-45; LONSUM 2005).  
 
Smallholders appear to have a different organisation from that of the public estates and 
private companies. In general, they tend to have a lack of technical knowledge, for 
example many of them could not distinguish poor and good seeds and periodically 
purchase the low yielding seedlings.  Others plant without terracing or following the 
appropriate fertilizer applications. This leads the smallholders to produce crops of low 
yield and quality.  While on average, the private companies and public estates could 
produce 20 and 15 tonnes per ha, respectively, smallholders could only produce 10 
tonnes per ha (Barlow et al. 2003; Zen et al. 2003).  
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Smallholders can be divided into supported and independent growers. On average, the 
size of supported smallholders’ individual plantations can be less than five ha, while that 
of the independent ones is less than 20 ha. Without sufficient economies of scale, 
smallholders are unable to operate their own CPO mills or other essential facilities, and 
do not have access to capital market to obtain credit for planting. Supported growers are 
integrated with public estates or private companies, with whom they often have verbal or 
written contract to sell their products. In contrast, independent growers cultivate their oil 
palm crops without any assistance and sell their Fresh Fruit Bunches either directly to 
local mills or through service providers. However, both the supported and independent 
smallholders often have problems in selling their products, especially in determining the 
quality and price of their products.    
 
The quality of Fresh Fruit Bunches is mainly determined by their oil content or CPO 
rendement. Problems in determining the quality of their products stem from several 
factors.  First, given a lack of knowledge to choose good seedlings and to apply the 
appropriate technique of production, many of smallholders produced Fresh Fruit Bunches 
with low level of oil content. Second, the rendement is not the same among each of the 
smallholders’ products. Third, most of smallholders do not have enough knowledge to 
measure the rendement of the oil palm.  
 
Similarly, problems in determining the price of their products arise from several factors.  
First, while market prices fluctuate in daily bases, prices offered to smallholders are 
calculated based on the 2-week average prices, hence current market prices are not 
always the same as prices received by the smallholders.  This gives incentives for 
supported smallholders to break their agreement with the public estates or private 
companies and sell their products to other millers that offer higher price. Second, with no 
processing facilities and given the perishability of the Fresh Fruit Bunches, smallholders 
appear to have low bargaining power and often have to accept prices offered by the 
buyers (Susila 2004).  Accordingly, in 1993, during the peak season, hundreds of tonnes 
of Fruit Fresh Bunches produced by the smallholders were spoiled as they were not 
processed within 24 hours.  Capacities of the CPO mills were less than the Fresh Fruit 
Bunches production and they give priority to process Fruit Fresh Bunches produced by 
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their integrated estates rather than that of the smallholders. However, after the 
implementation of Otonomi Daerah (Local Authority) in 2001, many independent CPO 
mills—which were not supported by oil palm estates—were established with permits 
from the kabupaten (regional) authorisation. In fact, such mills help smallholders to avoid 
delays in processing their Fresh Fruit Bunches production. Some of them even finally 
sign agreements to integrate with the independent smallholders.  
 
Smallholders do not have any joint marketing associations, and have areas less than 200 
ha, smallholders are not listed as members of the Indonesian Palm Oil producers 
Association. In 2001, the government helped smallholders to establish their own 
association called Indonesian Association of Palm Oil Farmers (Assosiasi Petani Kelapa 
Sawit Indonesia/ APKASINDO).  It accommodated some of the smallholders’ inspiration, 
but this association still has not dealt with any marketing arrangement, hence 
smallholders do not act strategically.  Together with the perishable characteristic of the 
Fresh Fruit Bunches and lack of processing facilities, smallholders appear to be price 
takers. Therefore, although the total size of smallholders’ production has reached 40 per 
cent of the market share, we could argue that they are effectively a (high-cost) 
competitive fringe. Hence, this group is not considered as one of the strategic groups in 
the industry.  
 
 
2.2.3 Government intervention 
 
There has been a high degree of interference in the palm oil industry by the Indonesian 
government, including domestic market obligations, export taxes, subsidies, and 
plantation size limitations. The domestic market obligations and export taxes policies 
were imposed when the CPO international price significantly increased, giving incentives 
for the producers to increase their export, while there was a lack of CPO supply in the 
domestic market. As a result, the CPO domestic price increased, as did the cooking oil 
domestic price.   
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When this price remained high, say for a month, the government required CPO producers 
to distribute a certain amount of their production at a certain price to meet all domestic 
consumption. During 1984–1990, the public estates group was still the largest CPO 
producer. With adequate production from the public estates, the domestic market 
obligation policy was likely to be effective in increasing the domestic supply to meet all 
domestic consumption (see Figure 2.6).  
 
Figure 2.6    CPO production and palm cooking oil consumption, 1984–1990 
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Source: Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (2004); Oil World in KPB (various issues). 
 
 
Since 1996, private companies have replaced the public estates’ role as the main CPO 
producer. The public estates’ share was no longer sufficient to cover all of the domestic 
consumption and needed some contribution from private companies’ production (see 
Figure 2.7), whereas in fact, the domestic market obligations policy does not apply to 
private companies producers, as the government has no authority to control their sales. 
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Figure 2.7    Development of the public and private estates production and the palm cooking oil 
consumption, 1996–2002 
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Source:  Directorate General of Plantation, Department of Agriculture (2004) and CIC (2003). 
                
 
During this period, various schemes were still used to directly control the market 
distribution of CPO produced by the public estates. Table 2.3 shows the changes in the 
CPO distribution system determined by government policies. Each of the policies 
appeared to hold for a brief period, indicating that the DMO policy was no longer 
effective to stabilise the domestic price.  For example, initially the CPO and cooking oil 
distributions were monopolised by BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistik or the Government 
Logistic Institution). In May 1998, the monopoly right was replaced by the State Joint 
Marketing Office (Kantor Pemasaran Bersama) and a state distribution company PT 
Dharma Niaga. But only two months later, BULOG was directed again to be involved in 
the state distribution of CPO, and the Indonesian Distribution Cooperative (Koperasi 
Distribusi Indonesia) replaced PT Dharma Niaga.   
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Table 2.3    Changes in the CPO Distribution System in 1998 and 1999 
April 1998 State-owned plantation companies were told to supply their entire CPO 
production to the three government-owned refineries (which were supported by 12 
additional refineries owned by smaller private producers), as opposed to 12 
private refineries. Cooking oil produced by these refineries would be distributed 
by BULOG and other state-owned distribution companies to ensure price 
stabilisation in the market.  Distribution of cooking oil processed by the private 
sector was independent of this system. 
25 May 
1998 
The new Habibie government signed a Ministerial decree which revoked the 
exclusive rights given to private companies to process CPO produced by state-
owned plantation firms. 
27 May 
1998 
BULOG was stripped of its role to distribute CPO in the domestic market and the 
Government made the State Joint Marketing Office (Kantor Pemasaran Bersama, 
KPB) and the state distribution company PT Dharma Niaga responsible for 
ensuring the supply of cooking oil around the country. Under the new scheme, 
KPB would buy all the cooking oil from the Association of Indonesian Cooking 
Oil Industries (AIMMI) and sell it directly to market retail cooperatives 
(Inkoppas) in the city at a subsidised price. 
July 1998 The government directed PT Dharma Niaga to sell olein at a subsidised price to 
the cooperatives, which were supposed to channel the cooking oil directly to retail 
consumers. 
July 1998 The government instructed the KPB to buy 176,850 tonnes of palm olein from 
private companies at international prices. The palm oil would be sold domestically 
at a subsidised price. This move was made as an effort to curb smuggling. 
July 1998 State plantation companies were ordered to sell their CPO to private refineries and 
BULOG was directed to buy it and sell it at a subsidised price. PT Dharma Niaga 
was then removed from the distribution chain. 
7 Sept 
1998 
The government handed over the task of distributing cooking oil produced by 
state-owned refineries to the Indonesian Distribution Cooperative (Koperasi 
Distribusi Indonesia, KDI), with BULOG’s assistance until the end of 1998. 
June 1999 The government lifted the monopoly granted to KDI to distribute cooking oil from 
state-owned companies in the domestic market. 
Source: Casson (2000, p. 28).                 
 
 
As an alternative, export taxes were used to limit exports, especially those from the 
private producers.  Table 2.4 shows how the government applied CPO export taxes in 
response to the domestic cooking oil demand conditions.  
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Table 2.4    Indonesian CPO export ban and export tax 
Date CPO export tax/ban (per cent) 
31 August 1994 10–12  
4 July 1997 2–5  
17 December 1997 40  
24 December 1997 Export ban 
7 July 1998 60 
29 January 1999 40 
3 June 1999 30 
2 July 1999 10 
12 September 2000 5  
February 2001 3 
Source: Department of Treasury (2000) in Arisman (2002, pp. 80-81); van Gelder (2004, p. 2). 
 
Higher export taxes are expected to limit CPO exports, thus leaving adequate supply for 
the domestic market. By increasing CPO supply to the domestic cooking oil refineries, 
policy makers expected a decrease in CPO prices, and in cooking oil prices. In fact, 
increasing export taxes could only be justified for developing downstream industries that 
used CPO as their main input, but not for decreasing the final output price (Arifin 2007).  
 
Table 2.4 indicates that this policy appeared to be reactive rather than long run strategic 
actions; the government admitted that the CPO export taxes policy was a short run policy, 
and was only temporarily imposed to stabilise the domestic price. Although export taxes 
did temporarily decrease the cooking oil wholesale prices, it was unlikely to stabilise the 
domestic cooking oil prices. The domestic cooking oil price still significantly increased, 
especially during New Year and Muslim festive seasons, indicating the failure of the 
market distribution to meet the market clearing level, or the gain from the low price CPO 
is not fully transmitted to the end consumers.   The tax did discourage foreign investors 
and affected the competitiveness of the Indonesian palm oil industry.  The export taxes 
that decreased the CPO supply to the international market appeared to lead to even higher 
increase in the CPO international price.  Moreover, it harmed the oil palm estates—
especially that of the smallholders that did not possess any CPO mills—as the price of 
Fresh Fruit Bunches was also determined by the level of export taxes (Mark et al. 1998; 
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Casson 2000, p.10; Hasan et al. 2001). As a result, CPO domestic supply was still low 
and its price was high. 
 
Both the DMO and export tax policies can be seen as government interventions that 
would indirectly influence the CPO and cooking oil domestic prices, as the price 
determination was still left to the market mechanism. Since they were unlikely to 
effectively decrease neither the CPO nor the cooking oil prices, the government imposed 
CPO and cooking oil price subsidies as an alternative policy.  Subsidies were given when 
the domestic market price significantly increased as the demand increased during festive 
seasons.  However, similar to the other policies, subsidies were not aimed at improving 
the market structure, but more as a response to the public demand for affordable cooking 
oil.   
 
In this case, the amount of subsidy was understood as the difference between market 
prices with and without the government intervention, which could either be determined in 
absolute value or in percentage.  For example, once market prices increased up to 
Rp8,500-Rp11,000 (about AUS$1.2 to 1.5) per litre, the government gave subsidies 
Rp2,500 per litre (Tempo 2007). At another time, the government reduced to 5 per cent 
(from 10 per cent) the cooking oil selling tax or the private companies cut their selling 
price by 30 per cent (Depkomfindo 2007).  Although subsidies from the government 
appeared lower than those from the private companies, they were often available for a 
longer period.  The government subsidies could be in effect for up to 4 months, 
depending on the market price and the government financial conditions (Bisnis Indonesia 
2007). While CPO domestic prices are often compared to the international prices—as 
most of them are sold in the world market—cooking oil domestic prices are rarely related 
to the international ones because they are mainly produced for domestic consumption.  
CPO subsidy was distributed to the cooking oil refineries, while the cooking oil subsidy 
was either indirectly distributed to the end consumer through the retail distributor, or 
directly distributed to a target group—people that were considered poor—through market 
operations arranged by the public estates or private companies (Republika 2007). The 
source of the government’s subsidy expenditure was CPO export tax earnings or 
government budget (Indonesia 2007; Indonesian Department of Finance 2007; Pikiran 
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Rakyat 2007).  Therefore, while subsidies might increase the consumer welfare, they 
could also decrease the aggregate welfare. Most, if not all of the subsidy policies, which 
decrease market price, intend to help end consumers to meet their daily needs rather than 
to reach the competitive market condition.  
 
The purpose of the plantation limitation policy was to reduce market concentration, and 
to prevent the dominance of a few groups of companies in the private sector. The size 
limitation varied across provinces, ranging from 20,000 ha to 100,000 ha. However, these 
groups still continued to acquire more land by establishing new companies (Casson 2000, 
pp. 12-13; van Gelder 2004, p. 28). From 1990 to 1996, the number of oil palm estates 
significantly increased from 226 to 555 units (see Figure 2.8). However, this did not 
reflect a more competitive industry because hundreds of new oil palm plantation 
companies were still controlled by only 18 Indonesian and 16 foreign business groups 
(van Gelder 2004, pp. 18,19,32).  
 
Figure 2.8    Growth in the number of plantations, 1990–2000 
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Source:  Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (various issues-d). 
              Note: Data for 1993 not available. 
 
In summary, the Indonesian CPO industry is characterised by several main features:  
 
(a) CPO has a single standard quality and market price, and thus can be seen as a 
homogeneous product; 
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(b) As a perennial crop, CPO has a long maturation period and economic life.  Given 
this pattern, capital used in CPO production can be considered as a quasi-fixed 
input.  ‘The average cost of changing the level of quasi-fixed input increases with 
the size of the changing period’  (Perloff et al. 2005 chapter 7, p.3). This indicates 
the existence of an intertemporal link and substantial adjustment costs in the CPO 
process; 
(c) Indonesia’s CPO producers can be divided into three groups, namely the 
government, private companies and smallholders. However, due to the absence of 
economies of size, skills and facilities, smallholders are unlikely to have an ability 
to influence market price. Hence, only the public estates and the private 
companies are considered as the dominant groups in this industry; and 
(d) As an important sector, the CPO industry has been the subject of considerable 
government interference. The main purpose of these policies was to ensure that 
CPO and cooking oil domestic prices remained low. In addition, they also aimed 
to reduce the market concentration and the dominancy of a few companies in the 
private sector.  However, these policies were not always effective. 
 
  
 
2.3 Possible sources of market power 
 
2.3.1 The requirement of high investment and market share 
 
Oil palm plantations require a significant initial investment; Potter and Lee (1998) 
estimate that US$ 2,500–3,500 per ha is needed to establish a new plantation and another 
US$ 5 million to build a CPO mill (cited in van Gelder 2004, p. 22). Due to the lack of 
funds partly caused by economic crisis, plantation expansions were not always followed 
by the establishment of new mills, thus the growth in mills was not enough to meet the 
sharp increase in FFB production. Consequently, at least one million tonnes of FFB were 
wasted in 2003 due to the lack of milling capacity (van Gelder 2004, p. 28).  Most of the 
wasted FFB were probably produced by smallholders, who did not own the mills.  
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Given the long maturation period, the high investment requirement, and the perishability 
of FFB, developing palm oil plantations is considered a risky business. To reduce the 
investment risk and encourage CPO producers to increase their production, the 
government supported these producers with concessionary credits. Private investors could 
obtain concessionary credits at an interest rate of 11 per cent during land preparation and 
establishment and 14 per cent after the trees yielded, when the annual bank interest 
during that time was around 16–23 per cent. Hence, the concessionary credits gave 
significant benefit to the investors.  
 
On average, each private company borrowed about 77 per cent of the total establishment 
cost of its plantation (Casson 2000). As a result, the private companies’ plantation area 
increased rapidly, growing more than seven-fold, from just 143,603 ha in 1985 to 
1,083,823 ha in 1996 (Directorate General of Plantation 2004). At the end of the 
concessionary credit period, on average, the size of individual private estates was 
approximately 10,000–25,000 ha, and they were mostly part of a larger estates group, 
ranging from 100,000 to 600,000 ha (Wakker 2004, p. 10). Ignoring other facilities 
owned by the integrated firms, this means that the more recent entrants needed at least 
US$250 million to US$2.1 billion of investment to compete with the incumbents. This 
amount will be much greater if other facilities such as CPO mills or cooking oil refineries 
are also taken into account.   
 
Concessionary credits for smallholders were distributed in projects called Perkebunan 
Inti Rakyat. Credits were ‘received’ by the public estates and private companies, and 
were used for expenditure during land preparation, establishment and the maturation 
period. As smallholders did not have sufficient skills and facilities for running CPO 
businesses, the public or private estates acted as ‘supervisors’, providing them with 
managerial and technical expertise to reduce the probability of failure.   During this 
period, the land was still controlled by the public estates and private companies. After 
three to four years, when the trees had reached maturity, the plots were transferred to the 
smallholders. FFB produced by the smallholders would be purchased, processed into 
CPO and sold by the public estates and private companies (Zen et al. 2005). With this 
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credit, the smallholders’ plantation area increased more than six-fold, from just 118,564 
ha in 1985 to 738,887 ha in 1996 (Directorate General of Plantation 2004). 
 
This concessionary credit led to changes in the share of oil palm plantation ownership. 
Figure 2.9 shows that the share of each group by area remained steady until 1985, before 
the credits were distributed. Thereafter, the share of both private companies and 
smallholders gradually increased, while that of the public estates decreased. When the 
credits were first distributed in 1986, the public estates still accounted for 54.8 per cent of 
the total oil palm area, but at the end of the credits, they had only a 19 per cent share. In 
contrast, the private companies’ share increased sharply from 23.8 per cent in 1986 to 
48.2 per cent in 1996, and that of smallholders from 21.4 per cent in 1986 to 32.8 per cent 
in 1996 (Indonesian Bureau of Statistics 2004).  
 
Figure 2.9    The Indonesian oil palm plantation share by area, 1967–2003 
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Source: Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (2004).  
 
Following the development of oil palm estates, CPO mills also grew from 82 units at a 
total capacity of 3,366 tonnes FFB per hour in 1990, to 179 units at a capacity of 6,596 
tonnes per hour in 1995. These mills belonged to the public estates, foreign private 
companies and domestic private companies. Initially, the public estates had the largest 
share, but the domestic private companies gradually increased their capacity and reached 
almost the same share in 2003 (see Table 2.5).   
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Table 2.5    Growth in the number and capacity of CPO processing plants, 1990–2003  
Description Year Public estates 
Foreign 
private 
Domestic 
private 
Total 
  1990 11 5 20 36 
Companies 1993 13 5 55 73 
(unit) 1995 13 5 76 94 
  2003 13 37 50 
  1990 45 16 21 82 
Plant 1993 72 16 67 155 
(unit) 1995 69 20 90 179 
  2003 n.a 20 90 n.a 
  1990 1,816 793 757 3366 
Capacity 1993 2,423 793 2,415 5631 
(tonnes FFB/hour) 1995 2,993 587 3,016 6596 
  2003 3,003 587 3000 6590 
Source:  Directorate General of Estates in CIC (1994; 1997). 
 
Similar conditions emerged in the downstream industry of cooking oil production. 
Although the refineries seemed to move towards a more competitive condition, with each 
brand in the palm cooking oil market having a share of less than 16 per cent, large 
companies often produced more than one brand. The concentration of the four largest 
groups (CR4) still accounted for 64.2 per cent in 1996 and only slightly less (58.1 per 
cent) in 2004 (see Table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6    Market share of the dominant cooking oil producer groups, 1996–2004 
Dominant Groups 1996a) 1999b) 2002c) 2004c) 
Prajona Nelayan/Wilmar 25.4 19.9 16.3 10.7 
Musim Mas 15.3 20.4 10.9 11.8 
Salim 12.5 n.a n.a n.a 
Sinar Mas 11.1 11.6 15.5 7.9 
Raja Garuda Mas n.a n.a n.a 27.7 
Hasil Karsa n.a 12.6 14.1 n.a 
CR4 64.2 64.5 56.8 58.1 
Sources:  a) AIMMI (1996) in Indiarto et al. (1996); 
    b) Asia Pulse Analysts (1999) in van Gelder (2004)  c) CIC (2004). 
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2.3.2 Vertical integration 
 
Traditionally, the main raw material in cooking oil in Indonesia was coconut oil.  Due to 
the limited growth in coconut oil production, this oil could no longer meet the demand 
from the cooking oil industry. As an alternative, cooking oil producers then used palm 
oil, which enjoys higher productivity and lower prices.  Since 1984, palm oil has replaced 
coconut oil as the main raw material for cooking oil. From 1984 to 1990, on average, the 
share of palm oil as a raw material for cooking oil is almost 60 per cent (Joint Marketing 
Office various issues).  From 1996 to 2002, the share of palm oil increased even further, 
almost reached 80 per cent from the total raw material for cooking oil (CIC 2003). Unlike 
CPO, cooking oil could be quickly produced and stored in response to price fluctuations, 
as long as there was a sufficient amount of CPO and refinery capacity. From 1998 to 
2002, the refineries utilised only up to 53.9 per cent of their production capacity (see 
Table 2.7).  
 
Table 2.7    Utilisation of the Indonesian refineries, 1998–2002 
Description unit 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Capacity tonnes 7,855,372 7,855,375 8,200,000 8,200,000 8,200,000 
Production tonnes 2,072,690 2,400,000 3,534,918 3,690,000 4,421,114 
Utilisation per cent 26.4 30.6 43.1 45.0 53.9 
Source:  Department of Industry and Trade (2002). 
 
This under-utilisation condition was set to meet the higher demand during certain 
occasions, such as Ramadhan, Ied-Fitri and New Year. It also provided leeway for the 
integrated CPO producers, either to directly sell the CPO or to process it into cooking oil. 
Since most palm oil demand in international markets is in the CPO form, this also implies 
flexibility for producers to sell the product in the international or domestic markets. 
 
The main factor that determines their sale decision is the price ratio of these two markets. 
Since 1998, international market prices have been higher than domestic ones (see Figure 
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2.10), giving the Indonesian producers an incentive to export more of their production. In 
the international market, CPO competes with various vegetable oils. Before the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the soybean oil produced 
by the United States was highly subsidised and the United States became the dominant 
vegetable oil producer in the world. However, with the implementation of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture in 1995 domestic support for agricultural producers and the 
use of export subsidies in international trade have been progressively reduced (Young 
1994; Hathaway and Ingco 1995; Tanner 1996). In accordance with WTO rules, massive 
subsidies in international trade have been restricted.  This led to a decrease in soybean 
exports and an increase in palm oil exports, as the two oils are close substitutes (Othman 
et al. 1998). 
 
Figure 2.10    Average CPO prices in the domestic and international market, 1997–2004 
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Source: Joint Marketing Office(2004); Oil World (2004). 
 
From 1995 to 2002, the annual demand for palm oil in the international market increased 
from 14,710 tonnes to 24,952 tonnes. This increase enabled palm oil producers—
including Indonesia’s—to increase their exports. If the domestic market share of 
Indonesian producers was significant, providing an option to sell in the world market and 
giving them an ability to influence the domestic market price and exercise market power.   
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In summary, since the distribution of the concessionary credits in 1986-1996, the CPO 
industry appears to be more concentrated and vertically integrated.  This might stem from 
the high investment requirement for establishing new plantations, mills or refineries. 
More recent entrants face even higher costs to enter because concessionary credits are no 
longer available, and hence the incumbents earn persistently higher profits than the 
potential entrant. The increase in market share may provide the incumbents with an 
ability to influence market price.  The incumbents also appear to be more vertically 
integrated—from oil palm plantations to CPO mills and cooking oil refineries—creating 
a further barrier to the new entrants. In addition, having a leeway to sell outputs in both 
the domestic and international markets, the CPO might have more ability to influence the 
domestic market price, hence exert some degree of market power 
 
 
2.4 Concluding comments  
 
The CPO industry is an important sector in the Indonesian economy. The structure of the 
industry has undergone a number of changes, becoming more concentrated and vertically 
integrated. This condition can increase firm efficiency and profit through economies of 
scale, leading to an increase in national income. However, the highly concentrated and 
integrated market creates some barriers for new entrants; while at the same time may 
provide market power for the incumbents.  
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Chapter 3  
Market Power Models: A Review 
 
The previous chapter illustrates that the Indonesian palm oil industry has an oligopolistic 
(duopolistic) market structure. Unlike competitive and monopolistic markets, there is no 
single general model for an oligopolistic (duopolistic) market. Each oligopoly (duopoly) 
model focuses on certain aspects of the case being analysed to answer a particular set of 
the research questions.  Therefore, in order to identify the most suitable model to the 
Indonesian palm oil industry, different models need to be explored.  In comparing these 
models, this chapter will focus on one main feature that needs to be captured in each one 
of them, which is the ability of the oligopolists (duopolists) to respond to their rivals’ 
actions (Gollop and Roberts 1979).  
 
Specifically, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 illustrates the idea of market 
power and its well-known measure, the Lerner index. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 explore 
models that have been developed to measure market power, using the structure–conduct–
performance (SCP) and the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approaches, 
respectively. The first approach is explored in Section 3.2, including related critiques. 
The second approach, covering static and dynamic models, is then discussed in section 
3.3. The static models are grouped into the comparative static and conjectural variations 
models; the discussion is focused more on the conjectural variations models, as they 
appear to have been broadly used in previous studies. The dynamic models cover the 
repeated-game and state-space game models. Each has different assumptions, 
determining the appropriateness of its application to certain cases. Finally, in section 3.4, 
some concluding comments are presented. 
 
 
3.1 Market power 
 
One of the main features of a competitive market is that firms behave as price takers and 
sell their output at prices equal to marginal costs.  In an imperfectly competitive market, 
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firms have the ability to influence price and sell their output at prices above marginal 
costs.  This idea was formalised by Lerner (1934, p. 161) with an index (known as the 
Lerner index)   
p c
L
p
−
≡ , where p  is the output price  and  c  is the marginal production 
cost.  A higher Lerner index is interpreted as a higher degree of market power: This 
interpretation needs to be used with caution, because the price–cost margins that 
determine the index can increase either with an increase in price or a decrease in marginal 
cost. The interpretation will be appropriate if the increase in the Lerner index is triggered 
by an increase in output prices.  If the increase stems from a decrease in marginal costs, a 
higher Lerner index may reflect higher efficiency rather than market power. This 
ambiguity may arise if the observations are derived from single-period equilibria. The 
one-shot game framework of such equilibria precludes both the possibility of new 
entrants to the markets and firms’ consideration of their rivals’ responses. In a multi-
period case, positive price–cost margins will attract new entrants to the markets, or give 
incentives for rivals to increase their output quantity.  If there are no barriers to entry—as 
in competitive markets—this process may continue until prices equal marginal costs 
again in equilibrium.  Therefore, the existence of a positive price–cost margin can only be 
considered as evidence of market power if its occurrence is persistent over time.  
 
Although the Lerner index has been broadly accepted as a good measure of market 
power, most studies do not directly use it because marginal costs are usually difficult to 
determine. As an alternative, many models have been developed in order to measure 
market power.  These models can be divided into the structure–conduct–performance 
(SCP) and the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approaches (Tirole 1988). 
 
 
3.2 Structure–conduct–performance approach 
 
The structure–conduct–performance (SCP) approach, introduced by Mason (1939; 1949), 
suggests that evidence of market power can be concluded from a positive relationship 
between structure and performance. In this approach, market structure variables—
measured by market concentration, product differentiation, vertical integration, or 
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barriers to entry—are treated as exogenous variables. Market performance variables—for 
which rate of return, price–cost margins or Tobin’s q index can be used as proxies—are 
treated as the dependent variable. The structure variable is regressed on the performance 
variable to estimate the market power in the industries. As well as evidence of market 
power, this estimation also provides an explanation of the impact of changes in market 
structures on changes in market performance. Therefore, this model is often used to 
evaluate the impact on market performance of policies that change market structure.  
The SCP approach has been criticised in at least three aspects. First, market structure 
variables are, in fact, not always exogenous. For example, market concentration—as one 
of the market structure variables—may be affected by firms’ efficiency.  Firms with 
higher efficiency will have lower costs, enabling them to sell output at lower prices.  Less 
efficient firms can not do so without facing a loss, forcing them to exit from the market, 
which leads to an increase in market concentration. In this case, the relationship between 
market performance and market structure is the inverse of the idea in the SCP approach, 
that is, the former variable is determined by the latter one (Caves and Porter 1977, p. 241; 
Bresnahan 1989; Delorme et al. 2002, p. 13).  As a result, suggesting that market power 
exists from a positive regression coefficient in such conditions may be misleading.  
Second, both market structure and market performance variables are often difficult to 
measure. In market structure variables, market concentration is widely measured with the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI).  However, this index has been widely criticised for 
its sensitivity to the relevant market definition in both geographical boundaries and 
product homogeneity (Lijesen 2003, p. 123). Product differentiation is also often difficult 
to measure. Data on product differentiation strategies such as advertising, marketing or 
technical change are rarely available. In addition, there is product differentiation that is 
unique to market leaders in the buyers’ perception, which is more difficult to measure. 
Even when in some cases these variables can be measured, their degree of differentiation  
may vary, as some firms may produce a product that is more differentiated than others 
(Rhoades 1985, pp. 344-347). Measuring vertical integration or barriers to entry is often 
problematic due to the lack of transaction costs data and the ambiguous interpretation.  
Economies of scale are not seen as a barrier to entry for the Chicago school because they 
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affect equally the costs of both new and old firms when they have access to the same 
technology.  In contrast, they are treated as a barrier to entry in the classic limit pricing 
model because it is assumed that incumbents will maintain their outputs and thus 
constrain the market available to new entrants (Gilbert 1989, p. 113; Meyer 2004, p. 
328). 
 
 In the market performance variables, the rate of returns is often problematic, as capital 
data are usually reported using accounting rather than economic concepts.  Price–cost 
margins are also difficult to calculate because marginal cost data are rarely available. As 
an alternative, average variable costs are often used as a proxy for marginal costs.  
However, unless the data are derived from a long run equilibrium, average costs may 
differ from marginal costs.  Similarly, measuring replacement costs and expenditures on 
intangible assets (such as advertising and research and development) in the Tobin’s q 
index, is often difficult (Boyer 1996, p. 116; Carlton and Perloff 2005, chapter 8; Perloff 
et al. 2005, chapter 2).  Therefore, the market performance measures may be inaccurate. 
 
Third, the SCP approach assumes that various industries—data from which are used as 
samples in the regression—have the same structure–performance relationships.  In fact, 
each industry may have important idiosyncrasies.  While in a regression analysis, the 
relationship between variables is supposed to be a causal effect between a dependent or 
explained variable and independent or explanatory variable, this needs not necessarily be 
true if data are collected from various industries with different structure and performance 
relationships.  The relationship between variables could be interpreted as only correlation 
or descriptive analysis.  As a consequence, a positive coefficient from such a relationship 
may not necessarily provide evidence of market power (Carlton and Perloff 2005, chapter 
8; Perloff et al. 2005, chapter 2).  
 
In the recent SCP models, the endogeneity problem is addressed by using a simultaneous-
equations technique (Delorme et al. 2002).  Another way is by carefully choosing the 
market—whose structure is set by the government rather than by other variables in the 
system—to avoid the endogeneity problem in the market structure variable (Brown and 
Brown 1998). However, even in these studies, the important idiosyncrasies and 
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performance measures issues have not been considered. Therefore, the results may still be 
implausible. 
 
 
3.3 New empirical industrial organization approach
2
 
 
The weakness of the SCP approach has led to an alternative, namely the new empirical 
industrial organization (NEIO) approach. Perloff et al. (2005) argue that the NEIO 
approach is better than the SCP because models based on the NEIO approach provide 
direct estimation and tests of market power, are supported by clear theories, do not suffer 
from the endogeneity problem, include institutional factors in their analysis and do not 
rely on  symmetry assumptions across industries. The NEIO approach includes both static 
and dynamic models. Basically, they measure market power by the deviation from the 
competitive price-taking behaviour, in which prices equal marginal costs. The deviation 
can be either examined by its movements or in its equilibria.  
 
  
3.3.1 Static models  
 
Static models can be divided into two different groups; namely, comparative static and 
conjectural variations models. Comparative static models employ a long run equilibrium 
assumption to indicate whether markets are in a competitive condition or not. In a 
competitive market, firms sell output at a price equal to marginal costs and produce at 
constant returns to scale.  The two well-known examples of this comparative static model 
are the Hall (1988) test and  Panzar and Rosse (1987) statistics. Hall (1988) determines 
market power by examining the movement of prices and marginal costs, while Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) examine the movement of revenues and input prices. The results of 
these comparative static models provide evidence about the existence but not the degree 
of market power. The conjectural variations models employ the profit-maximisation 
                                                 
2 Some of symbols used in the models are modified from their original version, so that all models have the 
uniform symbols and are easy to compare. 
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condition to obtain a proxy for the Lerner index.  Hence their results show the degree of 
market power of the case in question.   
 
 
Comparative static models 
 
The Hall test is a joint test of price being equal to marginal cost and constant returns to 
scale, in which both conditions are to be consistent with the long run equilibrium 
competitive market. It uses a single reduced form of a marginal cost or supply relation: 
 
Equation 3.1          ( )* * , , ,K Lc c K L w w=  
 
 
where the original marginal cost function is ( ),i i ic c q w=  and the production function is 
( ),i iq q K L= . K  and L  are capital and labour, respectively, and they are assumed to 
exhibit constant returns to scale. w  is a vector of  factor prices that are exogenous to the 
firm. The growth rate of output–capital ratio will be:  
 
Equation 3.2    
t t t
g α η θ∆ = ∆ +  
 
where : 
i
t
i
q K
g
q K
∆ ∆∆ = −  = log iq
K
  ∆  
  
is the rate of growth of the output–capital ratio;  
t
i i
wL
c q
α =  is the share of labour cost to the total cost; 
L K
L K
η ∆ ∆∆ = − = log L
K
  ∆    
is the rate of growth of the labour–capital ratio; and  
θ  is the constant technology.  
 
 
Defining 
t
µ  as the ratio of price and marginal costs, Equation 3.2 can be written as: 
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Equation 3.3     ( )1t t t t t tg α η µ α η θ∆ − ∆ = − ∆ +     
 
When 1
t
µ = , price equals marginal cost and Equation 3.3 is identical with Equation 3.2.  
Therefore, assuming that constant returns to scale exist, the deviation from 1
t
µ =  is used 
to indicate an imperfectly competitive condition. 
 
Another well-known reduced-form model is the Panzar and Rosse (1987)  test. This 
model uses a single reduced-form revenue equation: 
 
Equation 3.4     ( )* * , ,
i i
R R z w t=  
 
 
where the original firm’s revenue is ( )i i iR R q z= and its cost function is ( ), ,i i iC C q w t= , 
w  is a vector of  m  factor prices that are exogenous to the firm, z and t  are factors that 
shift revenue and cost functions, respectively. This test detects the competitive condition 
by examining the movement of revenues and factor prices. When constant returns to scale 
are present, prices equal marginal costs and normal profit 0
i
pi = is observed.  In such 
conditions, a one per cent increase in input prices always results in precisely one per cent 
decrease in firms’ revenue. This is formulated as the Panzar and Rosse statistic:  
 
Equation 3.5     
*
*
*
%
%
i i n
i
n i i
wR R
w w R
ψ ∆ ∂≡ ≡
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∑
∑
 
 
 
whose values  equal one in competitive states. Assuming that constant returns to scale 
exist, the deviation from 1ψ =  is used to indicate an imperfectly competitive condition. 
 
The above explanation illustrates that neither the Hall test nor Panzar and Rosse statistics 
take into account the transition process from short run equilibria to long run equilibria.  
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They assume that constant returns to scale exist in the period being analysed, so that 
prices being equal to marginal costs indicate a perfectly competitive condition. The 
exclusion of adjustment costs means that the demand function has a constant elasticity 
(Hall 2000, p. 2). In fact, such a condition is not established in every period of the real-
world market: Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) found that for 82 percent of 40 industries in US 
tobacco and food manufacturing in the period 1972–1987, the constant returns to scale 
hypothesis was rejected. 
 
Conrad and Unger’s (1987) study of 28 German industries in the period 1960–1981 and 
Millan’s (1999) study of 18 Spanish food industries in the period 1978–1992, also found 
that the existence of the long run equilibrium conditions  was also rejected for most of the 
industries being analysed. In short run equilibrium, firms may exhibit either decreasing or 
increasing returns to scale. In such conditions, both the Hall test and Panzar and Rosse 
statistics can be misleading. The decreasing returns to scale may be caused by the 
existence of high fixed costs in the short run. In such conditions, prices may still equal 
marginal costs even if—in fact— firms suffer a loss. The increasing returns to scale may 
reflect a dynamic convergence towards the long run equilibrium, as increases in output 
may require some adjustment costs. This often appears in the real-world market: Hall 
(2002) found that adjustment costs are statistically significant from zero in US industries 
for the period 1962–1983.  Berstein and Mohnen (1991) found that zero adjustment costs 
were also rejected for Canadian industries in 1962–1983. Adjustment costs associated 
with changes in the quasi-fixed factors cause short run marginal costs to exceed long run 
marginal costs. By excluding the adjustment costs from the model, prices may be greater 
than marginal costs even if—in fact—firms behave competitively.  Hence, the deviation 
of prices from marginal production costs does not reflect market power, but rather 
adjustment towards the long run equilibrium (Berstein 1992)  
 
The results of both the Hall test and Panzar and Rosse statistics do not provide any 
information about the degree of market power in an imperfectly competitive market. 
Other researchers have made attempts to develop these models in order to obtain a degree 
of market power from the tests. For the Hall test,  Shapiro (1987) derived the degree of 
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market power by employing the relationship between the mark-up ratio
t
µ  and a firm’s 
elasticity of demand β : 
 
Equation 3.6     *
1
µβ
µ
=
−
 
 
 
If the industry is monopolised or all firms collude effectively to duplicate the monopoly 
outcome, the monopolist’s demand elasticity will equal the market elasticity β . 
Therefore, he suggested that the ratio of the firm’s and the market elasticities could be 
used to capture the firm’s degree of monopoly power θ : 
 
Equation 3.7     
*
βθ β=  
 
 
However, this measure is only appropriate when the demand function has an exponential 
or Cobb–Douglas form, and the demand elasticities are constant. Using the chain rule of 
the second–order condition of the profit function, Perloff et al.(2005, chapter 3, p.19) 
show changes in prices with respect to changes in marginal costs as: 
 
Equation 3.8     
( )
( ) ( )
'
2 ' "
i i i
p Qdp dp dQ dQ
p
dc dQ dc dc p Q Qp Q
′= = =
+
 
 
 
where p is the inverse demand function, p′  and p′′  are its first and second derivatives, 
the numerator on the right-hand side is the slope of inverse demand and the denominator 
is the slope of the marginal revenue.  If the elasticity of demand is constant, Equation 3.8 
can be rewritten as:  
 
Equation 3.9     
1
i
dp
dc
β
β= −  
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where 0β > , as monopolists operate in the elastic portion of demand curve.  In such 
conditions, the movement of price and marginal cost is merely determined by the demand 
elasticity. In fact, demand functions may have a linear or log-linear form. In a linear 
demand function, price always rises by half the increase in the marginal cost, and in a 
log-linear demand function, price always rises by the same amount as cost, so the results 
show a competitive condition.  In such conditions, the movement of price and marginal 
cost is completely independent of the elasticity of demand. Therefore the ratio of a firm’s 
and the market elasticities cannot be used to represent the firm’s degree of monopoly 
power (Perloff et al. 2005) 
 
For the Panzar and Rosse model, Shaffer (1983) obtained the degree of market power by 
deriving the relationship between the Panzar and Rosse statistic *ψ  and the Lerner index, 
whose indices for an individual firm and for the industry as a whole, respectively, are as 
follows: 
Equation 3.10     ( )
1
1
i
i
L
ψ
=
−
    
 
and  
Equation 3.11        ( )( )
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where:  
i
i
q
s
Q
=  is firm i ’s market share;  
i
i
i
q
q
λ −∂=
∂
 is the change in other firms’ output with respect to the change in firm 
i ’s output; and  
H  is the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of concentration = 2is∑ .  
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However, Lerner indices shown in Equations 3.10 and 3.11 apply only before entry and 
exit occur, and therefore correspond to the short run equilibrium (Shaffer 1983, p. 178) 
which is not consistent with the assumption used in the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model. 
 
Despite such conditions, the Hall test (for example Delipalla and O'Donnell 2001) and 
the Panzar and Rosse statistics (for example,  Fischer and Kamerschen 2003; Matthews et 
al. 2006) are still being used, mainly because they require less data and are easy to 
estimate. However, Panzar and Rosse (1987, p. 455) argue that a rejection of the 
hypothesis * 0
i
ψ ≤  suggested that the observed firms were influenced by the actions of 
others. This interdependency has not been addressed in their model.  Therefore, they 
suggest that if data on equilibrium prices and quantities are available, conjectural 
variations models are likely to yield a sharper test.  
 
 
Conjectural variations models 
 
Conjectural variations, the underlying concept of which was first introduced by Bowley 
(1924), imply that the degree of market power is reflected in a firm’s expectation about 
their rivals’ response to a change in its output.  If a firm has market power, market  
response to a change in its output will be limited, while if a firm has no market power, the 
response will be extensive (Hunnicutt and Weninger 1999, p. 2). Since they not only 
provide evidence of market power (as in other static models), but also provide a measure 
of the degree of market power, Panzar and Rosse (1987, p. 455) suggest that conjectural 
variations models give a sharper result than the comparative static models. In conjectural 
variations models, the market power parameter is derived from the first–order condition  
of a firm’s profit function (Iwata 1974; Appelbaum 1982):  
 
Equation 3.12     ( ) ( ) ( ), , ' ,i i i ip Q z c q w p Q z qθ− =  
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where z  is a vector of exogenous variables that shift the inverse demand and 
i
θ  is the 
i th firm’s conjectural variations elasticity, that is, the  market power parameter.  In the 
Lerner Index form, Equation 3.12 can be rewritten as: 
 
Equation 3.13     i i
i
p c
s
p
θ
ε
−
= −  
 
where 
( )p Q Q
Q p
ε
∂
=
∂
 is the linear demand elasticity and i
i
q
s
Q
=  is firm i ’s market share.  
 
Generally speaking, the 
i
θ  parameter is obtained through solving simultaneously the 
inverse demand and supply relation equations using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
technique. Compared with reduced-form models, structural models provide a more 
rigorous and consistent result.  Moreover, they characterise the underlying economic 
theory, so that an economically meaningful inference can be drawn.  However, structural 
models require a lot of data and are sensitive to misspecification problems.  Incorrect 
specifications lead to biased inferences about market power, while less specific functional 
forms—such as the translog form—substantially reduce the ability of these models to 
determine market power.   
 
In some functional forms, such as the linear and log-linear forms, initially conjectural 
variations models cannot even identify the market power index (Hyde and Perloff 1995). 
Bresnahan (1982) successfully addressed this problem by including an interactive 
exogenous variable in the demand function, which is capable of both shifting the 
intercept and changing the slope of the demand function.  Without any interactive 
exogenous variable, an example of a linear demand function can be written as follows: 
 
Equation 3.14       0 1 2Q p zα α α ε= + + +  
 
In such a function, a change in the exogenous variable z  leads to a change in the 
intercept of the demand function, say, from 1D  to 2D , with marginal revenue 1MR  and 
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2MR , respectively (see Figure 3.1). 1E  and 2E  are equilibria in either competitive market 
C
P MC=  and monopoly market MMR MC= .  The bold line connecting these points 
shows the supply relation in both the competitive and the monopoly markets.  Unless the 
marginal costs are known, price taker and monopolist hypotheses are not observable in 
such a condition.  
 
Figure 3.1  Effect of changes in exogenous variable without interactive term on the demand 
function 
 
In contrast, with the addition of an interactive exogenous variable in the demand 
function, equilibria in a competitive market will be different from that in the monopoly 
market.  Suppose that the linear demand function with an interactive exogenous variable 
is: 
 
Equation 3.15   0 1 2 3Q p z pzα α α α ε= + + + +  
 
In this case, a change in the exogenous variable z  not only changes the intercept but also 
the slope of the demand function, say, from 2D  to 3D , with marginal revenue 2MR  and 
3MR , respectively (see Figure 3.2). Equilibrium in a competitive market 
C
P MC=  will 
no longer be the same as that of in a monopoly market MMR MC= . Equilibrium of the 
MCC 
MCM 
D2 
MR2 D1 
MR1 
E1 
E2 
P
Q 
 45
competitive condition remains 2E , but that of the monopolistic condition will be 3E .  
Hence, the market power index can be identified.  
 
Figure 3.2   Effect of changes in exogenous variable with interactive term on the demand 
function 
 
 
The market power parameter 
i
θ  can be interpreted in several ways (Perloff et al. 2005, 
chapter 3, p.7). First, 
i
θ  indicates the gap between price and marginal cost. If 0
i
θ = , 
marginal cost equals price, which indicates a competitive market. Otherwise, a mark-up 
is observed.  Second, 
i
θ  gives an index of market power or structure, because it lies in 
the closed set [ ]0,1  and yields 10,L ε− ∈   . Equation 3.12 shows that marginal revenue 
is ( ) ( ); ' ;i ip Q z p Q z qθ− .  If 0iθ = , marginal revenue equals price; thus a competitive 
market is observed.  If 1
i
θ = , marginal revenue will be ( ) ( ); ' ; iMR p Q z p Q z q= − , 
which equals the monopoly condition.  Third, 
i
θ  can be interpreted as a Lerner index 
adjusted by the market demand elasticity, in which 1
i
s = , so that Equation 3.13 will be 
iL
θ
ε
≡ −  and 
i
Lθ ε≡ − .  Fourth, 
i
θ  can also be interpreted as a conduct parameter or a 
firm’s beliefs about its rivals’ reaction on its action (Dockner 1992, p. 377), as 
MCC 
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D2 
MR2 
E2 
P
Q 
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( )
1 1
i i i
i i
i i
q q q
v
q q
θ − −∂ + ∂= ≡ + ≡ +
∂
.  i
i
i
q
v
q
−
∂
=
∂
 shows the change in a rivals’ output with 
respect to a change in firm i ’s output.  The indices 1
i
v = − , 0
i
v =  and  1
i
v =  imply a 
competitive, Cournot and a monopoly behaviour, respectively.  
 
Combinations of the firms’ v  values determine the pattern of interdependence.  By 
imposing a symmetry assumption, v  values will be identical for all firms. In contrast, in 
asymmetric duopoly interactions, each firm may respond to its rival’s action in a different 
way. The symmetry interactions comprise Nash Cournot, cooperative and non-
cooperative patterns, values of which are 0
i j
v v= = , 0
i j
v v= >  and 0
i j
v v= < , 
respectively. In a Nash Cournot pattern, firms recognise their interdependence, but each 
of them believes that its rivals have given their best responses.  Therefore, the rivals will 
not react to changes in its actions and change their output ( 0iq−∂ = ), thus 0iv = . In the 
cooperative pattern, firms accommodate their rivals’ actions, while in the non-
cooperative, they will compete with one another. The asymmetric interaction includes the 
leader–follower (Stackelberg) and dominant–fringe patterns.  In the leader–follower 
(Stackelberg) pattern, if firm j   has a leader role, it will set the price, so that it will not 
react to changes in its rival’s action and 0
j
i
i
q
v
q
∂
= =
∂
, whereas as a follower 0
i
v ≠ .  In 
the dominant–fringe pattern, firm j  with a dominant share position will defend its 
market position by behaving non-cooperatively and 0
i
v < , while the weaker or fringe 
firm i  will accommodate its rival’s action, thus 0
i
v >  (Putsis and Dhar 1998; Putsis 
1999).   
 
Although conjectural variations models are designed to capture a dynamic phenomenon; 
namely, responses among firms, they are obviously static. Friedman (1983, p. 110) lists 
several arguments related to this static condition:  
 
(a) the models are not actually dynamic, thus a dynamic interpretation is not possible; 
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(b) firms are assumed to maximise one-period profit rather than the discounted 
stream of profits over a given planning horizon;  and 
(c) firms’ expectations about how their rivals will behave need not be correct.   
 
All of these conditions may lead to inconsistent results of the conjectural variations 
estimation.   
 
As well as their static framework, the static conjectural variations models are also 
problematic in their estimation technique. As noted previously, the conjectural variations 
i
θ  are commonly obtained through the 2SLS technique.  However, Corts (1999) 
demonstrates that results from this technique could be invalid, as it yields only an 
‘average conduct’, which he named, the ‘as-if conjectural variations’: 
 
Equation 3.16     
( ) ( ), ,1 i i
i
i
p Q z c q w
p q
θ
− 
=  
−  
 
 
 
that is the average of price–cost margins for each output, normalised by the price level 
(which is similar to the Lerner index). Using the maximum likelihood estimation, Corts 
(1999) demonstrates that the conjectural variations are suppose to be a ‘response or 
marginal conduct’: 
  
Equation 3.17     
( ) ( )
*
; ,
1
i i
i
d p Q z c q w
dz
p dq
dz
θ
 
−  
 
=  
−  
 
 
 
that is the marginal change of the price–cost margins with respect to the inverse demand 
shock for each marginal change in output margins with respect to the inverse demand 
shock, and again, normalised by the price level.  In other words, the ‘as-if conjectural 
variations’ are determined by the ‘level’ of the output and only show the ‘level’ of the 
price–cost margins, while the ‘true conjectural variations’ are fully determined by the 
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‘equilibrium variations’ of the output and show the responsiveness of the price–cost 
margins to such variations. 
 
The ‘as-if conjectural variations’ are constant values, which are interpreted as the average 
of value of the conduct parameter (Bresnahan 1989; Genesove and Mullin 1998). In fact, 
the conduct values might change over time because a firm’s expectation about how its 
rival will behave might be incorrect.  When a firm becomes aware of the error, it will 
revise the conjecture using current observations.  The revision process continues over 
time until the conjecture precisely predicts others’ actions. In other words, the ‘as-if 
conjectural variations’ are inconsistent with rational behaviour except at the equilibrium 
point (Fellner 1965), which, in general, is not the average value. Empirically, Porter 
(1983) shows that estimation results of the conduct parameter from 2SLS and maximum 
likelihood techniques are different. The equilibrium point is reached when the conjecture 
precisely predicts others’ actions.  In such conditions, each player achieves the highest 
discounted profits by playing his prescribed strategy and gains nothing by deviating from 
this strategy.  This set of strategies is known as Nash equilibrium, which can be subgame 
perfect or not. It is subgame perfect if, for any subgame of a dynamic game that begins at 
any time t , no player can be better off by changing his strategy, otherwise it is not. 
 
There are two different strategies that have been widely used; namely, the closed-loop 
and open-loop strategies. Within a closed-loop strategy, firms do not commit themselves 
to a particular path. They revise their decisions each period and choose optimal strategies, 
and the Nash equilibrium is reached at each time (subgame); thus it is a subgame perfect. 
Many researchers apply the Markovian strategy as a special case of the closed-loop 
strategy, which reduces the number of parameters and makes estimating them easier. This 
strategy considers only the directly relevant information, which is from the period earlier, 
implying that the t th period decision depends on the ( 1)t −  period information, and then 
the ( 1)t −  period decision depends on the ( 2)t −  condition, and so on.  The rationale is 
that directly relevant causes should have a major effect, and vice versa.  Therefore, this 
should have an appreciable influence on behaviour (Maskin and Tirole 2001, p. 192).  
Dockner  (1992) shows that the closed-loop steady state condition is: 
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Equation 3.18     1 1
i
i i
i
i
i
u
s q
p c
u
r
q
η
−
−
−
 ∂  
  ∂
+ + =  ∂ − ∂  
 
 
where: 
( ) ( )i iu t q t
•
≡  is the rate of change of output of firm i  at time t ; 
r  is the discount rate; and  
i
i
i
i
u
q
u
r
q
−
−
−
∂ 
 ∂
 ∂
− ∂ 
is the conjectural variations.   
 
In contrast, within an open-loop strategy, a firm chooses a path of action based on the 
initial condition and commits for the entire game. Firms do not respond and revise their 
decision in the subsequent periods although unexpected shocks to the state may occur; 
thus, it is not subgame perfect (Fershtman and Kamien 1987, p. 1154).  Dockner (1992, 
p. 383)  shows that the steady state open-loop equilibrium is identical with the solution of 
the static conjectural variations in  Equation 3.13.  In other words, this static conjectural 
variations parameter or ‘as-if conjectural variations’ will be consistent only when firms 
play the open-loop strategy.  
 
The open-loop strategy is appropriate when the underlying event or the state of the world 
is not common knowledge at the beginning of each stage, where new information is not 
accessible or it takes a long time to be received. As only the old or initial information is 
available, players’ decisions are conditioned exclusively by this information. This 
strategy may also be used when the rival groups consist of many small firms, so not a 
single rival can greatly affect a firm.  In such conditions, either rivals may act as 
followers or their responses do not significantly affect the firm in question and can be 
negligible (Fudenberg and Tirole 1989, p. 296; Perloff et al. 2005, chapter 7, p.41). The 
open-loop strategy may also exist in long–run investment decisions, in which changing 
plans are difficult and incur very high costs (Flaherty 1980, p. 162).  In addition, firms 
might use this strategy if either collusive arrangements are infrequent (Dockner 1992, p. 
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385), demand shocks are permanent (Corts 1999, pp. 228-229), or rates of time 
preference and of depreciation are sufficiently close to zero and one, respectively (Itaya 
and Shimomura 2001). However, in most cases, the closed-loop strategy is often taken to 
be more realistic.   
 
Another factor that might lead to biased results from the ‘as-if conjectural variations’ is 
the assumption about the supply relation (Corts 1999).  Suppose that the true cost 
function is linear, thus the marginal cost is not determined by 
i
q : 
 
Equation 3.19     ( ) 0 1i tc w c c w= +  
 
and the supply relation has a linear form: 
 
Equation 3.20         0 1 2t t it itp w qα α α ξ= + + +  
 
 
so that Equation 3.18 can be rewritten as: 
 
Equation 3.21      2t i it itp c qα ξ= + +  
 
 
Comparing this equation with Equation 3.12 indicates that the ‘as-if conduct parameter’ 
is the coefficient of quantity in the supply relation 2α  scaled by the demand derivative 
( ),p Q z′ .  This means that the supply relation for a conjectural variations game is 
assumed to be a ray through the marginal cost intercept (see 1S  and MS in Figure 3.3).  In 
other words, the conduct parameter is only determined by the slope of the supply 
relations. While Bresnahan (1982) has addressed problems of estimating the conduct 
parameter stemmed from the demand function, the supply relation is still assumed to be a 
ray through the marginal cost intercept (see Figure 3.2). In fact, other non-conjectural 
variations models (see Gasmi et al. 1992, for example) can have supply relations with a 
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different intercept (see 2S  in Figure 3.3). In such cases, the difference between price and 
the intercept is not the same as the price–cost margins. Hence, measuring the margins 
only from the slope difference could be misleading.  
 
 
Figure 3.3    Supply relationships under different models of conduct 
 
 
 
In summary, the static conjectural variations models are problematic, either in their 
framework or estimation technique.  Their one-shot game framework precludes both the 
possibility of new entrants to the markets and firms’ consideration of their rivals’ 
responses. The single-period equilibrium might differ from the multi-period equilibrium. 
Thus, results from the static models could be misleading. Using the 2SLS estimation 
technique, the models cannot be used to uncover dynamic behaviour, particularly  the 
conjectural variations or firms’ conduct that underlies the equilibrium outcomes (Slade 
1995, p. 398). Accordingly, dynamic models, in which firms’ continuous interactions are 
modelled explicitly and which show the process towards the consistent or steady state 
equilibrium, are needed. 
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3.3.2 Dynamic models 
 
As indicated previously, the ability of each player to respond to other players’ actions is 
one of the important characteristics of an oligopolistic market. The conjectural variations 
models were meant to capture this interdependency through their parameters, but failed to 
do so within the static framework.  
 
Dynamic models can be established by including a time dependent parameter, so that 
future gains may be discounted.  They can also be established by utilising game theory, 
particularly by either constructing a repeated-game or state-space game.3  In dynamic 
oligopoly models, the interdependency between two or among more agents with 
conflicting objectives defines a game-theoretic situation. Hence the repeated-game and 
state-space game models are relevant (Karp and McCalla 1983, p. 641). Both explicitly 
include the best response of firm i  to other firms’ strategies, which can be either 
subgame perfect or not.  
 
The repeated-game models capture the responses through the punishment mechanism.  
They have been widely used to study cartel stability or collusive agreement (Porter 1983; 
Lee and Porter 1984; Slade 1990). The sustainability of the cartel or collusive agreement 
is determined by many factors, including the learning process and capacity constraints, 
among other things. The learning process may increase firms’ efficiency and decrease 
their costs.  This makes the expected future profits higher than current profits, deterring 
firms from breaking the collusion and exploiting their short run profits, hence increasing 
the stability of collusion (Mookherjee and Ray 1991). Capacity constraints determine 
both the ability of a firm to deviate and punish. The greater the firm’s capacity 
constraints, the lower the ability of a firm to deviate and punish would be.  On one hand, 
this condition could increase the stability of collusion as the firm has a low ability to 
deviate. On the other hand, this makes the firm’s threat no longer credible, increasing 
incentives for other firms to deviate, especially when output is homogeneous and market 
demand is strong (Rotemberg and Saloner 1986; Mookherjee and Ray 1991).  
                                                 
3 See Slade (1990, 1995) for an excellent survey of empirical repeated-game and state-space game models. 
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Firms do not maximise only one-period profit because they take into account threats or 
possible punishments that may come from their rivals as a response to the deviation.   In 
other words, firm i ’s action depends on past actions of all other players. The mechanism 
is not arbitrary but depends on the certain strategy rule chosen. The sequence of the 
actions is known as the path of action ( ) ( )( ){ }
1t
A a tσ σ
∞
=
= , where a  is the action and σ  
is the strategy. These actions determine the firm’s pay-offs, whose function is: 
 
Equation 3.22     ( ) ( )( )i iv v Aσ σ=%  
 
 
The impact of action at time t  is received at the end of period t . In other words, there is 
no physical link or tangible effect between periods in the repeated-game model. Thus, 
firms play a sequence of static game (Perloff et al. 2005, chapter 6).  The one-shot first-
order condition of a firm’s profit function in this game is identical to that in the static 
model (see Equation 3.12). During collusive periods, firms behave cooperatively, 
maintaining their output or price level below that of a competitive level, with conduct 
1
it
θ < , while during punishment periods, firms increase their output or decrease prices 
below that of a collusive level, with conduct 0
i
θ > .   
 
Porter (1983) shows that the collusive and punishment periods are differentiated using a 
simultaneous equation switching regression model, in which parameters of the demand 
and supply functions are estimated by: 
 
Equation 3.23     0 1 2 1log logt t t tQ p D Uα α α= + + +      
and 
Equation 3.24      0 1 2 3 2log logt t t t tp Q S Uβ β β β θ= + + + +  
 
where:  
t
D is a vector of other demand shifters; 
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t
S  is a vector of other supply shifters; 
t
U is a vector of random shocks; and  
t
θ  is a conduct parameter, whose values equal zero in the collusive periods and 
one in the punishment periods.  
 
In cooperative periods, the coefficient of the indicator variable is equal to 1
1
log
1
α
α
 
 + 
, 
indicating that the conduct parameter is determined by the responsiveness of equilibrium 
quantity to the demand shifter, which Corts (1999) suggests—as noted previously—as the 
accurate measure of conjectural variations.  
 
In these repeated-game models, adjustments and their impact are assumed to materialise 
immediately. However, using macroeconomic US data covering the period 1948–1979, 
Rotemberg (1982) found that this assumption was rejected. This assumption may be 
appropriate in cases where changes in production leading to an instantaneous adjustment 
in price (Porter 1983), or inventories being non-durable, thus the long-lived effect is 
irrelevant (Rotemberg and Saloner 1989). These models may also be appropriate if 
changes in parameters over time are random, so that firms’ optimal behaviour is myopic. 
That is, even though firms play an infinite sequence of games, they act as if they are 
always playing the current game (Slade 1989).  
 
Similar to the repeated-game models, the state-space game models also include the 
responses through a path, which in these models is a control path ( ) ( )( ){ }
1t
U u tσ σ
∞
=
= . 
However, unlike the repeated-game models, there are intertemporal linkages in the state-
space game models.  These linkages appear through the evolution of state variables: 
 
Equation 3.25     ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,nnx t g t x t u t=& ,  1, 2,...,n N=  
 
where:  
x  is a vector of states;  
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u  is a vector of control variables; and 
ng  is the transition function.  
 
Firm i ’s pay-off function in these models becomes: 
 
Equation 3.26     ( ) ( )( ); ;i t i tv x v U xσ σ=%  
 
showing that the total pay-off of each player i  is not only a function of the set of 
strategies σ , but also that of a vector of state variables 
t
x .  
 
Pindyck (1985, p. 194) argued that almost all real-world markets of both exhaustible and 
renewable resources had prices and production levels that were intertemporally 
determined.  The intertemporal linkage may stem from a learning process, the presence of 
adjustment costs for quasi-fixed factor inputs or for inventory holdings, or the firms’ 
response over time (rather than instantaneously) to changes in demand.  This argument is 
supported by empirical studies in a number of industries: the coffee (Karp and Perloff 
1993) and banana markets (Deodhar 1994), where the production process involves a 
maturation period and long periods of economic life; the potato-processing industry 
(Katchova et al. 2005), where output production is constrained by contract commitments 
or localised markets; the titanium dioxide industry (Hall 1990), where output expansion 
is constrained by high inventory costs; the cattle industry (Hunnicutt and Aadland 2003), 
where there is a lag between the need for an input and its availability, and the cigarette 
market (Roberts and Samuelson 1988), where there is a long-lived input effect from 
advertisements. In such cases, intertemporal linkages are important.  Since they are not 
captured in the repeated-game models, an alternative model such as the state-space model 
is needed (Karp 1982, p. 7).   
 
Most empirical applications involving state-space game models employ the linear 
quadratic specification, whose objective functions are quadratic in the state and control 
variables and the equations of motion are linear in these variables. This specification is 
broadly used because it constitutes a second-order approximation to other types of non-
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linear cost functions, and is analytically tractable (Basar and Olsder 1982, p. 184).  If the 
present discounted value of firm i  is defined as ( )1;i tJ q v− , given the state vector 
( )1 1 1,t it jtq q q− − −≡ , the dynamic programming equation of firm i ’s objective function 
becomes: 4 
 
Equation 3.27         ( ) ( )( ) ( )1; max ;
2it
i
i t t i it it it it i t
u
J q v p c t q u u J q v
θγ δ
−
 
= − − + + 
 
 
    
where:  
( ) ( )( ),
2
i
i t t t i it it it it
q u p c t q u u
θ
pi γ = − − + 
 
 is the profit from the current period 
(which is the profit function in static model including adjustment costs);  
δ  is the discount factor;  
( );i tJ q v  is the future profits;  
v  is an index of market power; 
2
i
it it itu u
θγ + 
 
 is adjustment cost functions, whose intercept and slope are  
it
γ  
and 
i
θ , respectively; and 
1t t tq q u−= +  is the equation of motion, whose vector of state variables and 
control variable are 1tq −  and itu , respectively. 
 
 
The first-order condition corresponding to Equation 3.27 is: 
 
Equation 3.28     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ); ;1 i t i tt i it it i it
i j
J q v J q v
p c t v bq u v
q q
γ θ δ
 ∂ ∂
= + + + + + + ∂ ∂  
 
                                                 
4 This model is based on Slade (1995) and Karp and Perloff (1993) 
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The market power index iv  is the dynamic analogue of the static models of oligopoly. Its 
value lies between competitive and monopolistic behaviour, whose indices are 1v = −  
and 1v = , respectively.  
 
Although this state-space game explicitly models the intertemporal physical link that 
cannot be captured in the repeated-game model, a number of limitations have been 
suggested. First, the objective function is only constrained by the equations of motion. In 
fact, other constraints such as non-negativity of prices and inventories or finite capacities 
might be needed (Slade 1995, p. 388), but imposing them using a classical approach or 
testing them would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Bayesian techniques can, 
however, be used as an alternative to do so (Karp and Perloff 1993).   
 
Second, the models are limited to a linear quadratic specification, which is linear in the 
equation of motion, and thus quadratic in objective function.  In fact, in some cases either 
the constraint could fail to be linear or the objective function could fail to be quadratic.  
The quadratic adjustment cost functions imply that adjustments are costly in speed and 
size, and always distributed smoothly over time.  In fact, this is not always be the case. 
Not every adjustment needs to be distributed over time; for example, when the desired 
production level is below the minimum efficient scale (Hall 2000).  In addition, not every 
adjustment can be distributed over time; for example, when there are lumpy inputs 
(Rothschild 1971; Nilsen and Schiantarelli 2003).  
 
There are at least three alternatives that have been used to obtain more general functional 
forms, particularly the equation of motion.  The first alternative is by using an algorithm 
that is capable of dealing with non-linearities, heterogeneity and discrete choice. Using 
such a general algorithm is complicated and it has not been applied for the oligopoly 
games.  The second alternative is by using Euler’s approximation.  This is relatively easy 
but results would be biased if the function is non-linear.  The third alternative is by using 
the linear quadratic approximation model, which is obtained by linearising the first-order 
condition of the function and iteratively solving the resulting linear quadratic game. With 
this model, the decision variables can either have a linear form or logaritmic form (Slade 
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1995, p. 390). Christiano (1990) demonstrated that results from both forms were 
remarkably accurate. 
 
In summary, the preceding dynamic models have successfully addressed the important 
features of dynamic behaviour that failed to be captured in the static models. In 
particular, these models have explicitly modelled firms’ long run planning horizon with 
multi-period interactions, and show the process towards the consistent or steady state 
equilibrium.  These models also include state-space games models that would be needed 
when intertemporal links exist.  Since, in general, market power appears to be a dynamic 
phenomenon, the dynamic version is likely to be a more appropriate approach to 
modelling market power. 
 
 
3.4   Concluding comments 
 
Market power is understood to be a firm’s ability to maintain prices above marginal 
costs.  Since marginal costs are usually difficult to determine, various models have been 
developed to measure this power.  These models correspond to the SCP and NEIO 
approaches. They may have either a monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure 
framework. However, since monopolistic markets rarely exist in the real world, most 
empirical studies appear to have used the latter framework. The oligopolistic market 
differs from the monopolistic one because players in the oligopolistic market have some 
interdependency. Each firm has some abilities to respond to another firm’s actions. The 
early NEIO studies made an attempt to capture this interdependency with a model called 
the conjectural variations model.  However, because of its static framework, this model 
fails to capture the responses, which are clearly dynamic.  Therefore, the use of the static 
model can be inappropriate and possibly misleading.   
 
Game theory can be introduced to capture the interactions of two or more agents with 
conflicting objectives, thus providing a method for analysing the responses.  Dynamic 
models may be divided into the repeated-game and state-space game models. Each model 
is appropriate for different situations.  The difference is in the intertemporal linkages, 
 59
which exist in the state-space game cases but not in the repeated-game cases. These 
dynamic models successfully reveal the dynamic behaviour that failed to be captured in a 
static framework.  Therefore, in general, a dynamic model would be a more appropriate 
approach to modelling market power. 
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Chapter 4  
Modelling Market Power in the Indonesian Palm Oil Industry 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, market power studies can be divided into static 
and dynamic models. Although static models may provide useful information about the 
outcomes, in general, dynamic models have been found to be more realistic. Within a 
multi-period framework, they address the important features of dynamic behaviour that 
are not captured by the static models. The dynamic models can be divided into repeated-
game and state-space game models. In the repeated game, current actions affect only 
current profits, while in the state space, current actions affect profits of the subsequent 
period as well as the current profits. In the presence of such an intertemporal link in the 
palm oil industry, the state-space game model is likely to be a more appropriate model for 
this study. 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to describe the analytical framework, assumptions 
and estimation techniques. In section 4.1, the theoretical framework of the state-space 
model is presented. In section 4.2 the empirical model, namely the adjustment cost model 
with a linear quadratic specification, is explored.  Then, the estimation method is 
discussed in section 4.3.  This comprises the discussion on the demand function, the 
adjustment system, Monte Carlo Numerical Integration and Bayesian inference.   In 
section 4.4, the various types of interaction that can result from the estimates are 
analysed.  Section 4.5 brings the chapter to a conclusion. 
 
 
4.1 Theoretical model 
 
The following discussion of the state-space game model is drawn from Caputo (2005), 
Chow (1997) and Slade (1995). Consider an oligopolistic market with n firms or players, 
whose objective is to maximise their discounted stream of profits over time.  To achieve 
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this, in each period, players choose the levels of certain variables, which are called the 
control variables. These variables can be output, investment in capacity or advertising 
effort.  The players’ choice is determined by the state variable, which summarises all 
history that is pay-off relevant. The players need to find an optimal decision rule or 
control function, so that when a state is determined and an initial condition is given, the 
objective function is maximised. The firm’s objective function is:  
 
Equation 4.1     ( ) ( ) ( )( ).max , ,
T
t
it
u
t
t x t u tδ pi∑  
              subject to ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 , , ,t Tx t g x t u t x t x x T x+ = = =   
showing the summation over t  and the maximisation over tu , where: 
[0, ]t T∈  is the planning period or planning horizon; 
δ is the discount factor;  
it
pi  is the instantaneous profit;  
u  is a vector of  control variables; and  
x  is a vector of state variables.   
 
In selecting the optimal control function, three different assumptions—namely, open-
loop, closed-loop and Markovian strategies—have been widely used in previous studies.  
In an open-loop strategy, a firm ignores the possible changes in states, and chooses a path 
of action based only on the initial information and commits for the entire period.  This 
means that the problem begins at 0t =  with state ( ) ( ) 00x t x x= = , so that Equation 4.1 
can be re-written as: 
 
Equation 4.2     ( ) ( ) ( )( ).
0
max , ,
T
t
it
u
t x t u tδ pi∑  
              subject to ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )01 , , 0 , Tx t g x t u t x x x T x+ = = =   
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In contrast, in a closed-loop strategy, a firm may revise its decisions at any time as a 
response to changes in states.  The problem can begin at any time [0, ]t T∈  with state 
( ) tx t x= , so that Equation 4.1 does not change. A special case of the closed-loop 
strategy that has been widely used in previous studies is the Markovian strategy.  Rather 
than taking into account the whole history, with a Markovian strategy, a firm considers 
only the directly relevant state.  The rationale for this is that directly relevant causes 
should have a major effect, and thus have significant influences on behaviour.  In 
practice, this reduces the number of parameters and makes estimation easier.   
 
With the open-loop strategy a firm does not revise its decisions; hence the optimal 
solution refers to the solution of the entire time path.  Use of the Lagrange multiplier, on 
the other hand, obtains the optimal solution from the necessary and sufficient conditions 
that can be used to find the optimal time path. Therefore, the Lagrange multiplier 
provides the tool to solve models using the open-loop strategy. The Lagrangean for firm 
i  can be defined as:   
 
Equation 4.3       ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }0
0
, , 1 , ,
t T
t
i i i i
t
L E t x t u t x t g t x t u tδ pi λ
=
=
 
 = − + −  
 
∑  
 
 
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier and 0E  is Lagrange expectation value given 
information at time 0. The optimal control rule is obtained by solving the necessary 
conditions of the Lagrangean, that is, 0i
L
x
∂
=
∂
, 0i
L
u
∂
=
∂
 and ( ) ( )( )1 , ,t ix g t x t u t+ = . In 
general, the expectation operator makes the problem complicated.  However, when the 
control rule is linear, or equivalently the objective function is quadratic, once the least-
square estimators are obtained, the error term can be replaced with its conditional mean 
value, which is zero, and hence the expectation operator is dropped.5 This considerably 
simplifies the problem.  As such, the linear quadratic form has been widely used in 
previous studies (Javier 2001, p. 24).  
                                                 
5 This is known as the certainty equivalence principle. 
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In the closed-loop strategy, a firm may revise its decision to reach the Nash equilibrium 
or optimal solution in each period.  Dynamic programming, on the other hand, obtains the 
optimal solution of a problem from the optimal solution of each of its subproblems. 
Therefore, dynamic programming provides the tool to solve models, using the closed-
loop strategy. Defining ( ).iV  as the value function for firm i , the dynamic programming 
equation firm i  can be specified as:   
 
Equation 4.4     ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), , max , , ,Ti t i i
u
t
V t x T t x t u t EV t x Tpi δ= +∑  
               subject to ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 , , ,t Tx t g x t u t x t x x T x+ = = =  
 
that is, the sum of the current profit and the discounted future values subject to the 
control function. E , as noted previously, is the expectation operator, which is then 
dropped for the same reason. The optimal control function that would maximise the value 
function is a function ( ).x  that gives the optimal path of the control variable for the entire 
planning horizon. The optimal path is associated with the slope of the function at each 
point of time in the planning horizon, and is obtained by solving the Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman partial differential equation: 
 
Equation 4.5         
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ),, , max , , 0
t
ii t
i
u
V t x TV t x T
t x t u t
t t
pi δ
 ∂∂
≡ + = ∂ ∂  
 
 
 
As the structures of the Markovian strategy (see Equation 4.1) and the open-loop strategy 
(see Equation 4.2) are identical, they will lead to the same optimal control function. 
However, because they have a different base time and base state, in general, the solution 
of each strategy will be different. The open loop may arise either because a firm can only 
observe the initial state at  0t =  or assumes that its decisions do not influence other 
firms’ decisions.  This precludes the ability to capture the ‘off-equilibrium path’ 
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solution.6  In contrast, within a closed-loop strategy, a firm revises its decisions as a 
response to the changing states until Nash equilibrium is reached.  Figure 4.1 gives an 
illustration of such conditions in a duopolistic market. 
 
Figure 4.1    Single-period pay-offs for a large firm and a small firm 
 Large Firm 
 H L 
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Suppose that there are two firms, namely a large firm and a small firm, engaged in a 
supergame with infinite time horizon. In each period, each firm can either use a high (H) 
or low (L) price strategy.  Values in parentheses refer to the single-period pay-offs for 
each possible price combination. The first values in the parentheses show the pay-offs for 
the small firm, while the second values are those for the large firm. The large firm’s 
dominant strategy is H, that is H maximises this firm’s current period pay-offs regardless 
of the small firm’s action.  The small firm’s dominant strategy is L, therefore, this firm 
prefers the (L,H) rather than the (H,H) price combination.  With (L,H) the small firm’s 
pay-off is 4, while  with (H,H) this firm only receives 3. In contrast, with the former, the 
large firm’s pay-off is 7, while with the latter this firm can gain 10. Therefore, to gain the 
highest possible pay-off it could reach, the large firm uses the punishment strategy by 
threatening to use L whenever the small firm uses L. Since the (L,L) pay-off is less than 
the (H,H) pay-off for both the large and small firms, both firms’ best response will be the 
latter. The path in which both firms use H is called ‘the equilibrium path’. 
 
By choosing (H, H), the small firm’s present discounted pay-off will be
3
1 δ− , where δ  is 
the discount factor.  If the small firm cheats and uses L, it gets 4 during the deviation 
period (because the large firm still use H), but in the next period the large firm will 
                                                 
6 Perloff et al. (2005) use this expression in explaining Figure 4.1. See Tirole (1988, pp. 245-6) for 
explanations about pay-offs in a supergame.  
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respond by using L forever, hence the small firm’s present discounted pay-off after the 
deviation period will be 
2
1
δ
δ−  (as their price combination will be (L,L))
7.  If  
3 2
4
1 1
δ
δ δ> +− −  (that is, if 0.5δ >  ), the small firm will consider the large firm’s threat 
and uses H.8  Otherwise, the small firm prefers to deviate to obtain higher pay-offs.   
 
The condition where both firms choose L is ‘off the equilibrium path’, but it is clearly an 
equilibrium.  Within an open-loop strategy, the large firm will not respond to the small 
firm’s deviation and continues to use H. In contrast, within a closed-loop strategy, the 
large firm will revise its decision by using L.  This means that only the closed-loop 
strategy reaches equilibria in every period of the game, both along and outside the 
equilibrium path.  Therefore, the closed-loop strategy can be seen as a subgame perfect 
equilibrium.  Although the estimation of the closed-loop strategy is more complicated 
than that of the open-loop strategy, in general, the former appears to be more realistic 
than the latter. Hence the closed-loop strategy is chosen.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 By choosing H, small firm’s present discounted pay-off will be ( ) ( )( )2 3
1
3 1 3
1
T
T
δ
δ δ δ δ δ
−
+ + + + + =
−
K .  
T = ∞  and  0 1δ< <  gives 0Tδ = , hence the pay-off can be rewritten as   ( )
( ) ( )
1 3
3
1 1
Tδ
δ δ
−
=
− −
.  By 
deviating to L, small firm firm’s present discounted pay-off will be ( ) ( )( )2 34 2 4 2 1
T
T
δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
−
+ + + + + = +
−
K .  
Given 0Tδ = , hence the pay-off can be rewritten as ( )
( ) ( )
2
4 4
1 1
Tδ δ δ
δ δ
−
+ = +
− −
 
 
8 Empirically, the magnitude of δ can be translated into the speed and strength of a punishment.  The 
greater the speed and the strength of a punishment, the less the net gain from cutting price or increasing 
output, hence the less incentive for a competitor to deviate to obtain higher pay-offs (Church and Ware 
2000, p.328). 
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4.2 Empirical model 
 
The empirical model is based on Karp and Perloff (1993), who apply the state-space 
game model to measure symmetric duopolists’ market power in the coffee export market.  
In the Indonesian crude palm oil industry, the duopolists represent the public estates and 
private companies. As described in Chapter 2, these groups are unlikely to be identical:  
the public estates appear to be more bureaucratic, less responsive to change and less 
productive than the private companies.  Therefore, the symmetric assumption of the 
model is relaxed.  
 
In each period, oligopolists choose the rate of their output as the control variable. Being a 
perennial crop means that firms run a long run production process. Inputs such as land or 
plant capacity, which are considered as fixed in the short run, are no longer fixed in the 
long run. They could be changed and adjusted but their full adjustments are reached in 
the long run. These quasi-fixed inputs are held constant in the short run due to the high 
cost of adjustment.  The greater the size or speed of adjustment, the higher the costs 
should be expended.  In other words, the average cost of changing the level of quasi-fixed 
inputs increases with the size of change or rate of adjustment.  
 
In this study, CPO mills capacity can be seen as one of the quasi-fixed inputs.  CPO mills 
capacity is a lumpy input, with level of 30, 45, 60 or 90 tonnes FFB per hour.  Many 
firms prefer to choose a large capacity mill although they are not always supported with 
sufficient amount of FFB.  The main reason is that establishing two small mills is much 
expensive than one large mill with a same level of capacity. The latter only needs 
additional machines to increase and to reach its full capacity, but the latter requires either 
additional buildings or total change in the small old mill due to the different characteristic 
of the large mill. Empirically, on average, a CPO mill with a capacity of 45 tonnes FFB 
per hour is established in 18 months.  However, a big investor can build the mill only in 
12 months.  The difference stems from the investor’s stock of materials that are needed to 
build the mill.  Most investors do not have a sufficient level of stock due to the 
requirement of extra costs.  
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The model is adopted from the neoclassical models of investment, which uses at least a 
one period lag between incurring the costs of new investment and the addition of new 
investment goods to productive capital.  Strictly convex adjustment cost function is then 
assumed to generate investment smoothing, which in turn provides a theoretical 
justification for the use of distributed lag in empirical work (Sanghamitra, 1991, p.268). 
Perloff et al. (2005, p.8) argue that their model needs the use of distributed lag for 
capturing delay in the rivals’ response to their actions. Therefore, convex adjustment cost 
function is then used in their model.  
 
As mentioned in the theoretical model, a linear-quadratic specification has been widely 
used in previous studies, as it considerably simplifies the estimation. In this case, the 
linear form refers to the adjustment system and the demand function, and the quadratic 
form refers to the objective and adjustment cost functions. Adda and Cooper (2001) 
suggest a more general adjustment structure by allowing the adjustment cost parameter to 
vary.  However, such an approach might be difficult to apply in this model, as a constant 
adjustment cost parameter is needed to recover the market power index.9 Therefore, the 
linear-quadratic specification is used in the following empirical model:  
 
 
Equation 4.6          ( )( )
1 2
T
t i
t i it it it it
t
p c t q u u
ε θδ γ ε−
=
 
− − + 
 
∑  
                                                 subject to 
t t
q g Gq ε−= +  
 
 
where:  
δ is the discount factor;  
t
p  is the linear inverse demand;  
( )ic t  is the constant marginal production cost;   
it
q  is the output; 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 4 for details. 
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2
it
it it it
u u
θγ ε + 
 
  is a convex adjustment cost, where 
it it it
u q q εε −≡ − ;  
ε  is the three-year length of maturation period;  
( )t tq g t Gq ε−= +  is the adjustment system, where ( )g t  is a column vector; and  
G  is a 2x2 matrix with elements 
ij
G  ( ), 1,2i j = .   
 
Defining ( );i t iJ q v  as the present discounted value of group i , given the state vector 
( )1 2,t t tq q q≡  and the group market power index iv , the dynamic programming equation 
for group i  is:  
Equation 4.7         ( ) ( )( ) ( ); ;
2
i
i t i t i it i it it i t i
J q v p c t q u u J q vε
θγ ε δ
−
 
= − − + + 
 
 
 
that is, the sum of the profits of the current period and the present discounted value of 
future profits. The first-order condition of Equation 4.7 is: 
 
Equation 4.8         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ); ;1 i t i i t it i i it i it i
i j
J q v J q v
p c t v bq u v
q q
θ ε δ
 ∂ ∂
= + + + − + ∂ ∂  
 
 
where:  
( )i i itc t uθ ε+  is the total marginal cost, which is the sum of marginal production 
cost and marginal adjustment cost;  
( )1t i itp v bq− +  is the marginal revenue;  
it
t
p
b
q
∂
=
∂
 is the slope of inverse demand;  
i
v  is the market power index; and 
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the term in brackets is the discounted shadow value of an extra unit of current 
output;  
  
 
If 1
i
v = − , marginal revenue equals price, and there is no mark up, reflecting a 
competitive condition.  While if 1
i
v = , the slope of marginal revenue is twice the slope 
of inverse demand, and the monopoly mark up is observed.  
 
In order to be interpretable, the estimates of this market power index 
i
v  need to lie 
between these two extreme values. Although the dynamic market power index is similar 
to the static one, the relationship between the index and price–cost margin is not as 
simple as in the static model. In the dynamic model, firms do not only take into account 
the marginal production costs, but also the marginal adjustment costs of changing their 
production over time. In addition, firms care about the future ( )0δ ≠ as well as the 
current condition.  In such cases, firms will not exploit their current profits by increasing 
the current price.  Therefore, the higher the discount factor δ ,  the lower the current 
market prices, and vice versa. 
 
The linear-quadratic model refers to a linear relationship in the equation of motion and 
quadratic in objective function.  In Equation 4.6, the linear equation of motion is stated 
by the constraint, while the objective function is a profit function.  Inverse demand 
t
p  is 
linear in output, so that revenue is quadratic in output. The linear quadratic problem has 
an important implication for the estimation of the adjustment cost parameter and market 
power index. In practice, adjustment cost data are rarely available.  Therefore, they can 
not be estimated by using a single standard regression.  As an alternative, the following 
structural approach is used.  Given 1it it itu q q −≡ − , defining 
it
it
q
v
q
−
∂
=
∂
, and setting 
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0
it
γ = 10, the first derivative of firm i ’s discounted stream of profits with respect to 
it
q  
gives the optimal control rule as11:  
 
Equation 4.9     1t tq g Gq −= +  
 
where : 
( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1
1
t t i
i
i
p p c
g
v
b
δ δ
δ θ
++ − +  
=
+ 
− + + 
 
 is the intercept;   
 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
i
i i
v
G
v b
δ
δ θ
+
=
− + + +  
  is the slope;  
b  is the constant slope of the demand equation;   
θ  is the slope of marginal adjustment cost function; and  
v  is the market power index.  
 
Given this, the slope of the control function G  can be written as ( ), , ,G f b vθ δ= .  In the 
case of a linear quadratic problem, this equilibrium value always exists. The recursive 
structure of the problem makes its optimal solution self-enforcing. In other words, as time 
advances, the player has no incentive to deviate from the original optimal rule.  This 
property is known as Bellman’s principle of optimality, and the control rules that satisfy 
this property are said to be time consistent  (Javier 2001, p. 17). Under such a condition, 
                                                 
10In this model, rate of production 1it it itu q q −= −  is used as an approximation for the adjustment variable, 
which is given as 
2
2
i
i it it
u u
θγ + . The minimum adjustment cost would be reached if its first derivation 
i i it
uγ θ+  equalled zero, thus  
i
γ  is set to zero.  This means that there would not be any adjustment cost if 
there were no adjustment or 0
it
u = , which holds if firms reach the long run equilibrium condition 
(Berstein 1992).  With no adjustment costs, if firms behave competitively 1
i
v = − , price will be equal to 
marginal production cost. 
11 The complete derivation is provided in Appendix 4.1 
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given ( ), , ,G f b vθ δ= , f  can be inverted to recover a subset of parameters , , ,b vθ δ .  If 
independent estimates of G  and b are provided and δ  is known, the adjustment cost 
parameter θ  and market power index v  can be obtained.  All constants included in the 
firm i ’s discounted stream of profits—the demand intercept and marginal costs—are no 
longer relevant to the optimal solution. Therefore, the optimal problems can be limited to 
only the quadratic part of the problem.  
 
Taking the quadratic part of the problem, setting 0
it
γ =  and defining the difference 
between the demand and cost intercept at time t  as 
it
a ,  the solution of the Markovian 
strategy (see Appendix 4.2) gives parameters 
i
v  and 
i
θ  that satisfy: 
 
Equation 4.10      ( )' 1 *'i i i i i i i i i i iK W e e Z v G e yδ δ θ θ θ− + + + = ≡   
 
 
where: 
i
W  is the inverse vectorisation of 
i
w , where 
i
w  is defined as:  
            ( )( ) [ ] ( )( )1' ' 'i iw I G G G G vec Kδ −= − ⊗ ⊗     
i
Z  is the inverse vectorisation of 
i
z , where 
i
z  is defined as:  
( )( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]( ) ( )1 '' ' ' ' ' 'i i iz I G G G G I G G I vec e eδ −  = − ⊗ ⊗ − ⊗ − ⊗    ;  
⊗  denotes the Kronecker product;  
i
e  is the thi unit column vector (a vector of 0’s with a 1 in the thi  position);  
i
K  is defined as ( )' 'i ib ee e e+ , which is an n-dimensional matrix of 0’s with b’s on 
the thi column and the thi  row, except for the ( ),i i element which contains 
2b; and  
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i
S  is an ( nxn ) matrix consisting of 0’s except for the ( ),i i element which contains 
θ .  
 
The derivation of Equation 4.10 does not depend on a symmetry assumption.  However, 
such an assumption is needed for the estimation process. Symmetric matrices have two 
useful conditions. First, they only have real eigenvalues, that is, complex eigenvalues 
never occur.  Second, they have enough independent eigenvectors to diagonalise the 
matrix (Simon and Blume 1994, pp. 620-621).  Since matrix 
i
K  is of rank 2, this 
assumption is required in order to obtain a solution.  Otherwise, the number of unknown 
parameters is more than the number of equations; hence the system will either have no 
solution or infinitely many solutions (Simon and Blume 1994, p. 143; Perloff et al. 2005 
chapter 9, p.18).  
 
The symmetric matrix G  implies that firms are treated as having identical behaviour, 
identical adjustment coefficients and identical cost structures. This assumption is 
relatively restrictive, but it has been used in all previous studies that employed this model 
(Karp and Perloff 1989, 1993; Deodhar 1994; Katchova et al. 2005).  However, in a 
duopoly market where 2n = , the number of equations is exactly the same as the number 
of unknown parameters, and thus the symmetry assumption is not required (see Appendix 
4.3).   
 
Utilise the recursive principle, assuming 0
it
γ = , 1ε =  and constant marginal costs, the 
discounted profit stream can be re-written as  
 
Equation 4.11   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1 1 1
2 2
i i
i t i it it it t i it it it
p c q q q p c q q q
θ θδ
− + + +
 Π = − − − + − − − 
 
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Defining 1
1
t t
t t
Q Q Q
b
p p p
+
+
∂ ∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂ ∂
 and 
1
1
jt jt j
i
it it i
q q q
v
q q q
+
+
∂ ∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂ ∂
, the maximisation of the 
discounted profit stream firm i  will be: 
 
Equation 4.12  
                        ( ) ( ) 1 11 11 1 0i i it t i i it i it t i i it
it
v q p c q v q p c q
q b b
θ δ δ δ δθ+ +
∂Π
= + + − − + + + − − =
∂
 
 
and the current price will be 
 
Equation 4.13  
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )1 11 1 1impt it it i i it tvp q q c q p
b
δ δ δ θ δ+ +
+
= − + + + + + −  
 
While if 1
i
v = , the slope of marginal revenue is twice the slope of inverse demand, and 
the monopoly mark up emerges. If 1
i
v = − , marginal revenue equals price, reflecting a 
competitive condition and Equation 4.13 can be re-written as 
 
Equation 4.14  ( ) ( ) 11 1ct i i it tp c q pδ δ θ δ += + + + −  
 
Consumer surplus without subsidies will be 
Equation 4.15  ( ) ( )
0
0
c
t
c
t
q p
c c c
t t t t t t
p
CS f Q dQ p q g p dp= − =∫ ∫  
 
while that with subsidies will be 
Equation 4.16   ( ) ( )
0
0
mp
t
mp
t
q p
c mp mp
t t t t t t
p
CS f Q dQ p q g p dp= − =∫ ∫  
 
therefore, the change in consumer surplus will be 
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Equation 4.17 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 mp
c mp c
t t t
p p p
c mp mp c
t t t t t t t t
p p p
CS CS CS g p dp g p dp g p dp G p G p∆ = − = − = = −∫ ∫ ∫  
 
This change in welfare can be illustrated by Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Changes in consumer surplus 
 
 
 
4.3 Estimation method 
 
The adjustment cost parameter θ  and market power index v  are calculated by providing 
the estimates of the slope of the adjustment system G  matrix, elements of which are 
ij
G  , 
and the slope of the inverse demand b .  The solution needs to satisfy three properties, 
which in the duopoly case are: 
(a) the system needs to be stable: 11 222 2G G− < + <  and 11 22 12 211 1G G G G− < − <  
(see Appendix 4.4);  
( ) (, ,t t t tp f Q Z Q g p Z= ⇔ =
mp
tP
c
tp c=
price 
Quantity 
0p
mp
tq
c
tq  
 75
(b) the market power index needs to be interpretable: 1 1
i
v− < < ; and 
(c) the adjustment cost function needs to be convex: 0iθ > .  
 
In this model, the stability of the adjustment system leads to stable estimates of the 
market power index, since this index is determined by the coefficients of the system. An 
unstable market power index may indicate that a firm has incorrectly predicted its 
competitor’s reaction (Karp 1982, p. 56).  In a symmetric duopoly case, where 
11 22 1G G G= =  and 12 21 2G G G= = , these coefficients need to satisfy 1 21 1G G− < + <  
and 1 21 1G G− < − < . However, this does not ensure that the estimates of market power 
will be within the desired range, which is –1 and 1.  
 
In static models, the desired range is obtained when firms have decreasing reaction 
functions, whose slopes 
ij
G  are between –1 and 0 (see Appendix 4.5). Simulation results 
show that the market power index will be between –1 and 1 if and only if 1G  takes 
positive values between 0 and 1, and 2G  takes negative values between –1 and 0 (see 
Figure 4.3). These simulation results are supported by the empirical evidence of  previous 
studies (Karp and Perloff 1989, 1993; Deodhar 1994; Katchova et al. 2005). However, in 
asymmetric dynamic cases, the relationship amongst the values is much more 
complicated, even if we assume that firms use the open-loop strategy. The desired v  
values are not determined by two ( )1 2,G G , but by four G  ( ), , ,ii ij ji jjG G G G  values.  
Furthermore, they are also determined by the combinations of these elements (see 
Appendix 4.6 for the solution for the asymmetric dynamic case with an open-loop 
strategy). The simulation results show that the combinations can have either positive or 
negative G  values between –1 and 1. No empirical studies of asymmetric cases appear, 
however, to have been conducted.   
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Figure 4.3    Relationship between v  and G  values 
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Imposing the three properties by using a classical approach would be extremely difficult, 
if not impossible.  However, the Bayesian approach provides a relatively easy technique 
to do so (Griffiths 1988; Karp and Perloff 1993, p. 452). In the Bayesian approach, data 
are treated as fixed and parameters are random.  Distribution of the parameters is 
generated using numerical integration.  The properties are imposed on the parameters by 
selecting those that satisfy the restrictions.   
 
Figure 4.3 shows the estimation process, which is based on Chalfant et al. (1991). First, a 
demand equation and an adjustment are estimated separately.  Using the estimates and 
covariance from the adjustment system, parameters are replicated with the Monte Carlo 
numerical integration method. For problems with dimensions more than three, such as the 
parameter vector of adjustment system µ  (see Equation 4.12), this method is suggested 
to be computationally more efficient than the other integration methods (Kloek and van 
Dijk 1978; Griffiths 1988; Geweke 1989; Chalfant et al. 1991, p. 480). The replications 
are then used to calculate the market power index and the adjustment cost parameter. 
Then the inequality restrictions are imposed. The G  stability restriction can be checked 
directly from the values of each of the replications. The market power index and 
adjustment cost parameter are checked by calculating them from each of the replication.  
Results that satisfy the restrictions are selected, otherwise they are dropped.  Using the 
 77
importance sampling method, each selected replication is weighted to take into account 
the probability distribution of the data and the Bayesian point estimates are calculated.  
 
Figure 4.4    The estimation process 
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The demand equation for CPO was treated as a derived demand for palm cooking oil, 
because CPO is used as the main raw material for this product. The demand equation is 
as follows: 
 
Equation 4.18     ( )1 1 2, , , , ,Q Q P P PP P D ε=  
 
where:  
Q  is the demand of CPO from the cooking oil industry; 
P  is the price of CPO; 
1P  is the price of crude coconut oil;  
2P  is the price of palm cooking oil;   
D  is the dummy variable of the economic crisis 1997–1998; and 
ε  are the  error terms.  
 
The adjustment system comprises two adjustment equations from the public estates and 
the private companies. Although a direct relationship between these adjustment functions 
does not exist, each is likely to be influenced by the same variables, namely its own and 
its rival’s previous production and the concessionary credit given to both of them in 
1986–1996. Therefore, the error terms across the public estates and private companies’ 
equations might be correlated, and the Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
technique could be applied to the following adjustment system: 
 
Equation 4.19     ( )3 3 1 2, , , , ,it it it jt itq q q q D D µ ε− −=   ;  , 1, 2 :i j i j= ≠  
 
where: 
it
q  is the current output; 
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3itq −  is the three-year lagged output; 
1D  is the dummy variable for the concessionary credit period, whose values are 
zero  before 1989 (three-year lagged after the concessionary credit periods) 
and one for the remainder;  
2D  is the dummy variable of economic crisis, which equals zero before 1997 and 
one thereinafter;  
µ  is a vector of parameters; and  
i
ε  are the error terms.   
 
Within the Bayesian technique, the three properties (stability, interpretable market power 
index and convex adjustment costs) are treated as prior information.  It is then combined 
with information from the data to form the posterior probability distribution function 
(pdf): 
 
Equation 4.20         ( ) ( ) ( )f q p l qµ α µ µ  
 
where;  
( )f qµ  is the posterior  pdf  of  the vector of parameters from the adjustment 
system µ , given the sample information q ; 
α  denotes proportionality; 
( )p µ is the prior pdf for the vector of parameters µ ; and  
( )l qµ  is the likelihood function of the vector of parameters µ . 
 
With a single point of the vector of parameters, and without any information about the 
mean and variance, it is impossible to evaluate the integrals analytically.  Hence, 
numerical integration is used for finding the pdfs. A very large number of replications of 
the vector of parameters µ  are generated from a multivariate t-distribution: 
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Equation 4.21     ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
1ˆ ˆ
J
g q
λ
µ α λ µ µ µ µ
+
−
− ′+ − ∑ −
  
 
 
where ∑  is the variance–covariance matrix of the vector of parameters µ , µˆ  is the 
estimation of parameters and J  is the number of parameters.  Using the variance–
covariance matrix of the vector of parameters ( )ˆV µ , the Cholesky decomposition 
matrix H , such that ( )' ˆHH V µ= , is estimated.  Then, 14 random vectors—10 of the 
same length of parameters in the vector µ  of the two share equations in the adjustment 
system, including the intercept ( )INp ,0~ , and four of the same length of the degrees of 
freedom ( )INs ,0~ —are drawn from a standard normal distribution.  It is suggested that 
four degrees of freedom are used to ensure the relatively ‘fat tails’ to cover the posterior 
pdf of the vector of parameters µ . The latter draw is then used to calculate 
( ) 1/ 2' /r s s λ =   , where λ  is the degree of freedom. Then, the vector of parameters in the 
adjustment system is replicated using the formula ˆ /A Hp rµ µ= +  with its ‘antithetic 
replications’ ˆ /B Hp rµ µ= − , which is suggested to improve convergence.   
 
Although the replications are generated from a multivariate t-distribution, in fact, the 
posterior pdf of the vector of parameters µ  does not always follow such a distribution. In 
such cases, the expected value obtained from the multivariate t-distribution will be 
different from the ‘true mean’ (the expected value following the posterior pdf of the 
vector of parameters µ ).  To correct this, each of the replications needs to be weighted. 
Those which are closer to the ‘true mean’ receive a larger weight, whereas those which 
are further away have the smaller weight.12  The weight is called the importance function, 
which is the ratio of the ‘true’ posterior pdf and the ‘generated’ posterior pdf (from the 
multivariate t-distribution).  The prior density of the ‘true’ posterior pdf for both variance 
∑  and mean value µ  are unknown, because the estimation results of the SUR provide 
                                                 
12 This method is known as importance sampling, details of which are provided in Kloek and van Dijk 
(1978). 
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only a single value for each of the parameters of the adjustment system. This means the 
prior pdf ( )p µ  will be very flat, hence the ‘function’ will be a constant. Given such a 
diffuse prior density, the resulting ‘true’ posterior pdf for θ  becomes: 
 
Equation 4.22         ( ) ( ) ( )f q p l qµ α µ µ = ( ) ( ) ( )f q cl q l qµ α µ α µ  
                                          = ( ) 2Tf q Aµ α −  
 
where A  is an ( )mxm  matrix ( m  is the number of equations in the adjustment system), 
and T  is the number of observations. The elements of matrix A  are given by 
'[( ( )) ( ( ))]ij i ja G Gε ε= , where ( )i Gε  is the vector of residuals for the share equation i  in 
the adjustment system, evaluated using any value of  θ  where the posterior density is 
defined.   Given Equations 4.21 and 4.22, the importance function becomes: 
 
 
Equation 4.23     
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
/ 2
1
|
ˆ ˆ
T
J
f q A
g q
λ
µ α
µ α λ µ µ µ µ
−
− +
− ′+ − ∑ −
  
 
 
 
Using each of the replications, the adjustment cost parameter and market power index are 
calculated.  Results that satisfy the restrictions are selected, otherwise they are dropped, 
giving the truncated densities for both ( ).f  and ( ).g , denoted by ( ).Rf  and ( ).Rg .  The 
Bayesian point estimates of the adjustment cost parameter θ  and market power index v  
are calculated using the selected samples and their corresponding weight from the 
truncated pdfs ( ).Rf  and ( ).Rg : 
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Equation 4.24     
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
R
n
k
k R
k k
R
n
k
R
k k
f q
g q
f q
g q
µβ
µβ
µ
µ
=
=
=
∑
∑
 
 
where n  is the number of replications that hold all of the three properties. The ratio of 
these selected samples to the total replications shows the probability of holding the 
properties: 
Equation 4.25     
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
ˆ
R
n
k
R
k k
D
N
k
k k
f q
g q
p
f q
g q
µ
µ
µ
µ
=
=
=
∑
∑
 
 
 
where N  is the number of all replications. Chalfant et al. (1991, p. 482) suggest that any 
pdf can be used as ( )|g qµ , because:  
 
Equation 4.26     ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
f
E f d g d
g
µµ µ µ µ µ µ µ
µ
= =∫ ∫  
 
showing that the expected value obtained from the data density will be the same as the 
weighted value obtained from the replications. However, the choice of ( )|g qµ  
determines the number of draws required to obtain a high numerical accuracy. The 
smaller the variance of ( )|f qµ  with respect to ( )|g qµ  , or the more similar these 
pdfs, the fewer draws needed to obtain good or accurate estimates. Otherwise, an 
excessively large number of replications needs to be drawn in order to reach a desired 
precision or accuracy  (van Dijk and Kloek 1980, p. 316; de Jong et al. 2000, p. 215). 
 
In addition, ( )|g qµ  needs to have a tail that is fatter than ( )|f qµ . Otherwise, 
( )|g qµ  will decline faster than ( )|f qµ , resulting in some of the weights becoming 
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extremely large and dominating the results. Van Dijk and Kloek (1980) and de Jong et al. 
(2000) suggest that for ( )|g qµ  to be considered ‘good’, the centre and rotation must not 
be too dissimilar to ( )|f qµ . The accuracy of the selected samples proportion is 
measured by the numerical standard error (NSE):  
 
Equation 4.27     ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
1/ 2
2
2
1
2
1
N
k
k k
k k
N
k
k k
f q
g q
NSE
f q
g q
µβ β
µβ
µ
µ
=
=
  
 
−     
=  
  
   
   
∑
∑
 
 
while that of the point estimate is measured by the standard deviation of the posterior 
distribution: 
Equation 4.28     ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
1
2
2
1
1
. .
Rn
k
k k R
k k
Rn
k
R
k k
f q
g q
s d
f q
g q
µβ β
µβ
µ
µ
=
=
  
−     
=       
  
∑
∑
 
 
 
 
4.4 Types of interaction 
 
Previous studies show that the types of interaction among firms can be determined with 
either the conjectural variations or the reaction function approaches.  The former gives a 
parameter of conduct, indicating a firm’s belief about how another firm will respond to 
its action.  It is obtained from the first-order condition of a firm’s profit function. The 
latter provides a coefficient of each player’s ‘best response’, in which each firm’s 
decision is expressed as a function of the other’s.  For consistent conjectural variations 
models, the  conduct and response parameters produce identical estimates of competitive 
interaction (Putsis 1999, p. 298).  
 84
The signs or values of the conjectural variations or the coefficients of the reaction 
function indicate certain types of market interactions, which can be either symmetric or 
asymmetric.  In the symmetric case, each firm responds to actions by its rival in a similar 
way.  This can be in the same or opposite direction, implying a cooperative or non-
cooperative interaction, respectively. There can also be a lack of response when a firm 
believes that all of its rivals have already given their best responses and produced the 
equilibrium quantities, hence none of them wants to change its output level.  Such an 
interaction is known as the Cournot interaction, in which both firm’s conjectural 
variations  
j
i
i
q
v
q
∂
=
∂
 and slope of reaction function 
j
j
i
q
q
α
∂
=
∂
 will be zero. 
 
In the asymmetric case, each firm responds to actions by its rival in a different way.  This 
includes the leader–follower (Stackelberg) and dominant–fringe interaction.  This means 
that the signs or values of the conjectural variations or the coefficients of the reaction 
function are different between firms.  Sato and Nagatani (1967) suggest that if some of 
the coefficients are positive and some are negative, the negative ones play a more crucial 
role. For example, a dominant firm reacts in the opposite way to its rival’s actions, while 
having an insufficient share to influence market prices.  Fringe firms simply follow the 
dominant firm’s actions. In other words, the coefficient of the reaction function of the 
dominant firm is negative, whereas for the fringe firm, is positive.  In the conjectural 
variations approach, the fringe firms believe that the dominant firm will offset its action, 
so that market price remains unchanged.  Hence, they will act as price takers with 
1dfr
fr
q
v
q
∂
= = −
∂
.  Dominant firms could either behave competitively or exert market 
power, which depends on the supply elasticity of the competitive fringe (Gollop and 
Roberts 1979; Putsis and Dhar 1998; Putsis 1999).  
 
In a leader–follower interaction, following firms’ actions do not significantly influence a 
leading firm’s profits, and thus, leaders do not react to followers’ actions.  In contrast, 
leading firms’ actions influence the following firms’ profits, hence followers respond to 
leaders’ actions. Depending on the market conditions, the followers’ response can either 
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be ‘cooperative’ or ‘non-cooperative’.  This means that the coefficient of the reaction 
function of the leader LL
f
q
q
α
∂
=
∂
 equals zero, while that of the follower can either be 
positive or negative.  In the conjectural variations approach, the followers believe that the 
leader will not respond to their action, thus their conduct parameter is 0Lf
f
q
v
q
∂
= =
∂
. 
 
With a static framework, a firm’s conduct parameter 
i
v  does not change over time.  With 
a dynamic framework a firm’s conduct parameter 
i
v  could either change or not change 
over time, depending on what strategy the firm uses in making its decision.  Within an 
open-loop strategy, firm i  makes decision based only on the initial information.  Given 
the initial state information, the conduct parameter 
jt
i
it
u
v
u
∂
=
∂
is obtained by solving the 
first-order condition of the firm’s objective function. Firm i  assumes that its rival firm j  
does not respond to a change in its action, which means that this conduct parameter 
i
v  
does not change over time. Hence, the conduct parameter resulting from an open-loop 
strategy can be seen as the dynamic analogue of the static conjectural variations 
parameter.  
 
In contrast, within a Markovian strategy, a firm i  makes decision based on information in 
each period. The firm revises its decisions in each period as a response to changes in its 
rival’s decision. Since the firm does not commit to a particular path, the conduct 
parameter 
jt
i
it
u
v
u
∂
=
∂
 will change over time until it is precisely equal to the actual response 
of the firm j .  This means that the conduct parameter 
jt
i
it
u
v
u
∂
=
∂
is not obtained by solving 
the first-order condition of the firm’s objective function but rather by solving the 
equilibrium condition. Therefore, the conjectural variations interpretation is no longer 
relevant to the dynamic conduct parameter using the Markovian strategy. This means that 
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this dynamic conduct parameter cannot be used as a tool for determining the type of 
interaction between firms. As an alternative, the reaction function approach will be used 
to assess the competitive interaction in this model. Here the adjustment system can be 
seen as a type of reaction function. Assuming a linear adjustment equation for a 
duopolistic market, the system will be:  
 
Equation 4.29           
1 0 11 1 1 12 2 1 1
2 0 21 1 1 22 2 1 2
t t t i i t
t t t i i t
q G q G q Z
q G q G q Z
α α ε
β β ε
− −
− −
= + + + +
= + + + +
 
 
where:  
it
q  is the current output;  
1itq −  is the previous output; 
i
Z   is a vector of output shifters; and  
i
ε  are the error terms.   
 
In this dynamic model, a firm does not respond to its rival’s action in the same period of 
time, represented by the slopes of the reaction functions 112
2 1
t
t
q
G
q
−
∂
=
∂
 and 221
1 1
t
t
q
G
q
−
∂
=
∂
.  
These slopes show the actual response of firm i  to the previous action of its rival j .  
This is different from the conjectural variations i
j
q
q
∂
∂
 , which shows the conjecture of firm 
j  about the future response of firm i .  The type of competitive interaction is then 
concluded from the combination of these coefficients. The different types of interaction 
can be summarised as shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1    Output response and implied market interactions 
Competitive interaction Output response 
Symmetric interaction  
         Independent 
12 21, 0G G =  
         Cooperative 
21 12, 0G G >  
         Non-cooperative 
12 21, 0G G <  
Asymmetric interaction  
         Firm 1 leader, firm 2 follower 
12 210, 0G G= ≠  
         Firm 2 leader, firm 1 follower 
12 210, 0G G≠ =  
         Firm 1 dominant, firm 2 fringe 
12 210, 0G G< >  
         Firm 2 dominant, firm 1 fringe 
12 210, 0G G> <  
Source: Modified from Putsis and Dhar (1998, p. 273). 
 
 
4.5 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter provides a framework for measuring market power and the type of 
interaction of dominant firms in the Indonesian palm oil industry.  A state-space game 
model, specifically the adjustment cost model, is selected because quasi-fixed inputs in 
the palm oil production system provide an intertemporal link. The solution of this 
adjustment cost model assumes that players use the Markovian strategy, as it is often 
argued to be more realistic. A linear quadratic form is chosen for the empirical model, as 
it has an important implication for the estimation of the adjustment cost parameter and 
market power index. Within this form, these parameters can be obtained by providing the 
coefficients of the adjustment system and the slope of the inverse demand. Using the 
Markovian strategy, the market power index no longer reflects the firm’s response to its 
rival action.  Hence this index cannot be used as a tool to determine the type of 
interaction between the firms.   However, the adjustment system can be seen as a type of 
reaction function, therefore, they can be used as an alternative to assess the type of 
competition between the firms.   
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Appendix 4 
 
Appendix 4.1    The derivation of the optimal control function 
 
The discounted profit stream of firm i  is given by:  
 
Equation 4.30   ( )( )
1 2
T
t i
i t i it it it it
t
p c t q u u
ε θδ γ ε−
=
 Π = − − + 
 
∑  
 
Using the recursive principle, assuming 0itγ = , 1ε =  and constant marginal costs, 
Equation 4.30 can be re-written as  
 
Equation 4.31    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1 1 1
22 2
T
ti i
i t i it it it t i it it it
t
p c q q q p c q q q
εθ θδ −
− + + +
=
Π = − − − + − − −∑  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 12 2
2 2
i i
i t i it it it it it t i it it it it it
p c q q q q q p c q q q q q
θ θδ
− − + + + +
 Π = − − − + + − − − + 
 
 
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 12 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
i i i i i i
i t it i it it it it it t it i it it it it it
p q c q q q q q p q c q q q q q
θ θ θ δθ δθ δθδ δ
− − + + + + +Π = − − + − + − − + −
 
 
The maximum discounted profit stream firm i  is obtained through its first derivation with 
respect to itq : 
 
Equation 4.32   1 1
i t t
it t i i it i it i it
it t it
p Q
q p c q q q
q Q q
θ θ θ
− −
∂Π ∂ ∂
= + − − + −
∂ ∂ ∂
 
( )
2
1
11 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2
0
i
it
i itt t it it it it
it t i it i it
t it it it it it it it
q
c qp Q q q q q
q p q q
Q q q q q q q q
θ
δ δ δ δ δθ δθ
+
++ + + + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
 ∂  ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + + − − + − =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
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Given  1it it itu q q −= − , hence 
1
1it
it
q
q
−
∂
=
∂
 and 1 1it
it
q
q
−
∂
=
∂
, t it jtQ q q= + , hence 1
t
it
Q
q
∂
=
∂
 , 
therefore 
( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t tt
it t it t
p Q p Q p QQ
q Q q Q
∂ ∂ ∂∂
= =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
,  1
1
t t
t t
Q Q Q
b
q q q
+
+
∂ ∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂ ∂
 and 
1
1
jt jt j
i
it it i
q q q
v
q q q
+
+
∂ ∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂ ∂
, Equation 4.32 can be re-written as  
 
Equation 4.33   
 
( ) ( ) 1 11 11 1 0i i it t i i it i it t i i it
it
v q p c q v q p c q
q b b
θ δ δ δ δθ+ +
∂Π
= + + − − + + + − − =
∂
 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 11 1i it i it i it t t i i i it i it i itv q q q p p c c v q q q
b b
θ δθ δ δ δ δθ δθ+ + + +− + + + = + − − + + − +  
( ) [ ] ( )1 11 11 1i i i it t t i i i itv q p p c c v q
b b
θ δθ δ δ δ+ +
 
− + + + = + − − + +  
 
[ ] ( )
( )
1 11
1
t t i i i it
it
i
i i
p p c c v q
b
q
v
b
δδ δ
θ δθ
+ +
 
+ − − + +  
=
+ 
− + + 
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[ ]
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
1 1
i
t t i i
it
i i
i i i i
v
p p c c b q
v v
b b
δ
δ δ
θ δθ θ δθ
+
+
++ − −
= +
+ +   
− + + − + +   
   
 
 
     1i i itg G q += + ;    where 
( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1
1
t t i
i
i
p p c
g
v
b
δ δ
δ θ
++ − +  
=
+ 
− + + 
 
 and 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
i
i i
v
G
v b
δ
δ θ
+
=
− + + +  
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Appendix 4.2     The solution for the Markovian strategy13 
 
Converting the objective function for a representative firm in the matrix form and writing 
it in continuous time give the following expression: 
 
Equation 4.34  ( )' '1
0
1 1
2 2i
rt
it t t i t t t i t
e a e q q K q u u S u dt
∞
−
−
 
− + − 
 
∫     
 
where:  
β  is the discount factor that is written in terms of discount rate r ;  
( )i ia cα= −  is the difference between the inverse demand intercept and the 
marginal costs ; 
i
e  is the i th unit vector;  
t
q  is the column vector of 
it
q ;  
( )i i iK b ee e e′ ′= + ;  
t
u  is the column vector of 
it
u ; and  
i i i i
S e e θ′= , where
i
θ  is the adjustment cost parameter of the i th firm.  
 
 It is assumed that 0
i
γ = , which implies that adjustment costs are minimised when there 
is no adjustment (see footnote 8).  The explicit matrix forms for firm 1, in a duopoly 
market ( )2n =  are as below:  
1
1
0
e
 
=  
 
, 
1
1
e
 
=  
 
, 
1
2
t
t
t
q
q
q
 
=  
 
, 1
2
0
b b
K
b
 
=  
 
, 
1
2
t
t
t
u
u
u
 
=  
 
,  and 1
0
0 0
S
θ 
=  
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Appendix 4.2 is drawn from Deodhar (1994) with some modification in the symbols to relate them to 
Equations in the chapters. 
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The stationary dynamic programming equation of Equation 4.34 will be: 
 
Equation 4.35       1 1
1 1 1 1
max
2 2 2 2
t i t t i t t i t t i t
q H q q K q u S u q H qδ
− −
  
′ ′ ′ ′
− = − − + −  
  
  
  
                   ( ) 1 1 11 1max
2 2
t i i i t t i t t i tq K S H q q S q q S qδ − − −
 
′ ′ ′= − + + + −  
  
 
The first-order condition of Equation 4.35 is: 
 
Equation 4.36            ( ) 1 0i i i i t i i tv K S H q v S qδ −′ ′+ + + =   
 
    
Equation 4.36 can be re-written as: 
  
Equation 4.37  1t tEq Sq −=          
  
                    1t tq Gq −=  
 
where the i th row of E  is ( )i i i iv K S Hδ′ + + , the i th row of S  is i ieθ ′ , and 1G E S−= .  
Substituting Equation 4.37 into Equation 4.35 gives: 
 
Equation 4.38    1 1
1
2
t i tq H q− −
 
′
− 
 
                                          
( )1 1 1 1 1 11 1max
2 2
t i i i t t i t t i tq G K S H q q G S q q S qδ− − − − − −
 
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + + + −  
 
( )1 11max
2
t i i i i i i tq G K S H G S S G S qδ− −
 
′ ′ ′= − + + − − +    
    
             ( )i i i i i i iH G K S H G G S S G Sδ′ ′= + + − − +      
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Equation 4.38 is then vectorised and yields:  
 
Equation 4.39    
i
vecH   
( )i i i i i ivec G K S H G G S S G Sδ′ ′= + + − − +    
( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]i i i i i ivec G K S H G vec G S vec S G vec Sδ′ ′= + + − − +                                        
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )[ ] [ ]i i i i i iG G vec K S H I G vec S vec G I S vec Sδ′ ′ ′ ′= ⊗ + + − ⊗ − ⊗ +      
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )i i i ivecH G G vecH G G vec K G G I G G I I vec Sδ  ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− ⊗ = ⊗ + ⊗ − ⊗ − ⊗ +    
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )i i i i iI G G vecH G G vec K G G I G G I I vec e eδ θ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− ⊗ = ⊗ + ⊗ − ⊗ − ⊗ +    
                              
( ) ( ) ( )1i ivecH I G G G G vec Kδ −′ ′ ′ ′= − ⊗ ⊗ +      
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 i i iI G G G G I G G I I vec e eδ θ−  ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− ⊗ ⊗ − ⊗ − ⊗ +       
  
 
Equation 4.39 can be rewritten as: 
 
Equation 4.40  
i i i i
vecH w z θ= +   
         
where 
i
w  and 
i
z  are the first and second term of right hand side of Equation 4.39,  except 
i
θ .  
i
vecH , 
i
w  and 
i
z  are all ( )2 1n x  column vectors.  Therefore, Equation 4.40 can be 
converted back in the form of ( )nxn  vectors by using inverse-vec(torisation) operation,  
yielding:   
 
Equation 4.41   
i i i i
H W Z θ= +   
     
where 
i
W  and 
i
Z  are the transformed forms of 
i
w  and 
i
z  having the dimension ( )nxn . 
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Given the i th row of as ( )i i i i i iv K S H G eδ θ′ ′+ + = , and substituting the value of iH  
from Equation 4.30, gives the solution of the Markovian strategy as: 
 
Equation 4.42                 ( )( )i i i i i i i iv K S W Z G eδ θ θ′ ′+ + + =      
          ( )i i i i i i i i iv K W e e Z G eδ δ θ θ′ ′ ′+ + + =        
                  ( )i i i i i i i i iG K W e e Z v eδ δ θ θ′′ ′ ′+ + + =    
                              ( ) 1i i i i i i i i iK W e e Z v G eδ δ θ θ−′′ ′ ′+ + + =     
 
 
Appendix 4.3     Asymmetric condition in the duopoly model   
 
Taking the quadratic part of the problem, the dynamic programming equation for the i th 
player becomes: 
 
Equation 4.43 ( )
,
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
max
2 2 2i t
t i t t i i i t t i t t i t
q
q H q q K S H q q S q q S qδ
− − − − −
 
′ ′ ′ ′
− = − + + + − 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.2 shows that solution of Equation 4.43 is: 
 
Equation 4.44 ( )' 1 *'i i i i i i i i i i iK W e e Z v G e yδ δ θ θ θ− + + + = ≡   
 
For duopoly cases, in which 
11 12
21 22
g g
G
g g
 
=  
 
,  
11 121
21 22
i
y y
G y
y y
−
 
= = 
 
, define matrix A  as 
i i i
bA K Wδ= +  and B  as '
i i i i
B e e Zδ= + , Equation 4.44, then, becomes: 
 
Equation 4.45  [ ] ' 1 *i i i i ibA B G e yθ ν θ θ−+ = ≡  
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For firm 1, in which 1
1
0
e
 
=  
 
 and 
11 12 111
1 1 1 1
21 22 21
1
0
y y y
G e
y y y
θ θ θ−     = =    
    
,  Equation 4.45 
becomes: 
Equation 4.46  
11 12 11 1 12 1 11 1
21 22 21 1 22 1 12 21 1
1bA bA B B y
bA bA B B v y
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
        
+ =        
        
 
 
which gives two equations with two unknown parameters. 
 
 
Appendix 4.4     Stability condition in an asymmetric duopoly case 
 
 Suppose that the adjustment system of the duopoly is: 
 
Equation 4.47                 
1 1 11 1 1 12 2 1
2 2 21 1 1 22 2 1
t t t
t t t
q g G q G q
q g G q G q
− −
− −
= + +
= + +
 
 
This dynamic system is asymptotically stable if the absolute eigenvalues of its coefficient 
matrix are less than one 1r <   (Simon and Blume 1994, p. 596).  For coefficient matrix 
11 12
21 22
G G
G
G G
 
=  
 
, the eigenvalues are obtained from the roots of the characteristic 
polynomial [ ]det G rI− . For the asymmetric matrix, the characteristic polynomial is:  
 
Equation 4.48    [ ] 11 12
21 22
det det
G r G
G rI
G G r
− 
− =  
− 
 
                                      ( )( ) ( ) ( )11 22 12 21G r G r G G= − − −  
                                      211 22 11 22 12 21G G G r G r r G G= − − + −  
                                      ( )2 11 22 12 21 11 22r G G r G G G G= − + − +  
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Equation 4.48 can be written as:  
  
Equation 4.49  ( )( ) ( )21 2 1 2 1 2r r r r r r r r r r− − = − + +  
and hence 1 2 11 22r r G G+ = +  and 1 2 11 22 12 21r r G G G G= − . With 1r < as the condition for 
stability, this gives 11 212 2G G− < + <  and 11 22 12 211 1G G G G− < − < . 
 
 
Appendix 4.5    The range of 
ij
G  and 
ij
v  in static model 
 
Suppose the inverse demand function is: 
 
Equation 4.50   ( )p Q a bQ= −    
 
where 0b >  and 
i j
Q q q= +  
  
The profit function of firm i  is: 
 
Equation 4.51     
i i i
pq cpi = −  
                        ( ) i ia bQ q c= − −  
                        ( )( )i j i ia b q q q c= − + −  
                       2i i j i iaq bq bq q c= − − −  
 
The first-order condition of Equation 4.59 is: 
 
Equation 4.52     2 0i
i j i
i
a bq bq c
q
pi∂
′= − − − =
∂
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2
j i
i
a bq c
q
b
′
− −
=   
 
 
 
The first-order condition of the profit function can also be written as: 
 
Equation 4.53            0i
i i
i i
p
q p c
q q
pi∂ ∂
′= + − =
∂ ∂
 
                                    0
i i
i
p Q
q p c
Q q
∂ ∂
′+ − =
∂ ∂
 
                                 ( )1 0i i ib v q p c ′− + + − =  
                                                                ( )1
i
i
i
p c
q
b v
′
−
=
+
 
 
Using Equations 4.52 and 4.53, we get: 
 
Equation 4.54           
2
j i
a bq c
b
′
− −
( )1
i
i
p c
b v
′
−
=
+
 
                        ( ) ( ) ( )2 1i j i i j ia bq bq c v a bq c′ ′− − − = + − −  
                       2 2 2 2i j i j i i i j i ia bq bq c a bq c v a v bq v c′ ′ ′− − − = − − + − −  
                      ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2i j j i j i i i i ia a v a bq bq v bq c c v c bq′ ′ ′− − − − − − − − =  
                      
( ) ( ) ( )11 1
2 2 2
i ji i i
i
v bqv a v c
q
b b b
′
−− −
= − −  
 
                     
( )1
2
ii
ij
j
vq
G
q
−∂
≈ =
∂
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1
i
v = −  gives 1
ij
G = − , and 1
i
v = gives 0
ij
G = . Therefore, in order to obtain 
i
v values 
between -1 and 1, 
ij
G  needs to be in between 1−  and 0 . 
 
 
Appendix 4.6    G  matrix and 
ij
v in the asymmetric open–loop solution 
 
The Lagrangean for the i th firm’s discounted profit stream is:  
 
Equation 4.55     ( )' 11 1
2 2
T
t
i i i i
t
L q K q u S u q u q
τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ
β λ−
−
=
 
′ ′= − − + + −  
∑    
  
where 
it
λ  is a ( )1nx  column vector.  The first-order conditions of Equation 4.55 are: 
 
Equation 4.56   1 0i t it itK q λ βλ +− − + =   
and      
Equation 4.57    0
i i t i it
v S u v λ′ ′− + =   
       
where 
i
v  is a ( )1nx  column matrix with 1 in the i th row and ijv  in the j th row.  The 
term 
ij
v  will be itij
jt
du
v
du
=  if i j∀ ≠ , and will be 1 if i j∀ = .  For example, the vector 
i
v  
for firm 1 will be 
1
i
ij
v
v
 
=  
 
.  Assuming that 
it
λ  is a linear function of 
t
q , which is 
it it t
H qλ =   for some ( )nxn  square matrix itH , and letting t → ∞ , so that  itH H= ,  
Equation 4.57 becomes: 
 
Equation 4.58         0
i i t i i t
v S u v H q′ ′− + =      
                                               
i i t i i t
v H q v S u′ ′=  
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Equation 4.58 can be re-written as: 
 
Equation 4.59          
i i t i it
v H q uθ′ =  
                             
i i t i i t
v H q e uθ′ ′=   
 
Equation 4.59 conditions are stacked for all firms to get: 
 
Equation 4.60    
t t
Eq Su=          
 
where the i th row of E  is 
i i
v H′  and the i th row of S  is 
i i
eθ ′ . 
t
u  is defined as 1t tq q −− , 
so that Equation 4.60 can be written as:  
 
Equation 4.61                ( )1t t tEq S q q −= −         
                          ( ) 1t tE S q Sq −− = −  
                                       ( ) 1 1t tq E S Sq− −= −  
 
Defining ( ) 1E S S G−− = , Equation 4.61  can be written as:   
 
Equation 4.62               1t tq Gq −=   
 
        
Using 
it it t
H qλ = ,  Equation 4.62 can be written as:  
 
Equation 4.63              1 0i t i t i tK q H q H qδ +− − + =        
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Using expression in Equation 4.62, Equation 4.63 can be re-written as: 
 
Equation 4.64                        ( ) 0i i i tK H H G qδ− − + =  
                                               ( ) 0i i iK H H Gδ− − + =      
                                            ( )i i iH H G Kδ− − =  
                                                           ( )i i iH I G Kδ− = −  
                                                                           ( ) 1i i iH K I Gδ −= − −     
Rewriting the definition ( ) 1E S S G−− =  as: 
 
Equation 4.65                             ( )S S E G= −       
                                  S SG EG− = −  
                              ( ) 1S I G G E−− = −  
                                                ( )1E S I G−= −       
  
pre-multiply both sides by 
i
e′ , and given the i th row of E  as 
i i
v H′  and the i th row of S  
as 
i i
eθ ′ , Equation 4.65  can be re-written as: 
 
Equation 4.66       ( )1i ie E e S I G−′ ′= −         
                         ( )1i i i iv H e I Gθ −′ ′= −         
 
Using the definition of 
i
H  in Equation 4.64, the solution of the open-loop strategy is 
obtained by re-writing Equation 4.66 as14:  
 
Equation 4.67               ( ) ( )1 1i i i iv K I G e I Gδ θ− −′ ′− = −  
                                                 
14 The steps of this derivation are drawn from Deodhar (1994). 
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                                                    ( )( )1i i i iv K e I G I Gθ δ− ′ ′= − −   
                                                    ( )( )1i i i iK v I G I G eδ θ− ′ = − − −   
                                                   ( )( )1 1i i i iK v G I G I G eδ θ− − ′ = − −      
 
Using the asymmetric condition 
11 12
21 22
g g
G
g g
 
=  
 
 and defining 
( ) ( )1 'Z G I G I Gδ− = − −  , we obtain:  
22 22 11 12 21 12
11 22 12 21 11 22 12 21 11 12
21 2221 21 12 11 11 22
11 22 12 21 11 22 12 21
1
1
G G G G G G
G G G G G G G G G G
Z
G GG G G G G G
G G G G G G G G
β β
β β
′ − +  
−  
− − − −   
=     − −+ −  
  
− −  
    
     
11 12
21 22
z z
z z
 
=  
 
 
 
In duopoly cases, the solution of the open-loop strategy of Equation 4.67 for firm 1 
becomes:  
Equation 4.68               
11 112
21 1
2 zb bv
zb
θ
θ
+   
=   
   
 
 
and for firm 2 becomes:  
 
Equation 4.69                  
12 2
21 22 22
b z
bv b z
θ
θ
   
=   +   
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where 1112
21
2
z
v
z
= −  and 2212
12
2
z
v
z
= − .  To satisfy the market power index restriction in 
which 1 1
ij
v− ≤ ≤ , the ratio of 11z  and 21z  need to be 
11
21
1 2 1
z
z
− ≤ − ≤  or 11
21
1 3
z
z
≤ ≤ , 
while the ratio of 22z  and 12z needs to be 
22
12
1 2 1
z
z
− ≤ − ≤  or 22
12
1 3
z
z
≤ ≤ . 
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Chapter 5  
Data, Estimation and Results 
 
In this chapter, estimation and results of the model estimation are presented.  In section 
5.1, data sources and the description of variables used for estimating the demand function 
and the adjustment system are presented. In section 5.2, the estimation results are 
reported. From the estimates of the adjustment system, the type of interaction between 
the public estates and private companies is determined. The estimates of the adjustment 
system are then replicated using the Monte Carlo numerical integration method, results of 
which are presented in section 5.3.  In section 5.4, the estimation results for the 
adjustment cost parameter and market power index are discussed. Section 5.5, completes 
the chapter with some concluding comments. 
 
 
5.1 Data  
 
The model was estimated using annual data for the period of 1968–2003. Discount rates 
and exchange rate data are from the International Finance Statistics. CPO domestic 
demand data were not available: CPO consumption data listed in the Oil World were used 
as a proxy. CPO domestic prices were constructed from two sources—the Indonesian 
Department of Agriculture and Oil World—while the crude coconut oil and palm cooking 
oil domestic prices were from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics and Suharyono (1996). 
All price data were deflated by the Indonesian Consumer Price Index data reported by the 
Indonesian Bureau of Statistics.   
 
In estimating the adjustment system, only the public estates and private companies were 
considered as the dominant groups. Due to diseconomies of size of each of the members, 
lack of processing facilities and trade associations, smallholders were unlikely to have an 
ability to influence market prices. Hence, they are not considered as one of the dominant. 
As CPO domestic supply data for the dominant groups were also not available, CPO 
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production data were used as a proxy.  These data were recorded by the Indonesian 
Directorate General of Plantations, Department of Agriculture. The relationship between 
the production and the domestic supply data is as follows (Suharyono 1996; Susanto 
2000; Zulkifli 2000; ISTA Mielke 2004):  
 
Equation 5.1         S O Q M X E= + + − −    
  
where: 
S  is the domestic supply; 
O  is the opening stock;  
E  is the ending stock; 
Q  is the production;  
M  is imports; and  
X is exports. 
 
,Q M  and X  are the accumulation values for each year, while O  and E are the  stock 
values at the end of January and December, respectively. For the national level data, 
stock and import values are insignificant.  Stocks are small because CPO is perishable 
and can not be stored for more than three months.  Imports are also small because usually 
domestic production is more than adequate to supply the domestic demand.  Excess 
demand occurs either when international prices are high, giving an incentive for 
producers to increase their export levels, or when domestic demand significantly 
increases due to feast months (Ramadhan, Ied-Fitr and New Year). The statistical 
summary of these data is shown in Table 5.1.15 
 
Data of the CPO demand, real prices of CPO, crude coconut oil and palm cooking oil 
were used in the estimation of demand equation. Table 5.1 shows that all of these 
variables have large differences between their minimum and maximum values.  The large 
differences between means and medians, and the non-zero values of skewness suggest the 
asymmetric distribution condition. Kurtosis values of all of these variables are greater 
                                                 
15 The complete data set for both the demand equation and adjustment system is provided in Appendix 5.1.   
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than for the normal distribution, indicating distribution with the small variance and the 
slim or long tails.  Finally, the Jarque–Bera statistics indicate rejection of the hypothesis 
that all of these data are normally distributed. 
 
Table 5.1    Statistical summary of research data  
Statistics 
CPO 
demand 
CPO real 
price  
CCO real 
price 
Palm 
cooking oil 
real price 
Public estates 
group’s 
production 
Private 
group’s 
production 
Unit 
Thousand 
tonnes/year 
Rp/   
tonne 
Rp/   
tonne 
Rp/        
tonne 
Tonnes/ year 
Tonnes/  
year 
Mean 1,025 94,997 108,486 119,305 1,118,954 895,268 
Median  613 18,142 29,765 32,040 345,827 886,740 
Maximum  4,083 815,546 929,105 822,027 4,627,744 1,706,852 
Minimum 23 354 558 487 59,075 122,369 
Standard     
deviation 
1,251 196,328 213,545 228,273 1,423,874 567,736 
Skewness 1.5 2.5 2.6 2.2 1.3 –0.0 
Kurtosis 4.0 8.1 9.3 6.1 3.4 1.4 
Jarque–Bera 
statistics 
12.4 64.4 86.5 37.2 11.1 3.9 
Jarque–Bera 
probability 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
 
 
Data of the CPO produced by the public estates and private companies were used in the 
estimation of the adjustment system. Table 5.1 shows that all of these variables have 
large differences between the minimum and maximum values. The skewness values and 
the large difference between the mean and median values indicate that these data are 
distributed symmetrically in the private production data but not in the public estates 
production data. The public estates data have a kurtosis value greater than the normal 
distribution, indicating a small variance and a thin tail, while that of the private data is 
smaller than for the normal distribution, indicating a large variance and a fat tail.  Finally, 
the Jarque–Bera statistics indicate that the normal distribution hypotheses are rejected in 
all of these data. 
5.2 Demand equation and adjustment system 
 
To estimate the adjustment cost parameter and market power index of the model, the 
slope of demand b  and the G  matrix need to be provided.  They were obtained from the 
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estimation of the demand equation and the adjustment system, respectively. Both were 
estimated using the EViews 5.1.  
 
The price of CPO, crude coconut oil, cooking oil and a dummy variable for economic 
crisis were chosen as regressors in the CPO demand function.  In addition, an interactive 
term between the price of CPO and crude coconut oil was included to capture the 
possible market power effect.  (see Chapter 3 for detail discussion suggested by 
Bresnahan (1992)). Except for the price of CPO, all of these variables were treated as 
exogenous variables.  The price of CPO was suspected to be endogenously determined 
with the quantity of CPO through the CPO supply function. This hypothesis was then 
tested through the Hausman test.  
 
To carry out the Hausman test, an instrumental variable—that is correlated with the 
suspect variable, CPO price, but not with the error tem of CPO demand equation—needs 
to be chosen.  In general, the theory of supply states that the cost of factor of production 
is one of the most important variables in the supply relation (see Equation 3.20 
0 1 2t t it itp w qα α α ξ= + + + as an example of a linear form of supply relation, where w  is the 
price of factor production). In this case, the price of estates workers is an important factor 
of production in the CPO supply relation, as the expenditure for the workers contributes 
30 per cent of the total production costs.  Therefore it was used as the instrumental 
variable in the Hausman test.  
 
The test comprises two stages: First, the suspect variable, CPO price, was regressed on all 
exogenous variables and the instrument variable, the price of estates workers, and the 
vector of residuals from this regression was retrieved. Then the CPO demand function 
was re-estimated by including the residuals from the first regression as additional 
regressors. The Hausman test result shows that the coefficient on the first stage residuals 
is not significantly different from zero; hence the exogeneity of the CPO price variable 
could not be rejected. Therefore, the demand equation was then estimated by using the 
instrumental variable technique.  
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Three different specifications, namely the linear, the double-log and the linear-log forms 
were estimated.  In the last two forms, variables used in the adjustment systems are not 
linear, but their relationships are clearly linear. In other words, all of them represent a 
linear relationship between the control 
t
u , or in parallel 
t
q , and the state 1tq − .  They can 
be seen as types of the linear equation of motion, whose specification is chosen in the 
theoretical and empirical models.  Using time series data, a unit root and cointegration 
tests were conducted in order to avoid a spurious regression. The CPO demand data need 
to be in the same order and cointegrated with all the regressors.  The Dickey–Fuller unit 
root test shows that all data are non-stationary.  
 
 
In the linear forms, the time-series data have different orders of integration, and hence 
cointegration relationships do not exist. In the double-log and linear-log forms, the time-
series data have the same orders of integration and cointegration.  However, most 
coefficients in the former were insignificant, while most of the latter were significant.  
Therefore, the linear-log form is used for the final demand equation. The Durbin–Watson 
statistic was inconclusive, and thus the LM test was used as an alternative.  The result 
shows no serial correlation in the system, and the 2R  value is high. The estimated 
equation is as follows (see Appendix 5.2): 
 
Equation 5.2         
1 1 24835.28 1166.55 2280 493.73 354.09 41.53Q P P PP P D= − − + + +  
                                     ( )***6.05     ( )**2.28−    ( )***7.23−        ( )***7.91           ( )1.23       ( )**2.04        
                                                    2 0.98R =             LM test, F-statistics 6.06*=  
                      *** and **  shows one and five per cent level of significance  
 
where: 
P  is the log of the domestic price of CPO;   
1P  is the log of the domestic price of crude coconut oil;  
2P is the log of the domestic price of palm cooking oil;  
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D  is a dummy variable that represents the economic crisis period of 1997–1998.  
Before 1997 it is zero, otherwise it is one; and  
numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
 
Except for 2P , all estimates are significant at the one or five per cent levels. The 
insignificant coefficient of the price of palm cooking oil 2P  might be explained by the 
government intervention in setting the market prices. Larson (1996, p. 18) found that the 
export tax changed the relationship between the CPO and the cooking oil prices.  
 
The coefficient of 1P  and 1PP  were used to calculate the cross price elasticity of CPO 
demand16. Figure 5.1 shows that until 1991, CPO and crude coconut oil are 
complementary goods, while afterwards they became substitute goods.  This might be 
explained by the increasing market share of CPO over time. In the earlier period, when 
the crude coconut oil still dominated the vegetable oil domestic market, CPO was not 
used as the main raw material in the cooking oil production process.  CPO was likely 
used in a relatively small amount as one of additive inputs in the process. While in the 
latter period, when CPO was largely used as the raw material, CPO and crude coconut oil 
then became substitute goods. A decrease in CPO demand from the cooking oil industry 
leads to a decrease in the supply of palm cooking oil, and thus an increase in its price. As 
consumers shift their demand to coconut cooking oil, the demand and price of the crude 
coconut oil are expected to increase.  
 
 
Figure 5.1   CPO cross price elasticities of demand, 1969–2003 
                                                 
16 The cross price demand elasticity is  
1
1
PQ
P Q
∂
∂
 . Given the demand equation as 
0 1 2 1 3 1 4 2 5log log log log logQ P P P P P Dα α α α α α ε= + + + + + + , its derivative 
1
Q
P
∂
∂
 is 
2 3
1 1
1 1 1 1
log
ln10 ln10
P
P P
α α+
 
 
 
, hence the own price elasticity is ( )2 31 log
ln10
P
Q
α α+ .   
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The coefficient of P  and 1PP  were used to calculate the own price elasticity of CPO 
demand17.  Figure 5.2 shows that the own price demand elasticities appear to be positive, 
indicating the nature of net price variable (Brown et al 1974). In this case, the net price 
refers to the actual price paid by the consumers, which is the CPO market price minus the 
subsidy. Due to the absence of subsidy data, the market price data used in the estimation 
do not take account of the subsidy data; hence these are not the net price variable.  
Therefore, an increase in the market price does not necessary mean an increase in the real 
price paid by the consumers.  If in fact, the net price is actually decreased, an increase in 
the market price may lead to an increase in the quantity demanded.  Hence, a 
counterintuitive positive own price demand elasticity will be observed.  
 
Figure 5.2 also shows that the CPO elasticity changed significantly towards a more 
inelastic demand, reflecting the increase in the CPO dominancy as the raw material for 
cooking oil.  
 
 
                                                 
17 The demand elasticity is the own price elasticity, the formula for which is 
Q P
P Q
∂
∂
 . Given the demand 
equation as 0 1 2 1 3 1 4 2 5log log log log logQ P P P P P Dα α α α α α ε= + + + + + + , its derivative 
Q
P
∂
∂
 is 
1 3 1
1 1 1 1
log
ln10 ln10
P
P P
α α+
 
 
 
, hence the own price elasticity is ( )1 3 11 log
ln10
P
Q
α α+ .   
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Figure 5.2    CPO own price elasticities of demand, 1969–2003 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The coefficient of P  was also used to calculate the slope of the CPO inverse demand 
b (see footnote 12), which is needed to estimate the adjustment cost parameter in the next 
section.  Figure 5.3 shows that the slope changes with the changes of CPO price P  over 
time.  However, even with a constant slope, calculating the adjustment cost parameter 
and the market power index in an asymmetric dynamic model is complicated.  Therefore, 
for computational ease,  the average value of CPO price was used to calculate the 
constant slope (Gujarati 1999, p. 263). The difference between the maximum and 
minimum values of the slope is relatively small; hence using the average value is fairly 
reasonable. 
 
Figure 5.3  Slopes of CPO demand function, 1969–2003 
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The adjustment system was estimated using the SUR. A similar argument was used in the 
estimation of demand function, on the basis of two different specifications, namely the 
linear and the double-log forms. For each group, output data were regressed on the three- 
year lag of their own and the other group output data. As both of the time series level data 
are non-stationary, 2R  value appears to be extremely high.  Unless the time series data 
are cointegrated, the relationship between them will be spurious.  
 
The unit root test shows that all of the time series data are I(1), but the Johansen 
cointegration test result indicates that a cointegration relationship appears only in the 
double-log form. Therefore, it was used for the final estimation. As lagged dependent 
variables were included in the model, the Durbin–Watson test for autocorrelation is no 
longer applicable and needs to be replaced by Durbin’s h-test. The result shows that there 
is no autocorrelation.  Two dummy variables for the periods of economic crisis and 
concessionary credit were also included.  Results are shown in Table 5.2 (see Appendix 
5.3). 
 
The G  matrix was constructed from coefficients of the groups’ own lagged 
( )11 22,G G and other groups’ lagged output ( )12 21,G G . Table 5.2 shows that all elements 
of the G  matrix, except 12G , are significant at the one per cent level. 11G  and 22G  are 
positive, indicating increasing growth in both the public estates and private companies 
output. The insignificant 12G  indicates a lack of response from the public estates to the 
previous action of private companies, while the positive 21G  shows that the private 
companies always accommodate the previous action of the public estates, and hence a 
leader–follower relationship is revealed.   
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Table 5.2    Estimation of the adjustment system  
 Public estates Private companies 
Constant 0.45 0.31 
 (3.32)*** (1.35) 
Economic crisis 1997 -0.10 0.06 
                  (-3.68)*** (1.25) 
Concessionary credit 1986–1996 -0.04 0.17 
                (-2.14)** (5.32)*** 
Own lagged output  0.90 0.70 
 (16.24)*** (8.12)*** 
Other lagged output 0.05 0.25 
 (0.89) (2.61)*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.99 0.99 
Durbin–Watson 1.27 1.79 
Durbin’s h 12.07*** 3.5*** 
Note : Numbers in parenthesis refer to t-statistics 
*** and ** shows 1 and 5 per cent level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
The asymmetric G  matrix may complicate the estimation if real eigenvalues do not exist.  
However, such a problem does not exist in this case. Given the characteristic polynomial 
of the asymmetric G  matrix as ( )2 11 22 12 21 11 22r G G r G G G G− + − + (see Appendix 4.5) 
and using the quadratic function rule, the roots of the G  elements will be: 
 
Equation 5.3         ( ) 2 211 22 11 22 11 22 12 211 2 4
2
r G G G G G G G G = + ± + − +
 
 
 
To obtain real eigenvalues, the expression under the square root needs to be non-
negative.  As both 11G  and 22G  are positive, 
2 2
11 22G G+  will always be greater than 
11 222G G− , and thus 
2 2
11 22 11 222 0G G G G+ − > .  Combined with the positive 12G  and 21G , 
the whole expression under the square root will always be non-negative, and hence using 
this G  matrix in estimation is possible. Within an asymmetric condition, the property of 
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stability will be 11 222 2G G− < + <  and 11 22 12 211 1G G G G− < − < , both of which are 
satisfied by this adjustment system (see Table 5.2).   
 
While both dummy parameters of the public estates are negative, those of the private 
companies appear to be positive.   The difference in the credit dummy estimates might 
stem from the amount and effectiveness of the credit received by each group. The public 
estates and the private companies received 15 per cent and 26 per cent of the total credit, 
respectively.  While a one per cent increase in the credit boosted the public estates area 
by 0.4 per cent, that of the private companies can be expanded by 1.5 per cent (ADB 
1997).  On the other hand, the difference in the economic crisis dummy estimates might 
stem from the market distribution and in the efficiency of the public estates and private 
companies. During the economic crisis, the international–domestic CPO price ratio 
significantly increased, making exports more profitable. The public estates did not fully 
enjoy such a benefit because most of its output needed to be supplied to the domestic 
market. Although such a restriction was not imposed on the private companies, a similar 
barrier existed from the high export taxes imposed during the periods of economic crisis.  
However, many sellers appeared to smuggle their CPO to the international market, and 
thus enjoyed the increase in export values (Marks et al. 1998, pp. 53-54). At the same 
time, being more efficient, the private companies may also have minimised the increase 
in production costs  due to the increase in imported input prices (Arifin et al. 1999).  
 
 
5.3 Monte Carlo numerical integration 
 
On the basis of the estimates of b and the G  matrix, the market power index v  and the 
cost of adjustment parameter θ  were calculated using Matlab 7. The Monte Carlo 
numerical integration method was used to generate 200,000 replications of the G matrix, 
including 100,000 of their antithetics. This antithetic variates method was used in an 
attempt to reduce the variance of the replications of the G matrix, and hence increase the 
precision. ‘The idea of antithetic variates relies on the intuition that extreme values can 
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be made less harmful in a simulation by also using other extreme values to counteract 
them’ (Fackler 2006, p. 5). The results are reported in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3    Results of the Monte Carlo numerical integration using asymmetric G matrix    
Properties Selected samples 
11 222 2G G− < + < ;
11 22 12 211 1G G G G− < − <  
197,918 
(99) 
0
i
θ >  152,912  
(76) 
1 1iv− < <  
1,850 
(0.9) 
Note : Numbers in parentheses refer to the percentage of the selected samples as a percentage of 
the total replications (200,000). 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the stability and the convexity properties hold in 99 and 76 per cent 
of the replications, respectively but the market power index property is satisfied in only 
0.9 per cent of the replications. The posterior density for the adjustment cost parameter 
i
θ  with no prior information is presented in Figure 5.4. Most of the values appear to be 
positive, so imposing the convex adjustment cost seems rather reasonable. The negative 
values of the adjustment cost parameters indicate some possibility of a non-convex 
condition, which might arise from various reasons. First, non-convexity might occur if 
inputs are indivisible, which in this case could refer to the machine capacity in the CPO 
mills (Rothschild 1971; Cooper and Haltiwanger 1993; Nilsen and Schiantarelli 2003; de 
Cordoba et al. 2005, p. 59). In this case, although the capacity data are not complete, the 
investment pause period18 in the palm oil industry might reflect non-convexity condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 In the palm oil industry, the different phases of investment occur due to the availability of capital and 
credit. In 1968–1996, they were more accessible through the World Bank aid and concessionary credits, but 
they were less accessible in 1997–1998 during the economic crisis (van Gelder 2004). 
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Figure 5.4    Probability distribution function of 1θ  and 2θ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, the non-convexity might stem from a data problem. Using annual data, the 
impact of adjustment could materialise within the same period. In this study, adjustment 
costs could stem from changing the level of CPO mill capacity.  On average, constructing 
a new CPO mill takes less than two years.  Therefore, annual data cannot capture the 
increasing average cost condition of a convex adjustment cost function.  Changes in 
annual rate of production data that are used as an approximation of the adjustment cost 
variable appear to have large changes in output from period to period for both the public 
estates and the private companies (see Figure 5.3). Previous studies show that changes in 
output rates not only exist in annual data, but also both in monthly and seasonal data 
(Lubis 1996; Simeh 2002; Abdullah 2003). Therefore, using monthly data might lead to a 
smooth graph and hence convex adjustment costs, as changes in output of more frequent 
data are likely to be much smaller than those for the annual data.  
 
Figure 5.5    Rate of production of the public estates and private companies, 1971–2003 
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For the market index property, although the property includes both the positive and 
negative values, Figure 5.6 shows that most of the replications in the posterior density 
with no prior information lie outside the desired range.  
 
Figure 5.6    Probability distribution function of 1v  and 2v  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These replications appear to have values less than –1, with both distributions having long 
tails. Imposing the convexity property on both group parameters simultaneously reduces 
the space of the truncated version of the posterior density space significantly. The 
rejection may, in part, be explained by the occurrence of positive elasticities of demand, 
noted previously. This index is obtained under the assumption that the elasticity of 
demand is always negative, so that profit maximisation conditions can satisfy: 
 
Equation 5.4         
( )1 i ii v sP c
P ε
+
−
= −  
 
where:  
i
v  is the market power index; 
P  is the output price; 
i
c  is the i th firm’s marginal cost; 
i
i
q
s
Q
=  is the firm’s market share; and  
Q P
P Q
ε
∂
=
∂
 is the elasticity of demand.  
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Given 1 1
i
v− ≤ ≤  and 0 1
i
s< ≤ , positive demand elasticities will lead to a negative result 
of the left hand side.  This means that market prices P  will always be less than the i th 
firm’s marginal cost, which is impossible, if firms are assumed to behave rationally. 
However, with a subsidy, a firm’s marginal costs exceeds market prices, and the 
difference between the two is the amount of the subsidy (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2001, p. 
317).  
 
The negative margins do not necessarily show a negative profit for the firm, as long as 
the amount of the subsidy is fully covered by other institutions such as the government. 
In Indonesia, the government imposed such a subsidy in two different ways.  First, the 
government bought CPO produced by the privately owned estates at the international 
price and sold it at lower prices. Second, CPO produced by the public estates was sold at 
a lower price than the market price (Larson 1996, p. 11; Arifin et al. 1999). While for the 
first type, the subsidy was likely to have been fully covered by the government, this was 
unlikely for the second. In other words, it seems that the negative price–cost margins 
might arise more in the public estates than in the private companies.  Since the market 
power index property needs to be satisfied in both groups, this might lead to a high 
rejection of this property.  In addition, the negative price–cost margins do not necessarily 
show that the duopolists behave competitively.  As policy makers have incomplete or no 
information about the groups’ cost functions, the amount of subsidies given is unlikely to 
be determined by the difference between price and the groups’ marginal costs.  If the 
subsidies are greater than this difference, the groups might still enjoy some degree of 
market power.   
 
 
5.4 Adjustment cost parameter, market power index and type of competition 
 
Using the 200,000 replications, all of the three properties, namely, the stability, convexity 
and desired range of market power index were imposed to obtain the selected samples. 
The mean, standard deviation and numerical standard error (NSE) of market power index 
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v  and cost of adjustment parameter θ  of the samples were calculated. The results are 
shown in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4    Bayesian estimates  
Selected samples = 1310 , Probability = 0.0034 
Parameters 
Mean Standard deviation NSE 
1θ  1.39E5 5.18E4 5E32 
2θ  1.77E3 278.99 4.98E29 
1v  -0.46 0.75 3.26E31 
2v  -0.72 0.15 6.29E26 
 
Table 5.4 shows that jointly imposing three properties reduces the selected samples to 
only 1310 out of the 200,000 replications. The standard deviation of the adjustment cost 
parameters and market power index are relatively small, but their numerical standard 
errors are very large. Recall the formula of the NSE as: 
Equation 5.5         ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
1/ 2
2
2
1
2
1
N
k
k k
k k
N
k
k k
f G q
g G q
NSE
f G q
g G q
β β
β =
=
  
 
−  
    =
  
  
    
∑
∑
 
where: 
200,000N =  is the number of replications; 
k
β  is the adjustment cost parameter or market power index calculated from each  
value of the parameter vector replications; 
k
β  is the mean value of the adjustment cost parameter or market power index 
calculated from the selected samples; and  
( )
( )
.
.
f
g
 is the ratio of the diffuse and multivariate t-pdfs. 
 
Equation 5.5 shows that the large errors might stem either from the large difference 
between 
k
β  and 
k
β , or from the great ratio ( )( )
.
.
f
g
. The estimation results show that all 
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parameters in ( )1 2 1 2, , ,k k k k kv vβ θ θ=  have large difference between their minimum and 
maximum values, which are [-7.5E10;1.7E10], [–3.7E9;2.4E9], [–6.4E5;2.3E5] and          
[–7.4E4;169.6E4], respectively.  The small proportion of the selected samples relative to 
the total number of replication—which are 1310 out of 200,000—means that 
k
β  only 
represents a small part of the entire possible values.  Hence, most of the replications have 
a large difference between 
k
β  and 
k
β .  In addition,   most of the replications have large 
ratio 
( )
( )
.
.
f
g
 (99.7 per cent of the total replications have ratio values more than 1E10).  As 
both conditions appear this case, NSE values become extremely large, indicating that the 
mean value of the numerical integration imprecisely estimate the ‘true’ mean value.  
However, if the tail of ( ).f  is fatter than the tail of ( ).g , the NSE might not be reliable 
estimates of the true NSE (Barnett, Geweke and Yue 1988 in Chalfant et al. 1991, p. 
483). In this so-called the ‘thin tail’ problem, the weights become extremely large (Matos 
et al. 1993, p. 2051). 
 
The four degrees of freedom used in the multivariate t-distribution was suggested to be 
fat enough to cover most of the values in the actual posterior distribution, by accepting 
the loss of the extreme values (Chalfant et al. 1991; Chen et al. 2000). However, Figure 
5.4 shows that most parameter replications that satisfy the market power index properties 
are located in the small probability region. While the importance sampling technique 
appears to be efficient in reducing the variance in the selected samples or the truncated 
density, the small portion of the truncated density makes this technique unlikely to be 
efficient in reducing the variance in the untruncated density.  This is indicated by the 
small standard deviations and large NSE of the parameters. In fact, the difference 
between the parameters and their mean values reach as high as 8E20.    
 
Molle (2002, p. 10) defines that a probability distribution is said to have ‘fat tail’ or 
‘heavy tail’ or ‘broad tail’ if it exhibit a relatively large mass in its extreme ends. In 
addition, the thinner tail function decline faster than the fat tail distribution.  He illustrates 
such conditions with an example of log functions as in shown in Figure 5.7.  
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Figure 5.7    Log function distribution 
 
Source:  Molle (2002, p. 82). 
Using the proportionality function of ( ).f  and ( ).g 19 , we obtain their distributions as 
shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9.   
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19 See Equation 4.20 and 4.21 in Chapter 4 for details. 
Fatter tail 
distribution 
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Figure 5.9    ( ).g  probability distribution function 
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These pdfs indicate that ( ).g decline faster than ( ).f .  In addition, ( ).f  has a longer tail 
than ( ).g , reflecting by their lower and upper bound, which are [7E–65 ; 5E44] and [4E–
49 ; 1E–5], respectively.  The four degrees of freedom used in the multivariate t-
distribution was suggested to be fat enough to cover most of the values in the actual 
posterior distribution by accepting the loss of the extreme values (Chalfant et al. 1991; 
Chen et al. 2000). However, Figure 5.6 shows that most parameter replications that 
satisfy the market power index property are located in the small probability region.   
 
 
Increasing the number of replications or decreasing the degrees of freedom might 
overcome the large numerical standard error problem (van Dijk and Kloek 1980, p. 316; 
Chen et al. 2000). The addition of 100,000 antithetic replications in this estimation might 
not be efficient because the pdfs are not symmetric (Kloek and van Dijk 1978).  
However, as the weight appears to be extremely large, the required increase in the 
number of replications might be infinite.  In addition, the four degrees of freedom is 
already relatively small compared to the 30 degrees of freedom of a normal pdf. The 
asymmetric condition might in part stem from the skewed data used in the adjustment 
system (see Table 5.1). The log form used in the adjustment system—that is suggested to 
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change the skewness of the distribution—is unlikely to be effective for this case (Chen et 
al. 2000, p. 2302) 
 
 
The rejection of the market power index property leads to a low probability of the 
replications. The rejection might either indicate that the values of the index are 
unbounded, or there are some important variables that are not included in the model and 
estimation. If the values are unbounded, we do not need to impose the market power 
index property.  However, this makes interpretation of the groups’ behaviour very 
difficult, if not impossible. If the rejection of the market power index stems from missing 
variables—such as the marginal cost or subsidy data—we need to include them in the 
model and estimation.  However, such data are not available. Therefore, the estimation of 
mean values of the adjustment cost parameters and the market power index are still used 
with caution.   
 
The estimation result shows that the mean value of the public estates’ adjustment cost 
parameter is higher than that of the private companies, which are 1.39E5 and 1.77E3, 
respectively.  In other words, the public estates appear to be less flexible than the private 
companies.  This might in part be explained by the bureaucratic structure of the public 
estates.  Firms in the public estates group appear to have a more complex organisation 
structure than those in the private companies group, resulting in a longer administration 
lag in the decision making process. In addition, many government interventions were 
imposed on public estates, making them less flexible in responding to changing 
conditions.   
 
The estimation result shows that the mean value of the public estates’ market power 
index is -0.46, indicating that public estates exert some degree of market power, while 
that  of the  private companies group’s is -0.72, which is much closer to -1, indicating that  
the private companies tend to behave competitively.   In addition, the estimation result of 
the adjustment system (see Table 5.2) indicates a leader–follower relationship between 
the groups.  In other words, the groups’ relationship could be seen as a Stackelberg 
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interaction, in which the public estates act as a leader and exert some degree of market 
power, while the private companies act as a follower and acts as a price taker. 
 
Market power of the public estates in the Indonesian CPO industry might stem from at 
least two sources. First is the requirement of high investment, which may create some 
barriers to entry. It was estimated that US$ 2,500–3,500 per ha would be needed for 
developing a new plantation and US$ 5 million would be required to build a CPO mill. 
On average, the size of an individual plantation is approximately 10,000–25,000 ha, and 
it is mostly part of larger plantation estates ranging from 100,000 to 600,000 ha. In 1986–
1996, such entry barriers were successfully eliminated by providing the potential entrants 
with some concessionary credits. On average, each of the entrants borrowed about 77 per 
cent of the total establishment cost of the plantation, leading to an increase in the oil palm 
plantation by almost seven-fold (Casson 2000; Potter and Lee in van Gelder 2004, p. 22; 
Wakker 2004, p. 10). Second is the existence of trade associations such as the Joint 
Marketing Office. Clarke (1983)  suggests that such associations could facilitate collusion 
by allowing oligopolists to homogenise their perceptions of both the market state and 
other firms’ information.  
 
 
5.5 Welfare analysis 
 
The market power indices 
i
v  which is estimated to be more than -1 indicates that market 
price is higher than firms’ marginal costs.  To test this, three different scenarios 
(reflecting three different conditions in the analysis period) were simulated. Given two 
dummy variables, referring to the economic crisis and the concessionary credits, the 
periods of analysis can be divided into period one of 1969-1985, in which 1 2 0D D= = ; 
period two of 1986-1996, in which 1 0D =  and 2 1D = ; and period three of 1997-2003, in 
which 1 1D =  and 2 0D = .  
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Using the first scenario, in which 1 2 0D D= = , which implies no  economic crisis and 
concessionary credits, the adjustment system can be re-written as  
Equation 5.6       1 1 1 20.45 0.90 0.05t t tq q q+ = + +  
                         2 1 1 20.31 0.25 0.70t t tq q q+ = + +  
 
Given the results of demand function and adjustment system estimations, the difference 
between the subsidised and competitive prices faced by the public estates will be 
 
Equation 5.7       1 20.00071 0.003233 0.000078
s c
t t t tp p q q− = − − −  
 
and that faced by the private companies will be 
 
Equation 5.8      1 20.00025 0.0002 0.001515
s c
t t t tp p q q− = − − −  
 
The relationship between 1tq  and 2tq  is obtained by combining Equations 5.7 and 5.8 
 
Equation 5.9   1 20.151665 0.4727t tq q= −  
 
Substituting this into Equations 5.7 and 5.8 gives 
 
Equation 5.10   20.00120 0.001450
s c
t t tp p q− = − +   
and  
Equation 5.11    20.00028 0.0014205
s c
t t tp p q− = − −  
 
Finally, combining Equations 5.10 and 5.11 gives  2 0.32tq = . 
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Due to the lack of subsidy data, market price data are not the net price data and could be 
treated as the subsidised price, hence the average price p   was used as an approximation 
of s
t
p  (see Figure 1).  Plug 128120.97p =  either into Equation 5.10 or Equation 5.11, to 
get  the competitive price 128121ctp = . Following the same steps as in scenario 1, gives 
the same results for the competitive price in scenarios two and three.  Therefore, it could 
be concluded that the competitive price c
t
p  is likely to be higher than p .   
 
 
5.6 Concluding comments 
 
This chapter has presented the estimation techniques and results of the model, which was 
specified in the previous chapter. The Bayesian technique was used as it has the ability to 
impose the three properties of the model, namely stability, convexity and interpretable 
market power index. While the stability and convexity properties hold in most of the 
replications, market power property appears to be strongly rejected. The public estates 
appear to act as the leader and have some degree of market power, while the private 
companies act as the followers and tend to behave competitively. This might be explained 
by the changes in both the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, the elasticity of 
demand changed from very elastic to inelastic, providing all sellers in the market with an 
ability to exert market power.   On the supply side, the increase their  market share and 
vertical integration provided the private companies with an ability to respond to the 
public estates’ current actions, making the public estates behave more cooperatively. 
Given the fact that the public estates exert some degree of market power, indirect and 
direct policies that assume perfect competition appear no longer applicable.  
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Appendix 5 
Appendix 5.1    Research data    
       
CPO CPO Crude  Palm  Government Private  
nominal demand coconut oil  cooking oil group's  group's Year 
 price  nominal price nominal price production  production 
  (Rp/kg) (tonnes) (Rp/kg) (Rp/kg) (tonnes) (tonnes) 
1968 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 122,369 59,075 
1969 64.0  22.4  #N/A 87.2 128,561 60,240 
1970 66.0  36.0  104.20 90.9 147,003 69,824 
1971 74.0  30.4  110.05 169.9 170,304 79,653 
1972 72.9  27.6  101.39 184.1 189,261 80,203 
1973 90.7  25.6  182.43 200.0 207,448 82,229 
1974 128.5  38.4  128.00 221.7 243,641 104,035 
1975 148.4  38.4  161.56 239.4 271,171 126,082 
1976 144.8 22.6  207.73 316.3 286,096 144,910 
1977 144.1 60.8  303.66 455.8 336,891 120,716 
1978 168.6 95.2  407.03 483.8 336,224 165,060 
1979 206.7 160.0  396.62 498.1 438,756 201,724 
1980 222.5 185.6  388.85 500.2 498,858 221,544 
1981 245.3 359.2  426.85 476.9 533,399 265,616 
1982 248.8 407.2  360.82 476.3 598,653 285,212 
1983 276.7 478.4  550.68 648.0 710,431 269,102 
1984 405.5 612.8  743.29 779.4 814,015 329,144 
1985 421.5 642.2  691.50 569.7 861,173 339,241 
1986 426.4 524.8  538.51 746.5 912,306 384,919 
1987 427.0 702.6  625.63 762.4 988,480 352,413 
1988 502.0 774.0  673.15 874.5 1,102,692 454,495 
1989 547.5 948.0  774.91 905.8 1,184,226 597,039 
1990 525.3 981.6  597.37 708.3 1,247,156 788,506 
1991 572.5 990.4  967.56 822.6 1,360,363 883,918 
1992 722.5 1211.2  996.12 961.4 1,489,745 1,076,900 
1993 700.7 1427.2  985.11 987.7 1,469,156 1,190,272 
1994 911.3 1588.0  950.85 545.5 1,571,501 1,597,227 
1995 1,093.6 1692.3  1098.06 1362.6 1,613,848 1,864,379 
1996 996.5 2022.3  #N/A #N/A 1,706,852 2,058,259 
1997 1,138.5 2208.4  2410.10 1959.2 1,586,879 2,578,806 
1998 2,408.5 3,288.1 #N/A #N/A 1,501,747 3,084,099 
1999 2,435.4 3,625.3 1756.93 3398.0 1,468,949 3,438,830 
2000 2,204.8 3,909.4 2248.86 3909.3 1,460,954 3,633,901 
2001 2,220.8 4,082.8 2750.00 2402.4 1,519,289 4,079,151 
2002 3,109.1 3,901.8 3542.00 2562.4 1,607,734 4,587,871 
2003 3,704.4 3,910.7 3953.00 #N/A 1,543,528 4,627,744 
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Appendix 5.2    Estimation result for the demand equation 
 
Dependent Variable: Q   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1970 2002   
Included observations: 31 after adjustments  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
LOGP -1166.553 512.7563 -2.275064 0.0317 
LOGP1 -2280.002 315.3408 -7.230280 0.0000 
LOGP2 354.0936 287.5915 1.231238 0.2297 
LOGPLOGP1 493.7347 62.44299 7.906968 0.0000 
D3 414.5342 203.5406 2.036617 0.0524 
C 4835.280 799.4283 6.048422 0.0000 
     
R-squared 0.989727     Mean dependent var 1025.427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.987673     S.D. dependent var 1252.898 
S.E. of regression 139.1060     Akaike info criterion 12.88033 
Sum squared resid 483761.8     Schwarz criterion 13.15788 
Log likelihood -193.6452     F-statistic 481.7333 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.727595     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Appendix 5.3    Estimation result for the adjustment system 
 
System: MOTION4    
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Sample: 1968 2003     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C(1) 0.446186 0.134205 3.324656 0.0016 
C(2) 0.903125 0.055598 16.24371 0.0000 
C(3) 0.045293 0.050994 0.888214 0.3782 
C(4) -0.040686 0.019012 -2.139990 0.0367 
C(5) -0.103981 0.028255 -3.680136 0.0005 
C(7) 0.306430 0.227938 1.344357 0.1843 
C(8) 0.246309 0.094430 2.608376 0.0116 
C(9) 0.703124 0.086609 8.118380 0.0000 
C(10) 0.171891 0.032291 5.323267 0.0000 
C(11) 0.060158 0.047989 1.253592 0.2152 
     
Determinant residual covariance 1.72E-06   
     
Equation: LOGGT=C(1)+C(2)*LOGGT3+C(3)*LOGPT3+C(4)*D01+C(5) 
        *D02    
Observations: 33   
R-squared 0.992531     Mean dependent var 5.886660 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991464     S.D. dependent var 0.327913 
S.E. of regression 0.030295     Sum squared resid 0.025699 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.265200    
     
Equation: LOGPT=C(7)+C(8)*LOGGT3+C(9)*LOGPT3+C(10)*D01 
        +C(11)*D02   
Observations: 33   
R-squared 0.993080     Mean dependent var 5.743803 
Adjusted R-squared 0.992091     S.D. dependent var 0.578594 
S.E. of regression 0.051455     Sum squared resid 0.074132 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.787956    
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Chapter 6  
Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the previous findings on price–cost margins, adjustment costs, the type of 
interaction and the degree of market power are highlighted. Based on these findings, the 
policy implications of the analysis are considered.  In the next section, the negative price–
cost margin condition is used to assess the effectiveness of a subsidy policy in the 
Indonesian CPO industry.  The impact of adjustment costs on the effectiveness of policy 
pricing and on market power is examined in section 6.2.  In sections 6.3 and 6.4, the 
leader–follower and market power results are discussed, particularly with regard of the 
public estates’ role as the internal regulator.   In section 6.5, the limitations of the analysis 
and possible avenues for further research are explored. Finally, in section 6.6, a number 
of conclusions are presented. 
 
 
6.1   Subsidies, negative price–cost margins and market power 
 
While average market price is higher than the competitive price, estimation results 
indicate that both groups of producers still enjoy some degree of market power.  This 
might, in part, be related to the imposition of subsidies either in CPO or cooking oil 
prices.  With a subsidy, the sellers’ price might exceed the buyers’ price (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 2001, p. 317). 20  Due to the paucity of subsidy data, the market price data used 
in the estimation are not differentiated with prices actually received by the producers.  In 
such conditions, negative margins do not necessarily show a negative profit for the firm. 
If fact, the amount of subsidies is greater than the competitive and market price margin; 
sellers would receive prices higher than the competitive price and enjoy gaining some 
degree of market power.  
 
                                                 
20 The seller’s price refers to price being equal to the seller’s marginal cost and the buyer’s price is the same 
as the market price. 
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The estimation result shows that the slope of demand b  is positive.  While this can be 
explained by the nature of net price variable, positive b values make competitive market 
prices higher than non-competitive market prices.  Recall the market power price 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )1 11 1 1impt it it i i it tvp q q c q p
b
δ δ δ θ δ+ +
+
= − + + + + + −  
 
Given positive values of q  and δ , with negative b  and 1v > −  (which refers to the non- 
competitive conditions), the first term 
( ) [ ]11 i it itv q q
b
δ +
+
− +  would be positive; hence 
competitive prices would be higher than the non-competitive ones. In the estimation 
process b was calculated by using the average market price p . 
i
v  values were obtained 
through the estimation of firms adjustment process and were not determined by the b  
value.  The separate estimations of b  and 
i
v values might lead to the condition of high 
competitive price.  
 
With market power, subsidies are unlikely to have a desired effect. This can be illustrated 
in Figure 6.1. Suppose that the price and quantity without subsidies are mp  and mQ , with 
subsidies are p  and sQ , and marginal cost is mc . Without subsidies, consumers could 
only receive a surplus as much as OHF, whereas with subsidies it could be as much as 
OBC.  This means that subsidies increase consumer surplus as much as ABCE. However, 
the expense of subsidies ( )m sp p Q− (which equals BCGH) is greater than the increase in 
consumer surplus.  The difference CGF indicates that with market power, subsidies could 
reduce the aggregate welfare.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130
Figure 6.1  Subsidies and welfare 
 
 
 
In Indonesia, the subsidies could be either covered by the government or the producer 
(either public estates or private companies).  Without subsidies, producer surplus is 
( )m mp mc Q− (see Figure 6.1).  If the subsidies are covered by the government and the 
government does not know the producers’ marginal cost, paying all the difference 
between the producer and the consumer prices, producers still receive prices at mp . In 
such a condition, the subsidy does not change the margin, and the producers still enjoy 
some degree of market power. The producer’s surplus increases as much as 
( )m sp mc Q− .  
 
In contrast, if all of the subsidies are covered by the producers, producers receive prices 
at sp , hence their price-cost margin will be negative and their surplus decreases as much 
as ( )s smc p Q− . Finally, the expenses of subsidies could also be divided for both the 
government and producers.  If government expenses for subsidies are great enough to 
lead to a positive price-cost margin, producers will still enjoy some degree of market 
power. Such a condition might appear in the Indonesian palm oil industry, as policy 
makers have incomplete or no information about the groups’ cost functions and the 
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amount of subsidies given is unlikely to be determined by the difference between price 
and marginal costs.   
 
If producers have different marginal costs due to the difference in efficiency, the 
subsidies might provide some degree of market power to the more efficient producer. The 
efficient producer has lower marginal costs, say mc p mc′ < < , than those who are less 
efficient.  In this case, producers still gain extra profit and enjoy market power even 
though they have to cover all of the subsidies.  In fact, the public estates appear to be less 
efficient than the private companies. On average, the production costs of the public 
estates were 36 per cent higher than those of the private ones.21 Therefore, in order to be 
effective, government price intervention needs to be based on the marginal cost 
information of efficient producers.  
 
In addition, subsidies would encourage the less efficient producers to remain in the 
industry. Green (1987, p. 487) suggests that there are two conditions that allow less 
efficient firms to remain in a market.  First, there is no better potential entrants. In the 
palm oil industry, this might be attributable to barriers to entry that stem from the high 
investment levels required to establish a sufficient scale of oil palm estates and CPO 
mills. In 1986 the government attempted to address this problem by providing potential 
entrants with some concessionary credits. On average, each of the private companies 
borrowed about 77 per cent of its total establishment cost and increased the oil palm 
plantation area almost seven-fold. However, after 1996 these  concessionary credits were 
no longer available (Casson 2000). This implies that the more recent entrants faced the 
higher costs of entry to the industry, and hence incumbents earned persistently higher 
profits than the potential entrants.22  If such barriers can be removed, ‘no one firm can 
succeed in the long run at earning profits that exceed costs without inducing additional 
entry’(Carlton and Perloff 2005, p. 77).  Therefore, providing potential entrants with 
similar credits—so that firms can enter with identical cost—could lead the market to a 
                                                 
21 De Fraja (1991) has used the average variable cost as the measurement of efficiency. The production cost 
of the private companies is approximated by the real average costs of a firm listed in the Jakarta Future 
Exchange during 1994–2003, and that of the public estates is approximated by the real average costs of 
plantation firms surveyed by Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia during 1994–2000.  
22 Carlton and Perlof (2005) defined such a condition as the long run barrier to entry. 
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more competitive condition, in which no inefficient firms can survive. This implies that 
the public estates would be forced to increase its efficiency to remain competitive.  While 
an inefficient government firm can still improve consumer welfare by selling output at 
below its marginal costs,23 this is obtained through a transfer from the rest of economy 
(for example, through general taxation), rather than from increasing total social welfare.  
In contrast, with low marginal costs, an efficient public firm can set a low price, forcing 
private firms to cut their price, which then increases the total social welfare (de Fraja 
1991, p. 315). 
 
The second condition allowing less efficient firms to remain in the market is the absence 
of competition among incumbent firms. Clarke (1983, p. 384) suggests that, in general, 
oligopolists have strong incentives to collude because they would gain profits by 
restricting their output and receiving a higher price.  However, incentives to collude are 
often offset by the problems associated with detecting cheaters on the collusive 
agreement, which stem from the uncertain market conditions. One way to reduce market 
uncertainty is by homogenising the oligopolists’ perception through a pooling 
mechanism, such as in the trade associations. Being a member of the same association 
(namely the Indonesian Palm Oil Producers Association) provides means for the public 
estates and private companies to improve their production or distribution processes as 
well as to promote technical or economic progress.  However, at the same time, this 
allows the groups to homogenise their perception about the market condition and to share 
information about other firms. In the absence of the competitive behaviour, both the 
public estates and private companies may enjoy some degree of market power.24  
 
Subsidies might also lead to a decrease in the elasticity of demand (Silvestre 1993, pp. 
136-137). For example, if the demand curve is a straight line, moving down along the line 
leads to a decrease in the elasticity. Subsidies decrease prices that need to be paid by the 
consumers, hence increase quantities demanded by the consumers.  In other words, 
subsidies move down the equilibrium point along the demand curve. For normal goods, 
                                                 
23 Being instructed to maximise the social welfare is often used as a justification for the losses in the public 
firms (de Fraja 1991, p.316). 
24 Green (1994) calls this a supra-normal profit.  
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an increase in their market price causes consumers to shift their demand to other 
substitute goods. However, with subsidies consumers pay either the same or a slightly 
higher price, and hence their demand might remain the same or only slightly decreases.  
This implies that a ‘change’ in output price does not change, or only slightly changes, the 
demand, so that producers could increase price without losing a significant portion of 
demand.  This provides producers with a chance to increase price above marginal cost 
and to enjoy the market power gain.   
 
To conclude, while subsidies are imposed to increase the consumer surplus, they might 
actually decrease the aggregate welfare due to market power.  In order to provide 
subsidies that could remove the imperfectly competitive market condition, policy makers 
need information on the marginal cost of the efficient producers.  If the amount of the 
subsidy is exactly the difference between price and costs, the competitive market price 
will be observed.  If the amount of subsidy is greater than the difference between price 
and costs, producers will still enjoy some degree of market power.  
 
 
6.2 Adjustment costs and pricing policy  
 
In an oligopolistic market with homogeneous products, each firm has an ability to 
influence market price by changing its output level. However, the existence of adjustment 
costs prevents the firm from changing its output level. The higher the adjustment costs of 
the firm, the lower its ability to influence market price (Cairns 1995, pp. 87-88).  
 
The estimation results suggest that the public estates incur higher adjustment costs than 
the private companies. The government often used public estates as an instrument to 
influence market price.  In particular, to ensure an adequate supply for the domestic 
market, the distribution of CPO produced by public estates is controlled by the 
government. When an increase in output was unlikely to decrease market price, the CPO 
produced by public estates was sold at less than the market price. These distribution and 
pricing strategies were designed to support the competitive condition in the domestic 
market.  However, the high adjustment costs of the public estates make it more difficult 
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for them to change their output level to influence market price. As a result, the 
effectiveness of government pricing policy in this industry is reduced.  
 
High adjustment costs might stem from the bureaucratic structure of the public estates. 
Improving the organisational structure of the government companies and reducing 
intervention by policy makers might reduce the bureaucratic nature of public estates, and 
hence decrease their adjustment costs.  As a result, this might increase the ability of the 
public estates to adjust their output and to influence market level. In addition, the 
government appears to have reduced the public estates’ dominance by supporting the 
entrance of private companies in the CPO industry. Since 1986, the government has 
helped the private companies to expand their output level by providing them with 
concessionary credits. However, an increase in the private companies output does not 
necessarily increase supply in the domestic market, because they can also sell their output 
in the international market.  Consequently, the public estates need to fill the gap between 
the market demand and the private companies’ level of supply in the domestic market. 
The problem is that the public estates’ share of output is no longer adequate to cover the 
entire domestic demand, hence, price is unlikely to be set at the market clearing level.  
 
The high adjustment costs might also emanate from the absence of vertical integration 
between the public estates and the cooking oil refineries. The maturation periods of the 
fresh fruit bunches make it necessary for the government to have an adequate amount of 
stocks (Harris and Wiens 1980).  Since CPO cannot be stored for more than three months 
without a reduction in quality, the public estates need to have the stock in the cooking oil 
form. This means that the public estates need either to be vertically integrated with more 
cooking oil refineries or to increase the capacity of their refineries.   
 
In addition, imported cooking oil could be used as an alternative. The cooking oil price in 
the world market is likely to be more competitive than in the domestic market.  The 
reason is that the world market is supplied with various types of vegetable oils, which 
appear to be highly substitutable for one another  (In and Inder 1997).  In such a 
condition, a small increase in a certain type of vegetable oil would lead to a high 
reduction in the quantity demanded. In other words, no single producer can increase price 
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without suffering from a significant decrease in its profit. Hence, producers of the various 
types of vegetable oils would sell their outputs as low as the competitive levels.   
 
 
6.3 The leader–follower relationship and the role of public estates as an internal 
regulator 
 
Relaxing the symmetry assumption provides the estimation results in a broader type of 
interaction between the public estates and private companies.  In particular, it includes 
the asymmetric interactions, such as the leader–follower relationship and the dominant–
fringe relationship, as well as the symmetric interaction, such as the independent, 
cooperative and non-cooperative interactions (Putsis and Dhar 1998). The estimation 
results suggest that the public estates and private companies engage in a leader–follower 
interaction, in which the public estates act as the leader and the private companies as the 
follower.  The public estates do not react to actions taken by the private companies, while 
as a follower; the private companies always accommodate output changes undertaken by 
the public estates.   
 
Part of the leader–follower/ Stackelberg interaction might be explained by occurrence of 
positive reaction functions and asymmetry costs between the public estates and private 
companies. Suppose that the i th firm ‘s profit, ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i iq q p q c q ppi = −    , where ip , 
i
q and ( ).c are the selling quantity and price and the cost function of the i th firm, 
respectively. p is determined by q , where ,
i j
q q q= . Dowrick (1986) shows that the 
slope of firm i ’s reaction function is given by 
ij
ii
pi
pi
− , where 
ij
pi  and 
ii
pi are the second 
cross and own partial profit function partial derivatives, respectively. To satisfy the profit 
maximisation condition, 
i
pi  and 
ii
pi  need to be zero and negative, respectively.  Hence, 
the sign of firm i ’s reaction function is merely determined by the sign of 
ij
pi .  
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Negative reaction functions are commonly assumed for a quantity setting game.  
However, the reverse may occur if and only if 0
ij
pi >  or .. 0
i j
i ij
i
p
p
q
> − > . As the 
product is homogeneous and thus 
i j
p p p= = , this can be re-written as 
.
. 0
j
ij
i
p
p
q
> − > . Given the non-negative level of output 
i
q , the second term means that 
goods are normal, thus its first own partial derivative is negative . 0jp < .  The first term 
.ijp refers to second cross partial derivates. The first order condition of the firm’s profit 
function shows the ratio between price and marginal costs, in which price must exceed 
marginal costs if output is positive, while that of the second order condition shows the 
ratio between the ‘margin’ of price and marginal costs.  This means that .ijp  is positive if 
the ‘margin’ of marginal costs is less than that of price, which can either emanate from 
the increase of the ‘margin’ of price or from the decrease of the ‘margin’ of marginal 
costs.   
 
The increase of the ‘margin’ of price could occur, for example, if the market demand is 
increasing and inelastic.  In this case, the estimation result shows that from 1967 to 2003, 
the CPO demand has been increasing and appears to be more inelastic.  The increase in 
CPO demand stems from the increase of population and income, while the inelasticity 
could partly be explained by the increase in CPO dominancy as the raw material for 
cooking oil. The decrease of the ‘margin’ of marginal costs could occur, for example, if a 
firm has a decreasing marginal costs function.  In other words, an increase in its output 
leads to a decrease in its marginal costs, implying that the firm still has not reached the 
minimum marginal costs.   
 
Theoretically, as a leader, the public estates can effectively help to suppress market 
power in the market.  Cremer et al. (1989, p. 283) suggest that the public firm’s role as a 
leader or first-mover, taking into account the reactions of the private firm, could be 
explained by its objective of maximising social welfare.  In order to maximise social 
welfare, the public estates need to sell output equal to or greater than the competitive 
level. The public estates can announce their output policy and set their output level so 
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that market price equals marginal costs. However, if the market price reaches the 
competitive level, the private companies will not obtain as high a payoff as when the 
market price is higher.  
 
In such a condition, selling in the international market becomes more profitable than 
selling domestically, leading to a further decrease of supply and an increase of price in 
the domestic market.   There are at least two factors that might explain the high price in 
the international market.  First, given land suitability and low labour costs, Indonesia was 
recorded as the most cost efficient CPO producer in the world (see Table 2.2). This 
means that the Indonesian CPO producers’ marginal costs are expected to be lower than 
those of other producers in the world. Second, CPO consumers in the international are 
likely willing to pay at higher prices either because the CPO is processed into outputs 
with higher added value than cooking oil—such as oleochemicals—or because the CPO 
consumer countries have higher purchasing power than that of the domestic market. As a 
result, the competitive price in the international market would be higher than that of in 
the domestic market. If, in fact, the increase in the private companies’ export leads to a 
significant increase in the domestic price, the public estates might see this as a credible 
‘threat’ from the private companies.  Gaining an increase in market share and vertical 
integration makes the private companies’ ‘threat’ credible, and hence deters the public 
estates from raising output to lowering the market price. As a result, both groups end up 
with selling outputs below the competitive levels and enjoying some degree of market 
power. Here, the role of the public estates as a leader does not suppress market power in 
the CPO industry, and there might be some social welfare loss in the industry.   
 
Figure 6.2 shows an extreme example in which the duopolists perfectly collude and 
become a monopolist.  Their total output will be Q1 and they receive a transfer surplus 
from consumers as much as the area A.  However, there will be a loss that is not offset by 
the surplus transferred to the monopoly, which may be as much as area B and is 
commonly known as the deadweight loss. Wien (1978) suggests that one way for the 
public firms to increase their output to the competitive market level is by giving the 
management incentives based on the companies’ performance. Suppose that the 
monopoly gain is evenly divided between the duopolists, so that each of them receives 
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A/2.  If the public firms have an adequate capacity to make up any difference between Q2 
and the private companies level of output and if policy makers can compensate the 
monopoly gain, then the public firms’ production level could be pushed up to fill the gap 
to reach the competitive level. Such an intervention—that is, increasing the public firms’ 
output to influence the behaviour of private counterparts—might be a better alternative 
than the pricing policy, as the government intervention to set prices below the market 
price appears to be ineffective in eliminating market power in the Indonesian CPO 
market.25 
 
 
Figure 6.2    Monopoly price and social welfare 
 
 
 
6.4 The existence of market power  
 
The cost of market power is well-known: It can reduce social welfare (as shown by the 
area B in Figure 6.2) and can increase the redistribution of wealth (as shown in the area A 
in Figure 6.2). Posner (1975) argues that the ‘traditional deadweight loss’ (the area B) is 
                                                 
25 Government interventions can be of two types.  One is to appoint an economic commissar in charge of 
the industry, that is, the so-called ‘regulatory authority’.   The other is to produce the output provided 
otherwise by the private companies, that is, the so-called ‘regulation by participation’ (Sertel 1988). 
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likely to underestimate the social costs of monopoly.  This is because the ‘traditional 
deadweight loss’ does not include the costs of establishing the monopoly itself, which can 
be as much as the monopoly profit (area A). With this in mind, in 1999, the government 
implemented Law No.5/1999 in order to deal with imperfect competition, which 
effectively discouraged the optimal allocation of resources and the implementation of 
more efficient technologies, and hence decreased social welfare. A Commission for the 
Supervision of Business Competition was established in order to ensure the 
implementation of the law  (KPPU 2000).  
 
According to Law No.5/1999, market share is used as a measure of a firm’s dominant 
position, which might enhance the sellers’ ability to influence prices in the market. Based 
on the market share of each of the public estates, the Indonesian Ministry of State-Owned 
Firms (2002) suggested that on average, these firms behaved competitively. With such 
behaviour, a decrease in their costs will lead to a reduction in their selling price.  
Furthermore, since they appear to be vertically integrated with the cooking oil refineries, 
this might also lead to a decrease in the cooking oil price. Given this assumption, many 
government policies were implemented to ensure that the cooking oil industry is supplied 
with an adequate amount of CPO at an affordable price.  Since more than 70 per cent of 
cooking oil production costs come from CPO expenditure, it  was expected that the 
impact would be significant  (Indiarto et al. 1996, p. 217).  Higher export taxes were 
imposed to limit CPO export, especially from the private companies, leaving an adequate 
supply for the domestic market. Subsidies for the CPO produced by public estates were 
provided to decrease the production costs of cooking oil refineries.  
 
The fact that both groups appear to exert some degree of market power implies that the 
effectiveness of the price transmission mechanism is questionable. Empirically, Isdijoso 
et al. (cited in Susanto 2000, p. 2) found that supplying an adequate amount of CPO was 
no longer effective in stabilising cooking oil prices, while Mark et al. (1998) showed that 
the gain from a lower CPO price in the domestic market had not been passed on to the 
cooking oil consumers. McCorriston and Reyner (2001) suggest that the impact of the 
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imperfect market on price transmission would be significant, given the existence of non-
constant marginal costs.26   
 
To deal with market power, Harris and Wein (1980, p. 131) list three possible solutions; 
namely, nationalisation of the industry, anti-trust policy and direct regulation. Law 
No.5/1999, which is used to address market power in Indonesia, can be seen as a type of 
antitrust policy. According to this law, firms are restricted from making an agreement to 
influence market price by controlling their production. This implies that, without any 
agreement, the law cannot be used to address such behaviour. Harris and Wein (1980, p. 
131) suggest that anti-trust policy is ineffective in addressing the tacit collusion problem.  
The model used here assumed that firms behaved non-cooperatively, in which each of 
them behaved in its own self interest (Tirole 1988, p.206). This is reflected in the 
optimisation problem of the model; firms choose the level of their production given their 
rivals’ output.  Within this model, estimation of market power index does not exclude the 
collusive equilibrium. By responding to its rival’s actions, the total output of the players 
could result in a collusive equilibrium. This can be either because the collusive behaviour 
provides the players with higher profits, or because one player has a credible threat that 
deters another player from deviating from the collusive behaviour. The Indonesian 
competition law that has been imposed since 1999 might be effective in preventing firms 
from signing collusive contracts. In fact, even without such an agreement, firms in the 
CPO industry are likely to exert some degree of market power. Therefore, eliminating the 
‘sources’ of market power might be a better solution.  
 
Another possible solution—nationalisation of the industry—might also be ineffective in 
addressing market power in the Indonesian palm oil industry, because the public estates 
also exert some degree of market power. This might arise from the inefficiency condition 
of the public estates.  Haskel and Sanchis (1995) suggest that pure profit maximising 
leads the private companies to successfully bargaining for a higher effort from their 
workers, and thus gaining higher efficiency. In contrast, having broader social 
objectives—including the welfare of its workers—the public estates do not bargain for 
                                                 
26 For the model, the non-constant marginal cost stems from the quadratic adjustment cost.  
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such high levels of efforts from its workers, which leads to a reduction in efficiency. To 
address this problem, the Indonesian government has made a long term plan to privatise 
some of the public estates which may potentially increase productivity and efficiency of 
the estates.  
 
On one hand, privatisation is often considered as the ‘no market failures’ solution 
(Capuano and de Feo 2006, p. 5). On the other hand, de Fraja (1991) argues that a more 
efficient firm does not necessarily improve the efficiency of the industry. If each firm has 
an ability to influence market price, the profit maximisation objective might not only lead 
to higher efficiency, but could also lead to a reduction in output to gain higher prices. In 
fact, the private companies in the Indonesian palm oil industry appear to be more 
efficient and behave more competitively than the public estates. Therefore, privatisation 
could be an alternative solution in reducing inefficiency and market power problems in 
the Indonesian palm oil industry.  To be more effective, this needs to be supported by 
introducing a more competitive condition, which could be achieved by at least two ways 
(Haskel and Sachis 1995, p. 303). First, this could be achieved by reducing barriers to 
entry coming from the high level of investment requirement for new entrants in the 
Indonesian palm oil industry.  Second, with a significant and increase trend in market 
share, developing an effective smallholders’ organization might lead them to be an 
influential strategic group, and to enhance the market competitiveness.  
 
 
6.5 Limitations of the study and future research 
 
Despite the increasing concern about market power in the Indonesian palm oil industry, 
no previous study appears to have been addressed this significant issue. This study is the 
first to model and measure market power in the Indonesian palm oil industry. In 
particular, it attempts to see whether or not dominant groups in this industry—namely, 
the public estates and the private companies groups—exert some degree of market power, 
and to study the nature of interaction between these groups. The findings show that both 
public estates and private companies do exert some degree of market power.  
Interestingly, public estates appear to have even higher market power. These findings are 
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potentially useful in providing information for policy makers. Intuitive policies based on 
the assumption of perfect competition are unlikely to have the desired effect in 
imperfectly competitive markets. However, it is important to note that the findings of the 
study suffer from low probability and high numerical standard errors.   
 
There are a number of reasons why this might be the case.  First, there might be a data 
problem. Due to the lack of data, the adjustment system was estimated using group level 
data. This may not apply to the public estates group, as the CPO produced by its members 
is sold through the Joint Marketing Office. However, there is no clear information about 
the interactions among companies of the private group. In addition, the absence of some 
important data leads to a high rate of rejection of satisfying the convexity and market 
power index properties. For example, by failing to include subsidy data, price–cost 
margins of the public estates and private companies appear to have some negative values, 
leading to frequent rejections in the market power index property.  As a matter of fact, the 
margins might either be zero if all the differences between price and costs were covered 
by the subsidies, or positive if the subsidies were greater than the costs. Therefore, a 
richer data set in the future could potentially improve the estimation results.   
 
Second, there might be an estimation problem. The multivariate t-pdf with four degrees 
of freedom was used to generate the replications of the parameters in question. Four 
degrees of freedom were chosen to ensure that the tail of the multivariate t-pdf was thick 
enough to cover most, if not the entire, range of the actual posterior distribution.  
Actually, the posterior pdf appears to skew to the left and to have a very long tail. This 
makes the ratio between the multivariate t and posterior pdfs extremely large and hence 
increases the numerical standard errors. Using the assumption of an asymptotically 
normal distribution, the estimation is more focused on the central regions of the density 
function.  However, the tail cannot be considered as less important because replications 
that satisfy the properties are located in this region. Therefore, future research that covers 
the tail regions is needed.   
 
Finally, there might also be a minor modelling problem. Due to the indivisibility of inputs 
and discontinuity of adjustments, the model is found to be limited to a convex adjustment 
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costs structure.  This has an important implication for the estimation of the market power 
index.  In particular, it makes the estimation of the market power index possible, even 
without using the cost function (see Chapter 4 for details). Adda and Cooper (2001) 
suggest a more general adjustment structure by allowing the adjustment cost parameter to 
vary.  However, such an approach might be difficult to apply to a model that uses a 
constant adjustment cost parameter to calculate the market power index. Thus, future 
research that explores more flexible structures could provide further insights into 
modelling market power in the Indonesian palm oil industry.   
 
 
6.6 Concluding comments 
 
The increase in market share and vertical control in the Indonesian palm oil industry has 
given rise to concern about market power exercised by private producers in this industry. 
Despite its significant market share and apparent vertical integration, the public estates 
are often assumed to behave competitively and to maximise social welfare. Therefore, the 
existence of the public estates in this industry is expected to suppress the market power of 
the private companies.  Many government interventions were undertaken based on these 
assumptions.  In fact, the public estates enjoy some degree of market power. As a result, 
government interventions, in general, are unlikely to have the desired effect.  
 
However, to determine whether a firm exercise market power or not is not always easy 
and practical. Although the price–(marginal) cost margin has been broadly accepted as a 
measure of market power, it is often not conducive to apply. The main practical obstacle 
is to determine firms’ marginal cost.  Hence, courts and policy makers in Indonesia often 
use other proxies—such as market share—to identify market power. Although this might 
be more practical, the results often appear to be problematic and   misleading.27  In 
contrast, using an appropriate market model might reveal more reliable information about 
a firm’s behaviour in the industry, including that emerged from a non-cooperative 
mechanism. The information about the firms’ behaviour would be useful for promoting 
                                                 
27 See the SCP critiques in Chapter 3. 
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competition in the Indonesian CPO industry, as well as other industries. As indicated, the 
consequence is expected to be significant because of the importance of this industry.  
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